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MEN WHO HAVE MADE THE NEW
GERMAN EMPIRE.



MEN WHO HAVE MADE THE NEW GERMAN EMPIRE.

A SERIES OF

BRIEF BIOGRAPHIC SKETCHES.

BY

G. L. M. STRAUSS.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOLUME II.


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ERRATA TO VOL. II.

Page	5,	line 12 from the bottom,	for "Fræbel,"	read "Fröbel."
"	6,	" 1	"	" for "superior," read "chiefs."
"	7,	" 10	"	top, <i>dele</i> "of."
"	26,	" 13	"	" for "Emperor," read "Emperors."
"	"	" 15	"	" after "Nürnberg," <i>dele</i> "."
"	"	" 8	"	bottom, <i>before</i> "1218" and "1230," <i>insert</i> "d."
"	40,	" 6	"	top, for "Prittnitz," read "Prittwitz."
"	43,	" 9	"	" for "Elberfeldes," read "Elberfelder "
"	49,	" 13	"	bottom, for "100.000," read "130,000."
"	51,	" 8	"	top, after "Austrian," <i>insert</i> "corps."
"	59,	" 11	"	bottom, for "pieces," read "guns."
"	65,	" 12	"	" after "July," <i>insert</i> " ,."
"	69,	" 14 & 15	"	top, for "considerable," read "numerous."
"	80,	" 1	"	bottom, for "delight in," read "predilection."
"	83,	" 3	"	" for "was formed," read "sprung up."
"	85,	" 13	"	top, for "chances," read "chance."
"	94,	" 14	"	top, and in other places, for "Colin," read "Kolin."
"	112,	" 1	"	" for "Amelia," read "Amalia."
"	115,	" 14	"	" for "present," read "late."
"	131,	" 3	"	" for "in through," read "through in."
"	150,	" 8	"	" for "healthy," read "hale."
"	172,	" 12	"	" for "unsoldierly," read "suddenly."
"	177,	" 8	"	" after "placed," <i>dele</i> "in."
"	179,	" 8	"	" after "was," <i>dele</i> "to be."
"	184,	" 3	"	" for "orders," read "order."

lead us too far. Suffice it just to hint, that the motives which induced the German government to insist upon the project of law being carried intact as proposed, and as a permanent and not merely a triennial or quinquennial measure, lay much deeper

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MEN WHO HAVE MADE THE NEW GERMAN EMPIRE.

EDWARD LASKER.

THE leader of the most important section of the great National-Liberal party in the German Reichstag, upon whose decision seemed to hinge some time back the momentous question of a possible renewal of the old conflict between crown and parliament, so happily terminated on a former occasion by the indemnity vote given in 1866, occupies such a prominent position just now in German and, indeed, in European politics, that a few facts and notes anent the man and his career will not be out of place.

There is no need here to discuss the great question of the German Army Bill. Such a discussion would lead us too far. Suffice it just to hint, that the motives which induced the German government to insist upon the project of law being carried intact as proposed, and as a permanent and not merely a triennial or quinquennial measure, lay much deeper

than was apparent on the outside. Moltke had been compelled to put forward what has been termed the "French plea" as the chief, if not the sole, cause of the necessity of the new Army Bill. *He* could not well be expected, under the circumstances, to hint at possible hostile coalitions against the German empire. But the Emperor William, the great chancellor, Moltke, and the other military advisers of the crown were painfully conscious of the probability, rather than the simple possibility, of certain by no means distant contingencies that might be expected to try and test to the utmost stretch all the vigour and resources of the new empire.

Had Bismarck been able to plead the cause of government personally before the Reichstag, there can barely be a doubt but he would have fully succeeded in carrying with him the votes of the National-Liberals and the more reasonable of the progressists. Unhappily, the chancellor's illness had thrown the entire machinery out of gear. When Atlas bends, however slightly, the burthen he carries must necessarily begin to oscillate.

It was not very surprising, then, that Lasker, who before 1866 was himself one of the most advanced and uncompromising progressists, should dislike to grant the government such an extensive vote of confidence as was implied in the Army Bill, especially in the absence of the all-conquering influence of the sole supreme chief of that government.

The vile suggestion which has been thrown out in some quarters, that disappointed ambition had something to do with Lasker's reluctance to vote the Army Bill, must be repudiated with scorn. Lasker is the last man in the world to be guided by unworthy motives. The matter is happily settled now. There is reason to believe that the "septennial" compromise was first suggested to Bismarck by Lasker.

It was in August, 1866, that the writer had the pleasure of meeting M. Lasker for the first time. It was at Baron Keudell's office we met, where Professor Tellkampff, member of the Prussian House of Lords for the University of Breslau, kindly introduced me to a small, rather insignificant-looking gentleman of unmistakable Hebrew cast of countenance, with delicate features, fine, intelligent eyes, and high, thoughtful brow. This was Lasker. Although only in his thirty-seventh year at the time, his dark hair began to show slight tinges of grey. After listening for half an hour or so to the charms of his marvellous eloquence, there remained no longer the least trace of insignificance about the man in my eyes. He stood fully revealed to me as a giant in intellect, power, and aspirations.

Edward Lasker was born on the 14th of October, 1829, in the small township of Jarocin, near the Polish frontier. He was one of a rather numerous family. His father, a Hebrew merchant in a small, way of business, justly enjoyed a high reputation for

integrity. His mother, an excellent woman, gifted with much natural shrewdness, bestowed the utmost care upon the moral training of her children. A young Hebrew teacher was engaged as house tutor to the children, to teach them the Hebrew language and the Talmud and other sacred books of the Jews.

Little Edward made very rapid progress in his educational course. He was barely eight years old when he agreeably surprised his parents and his tutor with a really meritorious Hebrew translation of one of Schiller's poems.

In his fourteenth year he had the misfortune to lose his beloved mother. Soon after this sad loss his father sent him, together with his elder brother, to Breslau, to enter the gymnasium there, where he was admitted to the fourth form.

He here bestowed upon the acquisition of Latin and Greek the same untiring zeal and unwearying diligence with which he had studied Hebrew, and so rapid was his progress in learning that the fastest permitted routine advance from class to class was much too slow for him. So he left the gymnasium, resolved to prepare himself by private study for the severe examination to be passed by young men who wish to enter a Prussian university as students. Had he continued to pursue his career at the gymnasium, it would have taken him till the age of nineteen before routine would have allowed him to show that he was ripe for the University. But the young

enthusiast passed brilliantly at the age of seventeen and a half, thus gaining a clear saving of eighteen precious months of the best part of his life.

He had at first intended to study medicine, but his father for some reason objected, and, obedient to the paternal wish, he turned his chief attention to mathematics instead. This was in the year 1847.

Like most young students of the period, Edward Lasker was an ardent and enthusiastic Liberal. He joined the Burschenschaft. The great events of 1848 stirred him to his inmost depths. In October of that *annus mirabilis* he went to Vienna to hear the lectures of the famous Professor Endlicher. These were the sad times when the unhappy city of Vienna was besieged by Windischgrätz with overwhelming forces, and defended by a mere handful of brave men under Bem, Franck, Messenhauser, Robert Blum, Julius Fräbel, and a few more stanch champions of freedom. Edward Lasker threw himself heart and soul into the cause: he joined the famous academic legion, and narrowly escaped sharing the fate of Robert Blum, who was basely and cowardly murdered by Windischgrätz on the morning of the 9th of November, 1848.

Lasker, with his clear head, soon understood that revolutionary risings, such as those of Berlin, Vienna, and other German cities, were not exactly calculated to promote the great cause of true liberty and rational progress. He withdrew from political agitation and

devoted himself with all the energy of his character to the study of the law. In less than eighteen months he was ready to pass his first examination as auscultator (the first step, by the by, in Bismarck's career), and less than two years after (in 1852) he brilliantly passed his final state examination.

At this period of his career he had the grievous misfortune to lose his beloved and revered father. He sought solace for his deep grief in foreign travel, and came to England.

Here he was powerfully attracted by the social and political life of the nation. He found firmly established here that constitutional liberty which formed the object of his most ardent aspirations, and he resolved to make the institutions of this favoured land the subject of a searching study. He remained in England nearly three years and a half. It is not too much to say, that there is hardly another German to be found who can justly boast of anything even remotely approaching the profound and absolute knowledge of England and everything English which Edward Lasker possesses.

In 1856 he returned to Prussia, and re-entered the service of the state. Of course he had to begin again on the lowest steps of the ladder. In 1858 he obtained the appointment of assessor at the Berlin City Court, where the heaviest and most complicated affairs were constantly thrown on his shoulders, as his superior had soon discovered his singular abilities

and his marvellous working energy and endurance. He cheerfully bore the burthen of all these arduous labours, although his office was a mere titular one in a pecuniary sense, and though he was quite aware of how little chance of promotion and lucrative employment there was for him—the Jew Lasker. I shall have occasion to return to this point to show that there are still powerful social and religious prejudices of which the enlightened Germans will have to get rid of before they can justly claim to rank among the most civilized nations.

When Prince William was named regent, and the wretched rule of Frederick William IV. and Elizabeth was thus brought to a close, Lasker again began to occupy himself earnestly with political questions. He wrote some of the most remarkable political papers of the day. In an article from his pen, which appeared in *Oppenheim's Political and Literary Annual* for the year 1861, under the title “The Powers of the Police and the Protection of the Law,” he severely and caustically castigates the monstrous principle of the Prussian law of the 11th of May, 1842, which refers all complaints against police officers for abuse of power and excess of duty to the decision of the police authorities themselves whose officers are complained against !

“England,” Lasker says in this paper, “has attained to mighty power, not on account of her insular position, not by the strength of her wide commercial

connections ; not, as is sometimes said by those who do not think deeply upon the matter, despite of the narrow legality within which her movements are confined, but by the very force of that narrow legality, that absolute supremacy of the law. It is this absolute supremacy of the law which has made England great, and which has bestowed true freedom upon her. The certainty of finding protection in the law of the land against all attempts to commit arbitrary acts inspires the English citizen with that noble self-consciousness and self-reliance which more excites the envy of the sensible continental citizen than the wealth and the many other advantages possessed by England. This proud self-consciousness and self-reliance constitute the chief source of the Englishman's energy of thought and action, of his prosperity, of his active participation in the political life of the nation, of his cheerful willingness to bear his share of the national burthens, of his moderation, of the power of the state, and of the undisturbed order which reigns through the land."

High praise this, indeed ; a pity the picture should be so glaringly overdrawn and overcoloured. There is, however, some excuse for Lasker's somewhat extravagant praise. At the time when he penned this marvellous panegyric upon the supremacy of law and justice in England, and the total absence of all arbitrary will and power in this highly-favoured country, the Tichborne trial and its sad lessons lay

still buried in the womb of the future. Now of course we know better.

Lasker soon became renowned as one of the most eminent political writers of the day. In every article from his pen it was clearly apparent that he had thoroughly mastered the subject he was writing upon. His clear exposition, lucid diction, and nervous style gave even to his lightest and most fugitive papers the character of political essays of the highest order.

All this time the great writer continued in his humble office of assessor, without pay, to the Berlin City Court. Being a man of singularly simple and frugal habits, he has always found it easy to defray the expenses of his living, &c., out of the proceeds of his literary labours and his chamber practice as a jurisconsult. Had he ever felt disposed to turn his immense talents and knowledge and his indefatigable working powers to profitable account in the manner of so many of his contemporaries, he might easily have acquired wealth. But Lasker is cast in an antique mould: the eager pursuit of wealth has no charms for him; he freely gives his best services to his country and his fellow-men with rare disinterestedness.

If I mistake not he is still a bachelor. He is of a most amiable temper and most affectionate disposition; children more especially he loves dearly. I do not know whether he still continues to lodge

with his old landlord and landlady, with whom he lived for years in the third story of a most unpretending mansion, and whom he followed to even more modest quarters when the unconscionable rise of rents in Berlin compelled them to "move on ;" but I should believe so.

In 1862, if I mistake not, Lasker became a member of the Berlin Press Union, also of the great Berlin Workmen's Union, where he soon took a leading part as a public lecturer on the subjects most interesting to working men.

When the great conflict between crown and parliament was raging, Lasker treated the constitutional and budget questions in a series of papers, published in the "German annuals," which excited universal attention and made the great Liberal and Progressist party anxious to secure the writer for one of their champions in parliament.

This was, however, much more easily conceived to be a most desirable thing to do than to be carried into effect. There was a formidable obstacle in the path—the same obstacle, in fact, which opposed itself to Lasker's promotion in the legal profession, of which he yet was universally admitted to be one of the brightest ornaments. As has already been mentioned, Lasker is a Jew.

Here in England, where we have only recently bestowed the second highest equity office in the land upon a Jew gentleman, who, be it said without dis-

paragement of his legal attainments, cannot possibly claim comparison with such a giant of the law as Lasker is, we can barely conceive that Germany should still lag so far behind in true civilization and enlightenment as to be actually capable of tabooing for years one of her greatest men simply and solely because he claims descent from the ancient Chaldean warrior princes of Palestine, and holds fast by the faith of his fathers.

There are a great many most excellent institutions and customs in Germany, more particularly in Prussia; but it must be confessed that there are also a great many glaring abuses and defects blotting the political and social system of the land; and this extremely stupid professed prejudice against Jews is assuredly one of the most glaring of these blots.

When King Frederick William III. appealed to his people in 1813, his Jewish subjects obeyed the call with the same alacrity as the followers of Christ, and fought as bravely and as well.

A few years after, in 1817, a Jew, bearing the unmistakable name of Joshua Aaron, who had greatly distinguished himself in the war of liberation, and who felt strong within him the fierce spirit of his illustrious ancestors, presented himself before the examination commission with a modest request to allow him to pass his examination for an officer's commission in the army.

Lieutenant-General von Holtzendorff, the president

of the commission, stood literally aghast at the Jew's impertinence. He rushed incontinently into the king's presence to shock his majesty's reformed Christian ears with the dire report. What! a Jew wanting to be an officer in his majesty's forces! The thought was madness. The horrified monarch at once issued an order sternly prohibiting the children of Israel from daring to repeat Joshua Aaron's bold experiment.

This was some sixty years ago, you will perhaps say, and does not apply to the present time. Well, some fourteen years ago, if my memory serves me right, General Steinmetz, who is now a field-marshal, obtained a somewhat unenviable notoriety by issuing an order forbidding certain classes of men, Jews among the number, to apply for officers' commissions in his division. I remember the case very well, because poor Otto Hagen, the then editor of the *Insterburger Zeitung*, got into sore trouble for publishing the obnoxious order in his paper; for Steinmetz, having performed his good and heroic deed in secret, blushed to find it fame, and came down heavily upon the poor journalist for his indiscretion.

At last, on the 3rd of July, 1869, a kind of Bill of Rights and removal of religious and other disabilities was passed, which, one would certainly have supposed, ought to have rendered impossible the repetition of such foolish tricks as those played by Steinmetz

and Holtzendorff. But *volenti nil difficile*: when a fool has made up his foolish mind to perpetrate an act of folly he is safe to succeed in his purpose.

A Jewish gentleman, named Gottfried Hirsch, having duly passed his examination, entered the Prussian army in 1866 as a one-year volunteer. He was present at the battle of Sadowa and Chlum, where he distinguished himself by his cool bravery. He served at the time in the famous division of General Fransecky, to whose heroic endurance the success of the day was mainly due. Well, in 1870 Gottfried Hirsch was called out again, and again he fought bravely throughout the campaign, but especially in the desperate encounter before Belfort, where General Werder gained his well-earned laurels. Gottfried Hirsch aided might and main in achieving the great and glorious result. Indeed, so brilliantly did he distinguish himself that his captain and his major, both of them Christian gentlemen, warmly recommended the brave sub-officer for a commission.

But if they expected to see Gottfried Hirsch soon one of themselves, and if the man Gottfried Hirsch himself indulged in the flattering thought, they calculated without their divisional commander, one Herr von Debschütz, who felt as horrified as Holtzendorff had felt of old at the audacious presumption of a Jew wanting to be an officer!

This excellent Herr von Debschütz accordingly

sent back an indignant refusal to sanction the major's and the captain's recommendation, accompanied by a remarkably stiff official intimation, that he must beg never to be troubled again with recommendations of Jews for officers' commissions !

So Gottfried Hirsch, who, to say the least of it, had certainly distinguished himself quite as much as the sublime Debschütz, whose name most likely would never have been handed down to fame but for this curious little episode, had to take his leave in his old non-commissioned capacity, the stupid divisional commander being left untouched and unproved, because poor old Roon, with all his brilliant attainments, and despite his real greatness, happened to be just as brimful of foolish class prejudice as Debschütz himself ; and Bismarck, with a multitude of hornets swarming and buzzing about his ears, of course felt reluctant to put his fingers into another nest of the interesting insects. Well, luckily, Roon is gone at last, and Kamecke is said to be pretty free from his predecessor's foibles.

Still, such men as Holtzendorff, Steinmetz, Debschütz, Roon, and others of the same stamp, might plead inveterate class prejudice in extenuation of their ridiculous conduct. But what can possibly be urged in excuse of the so-called Ultra-Liberal electors in Prussia, who for a long time declined admitting the candidature of Edward Lasker, pleading that they must draw the line somewhere ; and that they

sincerely believed they ought to draw it at Jews! And, mark, not alone the provincial liberal constituencies acted upon this almost incredibly stupid notion, but the most highly intelligent first electoral district of Berlin, the capital of intelligence, where only the most advanced champions of progress ever have a chance of election, repeatedly rejected Lasker the Jew for infinitely smaller men of the Christian persuasion. Yet many of the electors of this first district would be angry indeed if their freedom from all religious prejudice and superstitious taint were called in question.

So it was only in March, 1865, when Professor Temme resigned his seat in the Prussian parliament, that Edward Lasker was at last chosen to represent the fourth electoral district of Berlin.

On the 27th of March, 1865, the newly elected deputy delivered his maiden speech. It was late in the afternoon, and the house was more than tired—in fact, completely knocked up. Parliamentary practice had not then of course polished Lasker's organ and attuned it to the sensitive ears of his hearers; there was, it is said, even a little of the Jew dialect in his enunciation. No wonder, then, that the maiden speech, like our own Disraeli's, turned out anything but a success.

Yet, strange to say, within a few brief months after, Edward Lasker had overcome all drawbacks, and the members of the house were placed in a position to

freely and ungrudgingly admire the marvellously clear intellect and the amazing extent of knowledge of the new representative of the fourth electoral district of Berlin. Lasker had of course joined the Progressists, and he fought his first great battles under the venerable Waldeck, the supreme leader of that fraction of the house.

With his clear head and lucid understanding, Edward Lasker soon discovered that the Progressists, with all their sincere honesty of purpose and their undoubted high talents, were too closely wedded to party prejudices and crotchets ever to lay down a thoroughly intelligible and practical programme, and to carry it out. So when, after the great events of 1866, the first electoral district of Berlin sent him at last into the new parliament, he seceded from the Progressist fraction and became one of the chief founders and leaders of the National Liberal party, to which he continues to belong.

His secession from the Progressists, and his open declaration that the passing of the constitution of the North German Confederation was of paramount importance, and ought to override all party considerations, cost him the confidence of his constituents. However, this was a matter of very little importance to him, as there were now plenty of constituencies only too happy to secure the Jew Lasker for their representative.

From that time forward it may be truthfully said

that no law of any importance, touching either the Prussian kingdom, the North German Confederation, or the German empire, has been passed that does not bear the stamp of Lasker's mind. The great tribune has, ever since 1866, honestly endeavoured to give the chancellor of the North German Confederation and of the German empire his most powerful support.

In the early part of last year Edward Lasker rendered one of the most signal services to his country by laying bare with a firm and unsparing hand the cancer of corruption in the Ministry of Commerce, that was threatening to eat into the very heart of the official machinery of the state in Prussia. It would have been difficult indeed to find another man equally fit for the delicate task, and one so absolutely free from the remotest suspicion of taint as Lasker may honestly claim to be.

Although the Jew has been permitted at last to find his way into parliament, the door of official promotion is still kept jealously closed against him. Yet after the removal of Lippe from the Ministry of Justice, one would have thought Dr. Leonhardt, Lippe's successor, would have been proud to push a man like Lasker. But the great lawyer is still left standing on the lowest steps of the ladder. The city of Berlin, however, has bestowed upon him a somewhat remunerative appointment. The state would seem to find it difficult indeed to get rid of

its anti-Jewish prejudices. It is very true that the late Dr. Stahl, who was a Jew by birth, was permitted to attain high office in the Prussian state ; but then he had Manningized from the ancient faith, and had become a shining light of ultra-orthodox Prussian Protestantism of the most exclusive and intolerant description. So the instance does not apply to Lasker's case.

In 1871 an anecdote was told in Berlin, and was much commented upon at the time, as to how the chancellor on the occasion of one of his meetings with Lasker, having listened with rapt attention to one of the great parliamentarian's lucid disquisitions on a question of the day, had warmly shaken hands with him, saying, "My dear Herr Lasker, decidedly we must be colleagues one of these days." To which Lasker was reported to have replied, "How so, your highness? Can it really be your intention to return once more to the noble profession of the law?" What might have seemed a joke then, may, perchance, now ere long acquire the substantial proportions of a reality. It is well known that Bismarck is entirely free from the narrow prejudices of his class. Lasker certainly would make a very good minister of justice, or, better still, an excellent home secretary.

In 1872, if my memory serves me right, the Law Faculty of the University of Leipzig bestowed the diploma of Honorary Doctor of Laws upon Edward Lasker.

V.

FIELD-MARSHAL VON WRANGEL.

IN the memoir of Bismarck, mention has been made of a certain illuminated transparent scroll, seen by the writer in Elberfeld at the celebration of the first anniversary of Sedan, recording the rearing of the “noblest structure of the world’s history,” to wit—the new German empire.

As the foundation pillars of this noble edifice, the scroll recited — Civism, education, industry, intelligence, order, faith, honour, loyalty, patriotism, discipline, duty, endurance, fortitude, active obedience, valour.

It is as the typical representative—the very incarnation, in fact—of many of these high qualities that old Field-Marshal Wrangel finds a place assigned him here among the makers of the new German empire.

Whoever has attentively followed the victorious career of the Prussian armies from 1864 to 1871, and has intelligently endeavoured to trace the effects

back to their causes, cannot but have been struck with the large share which must be assigned in the latter to the ingrained stern discipline, the deep sense of duty, the tenacious endurance and fortitude in doing and suffering, the intelligent, active obedience (so very different from the mere stolid, passive submission to the word of command found in certain other continental armies), which have throughout characterized the Prussian soldier.

Now these high qualities existed in the old Prussian army long before Roon and Prince William had conceived their reorganization plan, which was not indeed intended to create a new soldiering spirit ; but simply contemplated turning to the best and most efficient account the splendid material in that line already abundantly existing, and strenuously and incessantly cultivated many long years by the old school of officers dating from the great liberation war, of whom Field-Marshal Wrangel may fairly be taken as the prototype.

This tough old soldier, Frederick Henry Ernest Count von Wrangel, was born on the 13th of April, 1784, at Stettin, in Pomerania. His education was slightly defective, and although the popular notion is founded in error, that the field-marshal is even very indifferently up in High Dutch, and can express himself with proper fluency only in Pomeranian *patois* and in vernacular Berlin cockney, yet it is said to be very questionable whether he could ever at

any period of his career have passed the mildest competitive examination in any but the rudimentary branches of knowledge.

He certainly forms a curious contrast with such men as Moltke, Roon, Göben, Voigts-Rhetz, Blumenthal, Sperling, Zastrow, Fransecky, Podbielski, Wartenberg, Holleben, and an almost innumerable host of others of the same high class of brilliant attainments.

At the very early age of twelve he entered the military service of his country. However, the regiment of dragoons in which he served was only mobilised after the defeat of Jena, and he was full twenty-three years of age before he had the first opportunity afforded him of fleshing his maiden sword. Of this opportunity he availed himself to such excellent purpose in the campaign of 1807, more particularly in the fight at Heilsberg, that the king bestowed upon him the distinguished military order *pour le mérite*.

This order was originally created under the style and title of *Ordre de la Générosité*, by Margrave Frederick of Brandenburg, afterwards Elector (Frederick III.) and King of Prussia (Frederick I.). It was reorganized in 1740 by King Frederick II., under the style and title of *Ordre pour le Mérite Civil et Militaire*. Subsequently, in 1810, King Frederick William III. reorganized it anew as *Ordre du Mérite Militaire*. Frederick William IV. added

a civil class to it for eminent artists and distinguished men of learning (31st of May, 1842).

After the peace of Tilsit the dragoon regiment in which young Wrangel served was completely re-organized, or, more correctly speaking, two new regiments were formed out of its material. In one of these, the East Prussian Cuirassiers, Wrangel was appointed captain.

In the campaign of 1813, Captain Wrangel did good service at Hainau, Liebertwolkwitz, and Leipzig, for which he was raised to the rank of major.

In 1814 he first assisted in the blockade operations round Luxemburg, then took a prominent share in the hard fighting in February. On the retreat to Etoges he was complimented by Blücher upon the excellent manner in which he had led his regiment and kept his men in hand. He gained honourable distinction also at Laon and Sezanne.

In short, wherever he appeared in the field he showed himself a most valuable and efficient officer; so in April of the same year (1814) he was promoted to a lieutenant-colonelcy, and made commander at the same time of the 2nd West Prussian Regiment of Dragoons.

This new regiment took no part in the campaign of 1815, which was always a very sore point with Wrangel, who used to declare, with comic indignation, that "old Blücher had no business to finish the matter right slick off at Belle Alliance (Waterloo), thereby

depriving a poor fellow of all chance of coming in for his legitimate share of the slashing. He would like to know what old Marshal Forward would have said if he (Wrangel) had played him such a mean trick as that. Why, he would have sworn like a trooper; and so would he (Wrangel), only that he knew he must not, as it was against the rules of the service."

But though Wrangel thus took no part in the campaign of 1815, he was promoted in the same year to the rank of full colonel.

In 1821 he obtained the command of the 10th Cavalry Brigade, and two years after, ere he had reached his fortieth year, he was made major-general.

In 1834 he was appointed commander of the 13th Division. The head-quarters of this division was at Münster, in Westphalia.

Three years after the whole of Rhineland-Westphalia was plunged in sad religious troubles; for it is a grievous error to suppose that there were no difficulties with the Ultramontane clergy in Prussia before the days of Bismarck.

Even as early as 1837, the then Archbishop of Cologne (Droste-Vischering) tried his hand at something like the same game. Messieurs Förster, Krementz, Martin, Ledochowski, and Melchers are now trying their hardest to play against the imperial government, to the greatest possible damage to the

state, and the deepest injury to that very religion in whose name and interest they profess to act.

Frederick William III. was always very stiff in matters touching the supremacy of the crown, and he speedily made the recalcitrant archiepiscopal dignitary feel that he was determined to submit to no *imperium in imperio*, to no self-assumed license on the part of an antagonistic Roman establishment in Protestant Prussia.

The Ultramontanists, who have never yet hesitated to act wherever practicable upon the beautiful Jesuit maxim, that where the end may seem good and desirable, all means conducive to that end are equally allowable, did their worst to support the archbishop's falling cause by the argument of religious disturbance and riot in Rhineland-Westphalia.

General Wrangel's position at Münster was one of very considerable difficulty, which required equally delicate and energetic handling. He showed himself fully up to the occasion, however, and managed to keep the province under his especial guardianship in most excellent order.

It is said that he sent for the dignitaries of the Roman Church in Westphalia, more especially in Münster, and that he addressed these gentlemen in very good and unmistakably plain and intelligible High Dutch, telling them that he should hold them, collectively and individually, personally responsible for all popular disturbances that should require the strong

hand to put them down. He was not going to shoot down an ignorant, priest-excited, and misguided fanatical mob in the streets of Münster, or elsewhere ; but he would, with inexorable severity and unwavering firmness, strike down the priestly plotters and wire-pullers who were directing the moves of the pawns in the game. He assured them that he would be as good as his word, and they wisely believing him, the dreaded troubles were nipped in the bud.

It was partly to reward him for the signal services he had rendered the crown in this emergency that Wrangel was made lieutenant-general in 1838.

The year after, he was appointed to the command of the 1st Army Corps at Königsberg, in Prussia. Here his military bluntness, it would appear, led to a clash with some of the high authorities of the province, which induced the government to transfer him to the command of the 2nd Army Corps at his own native city of Stettin.

In autumn, 1842, he commanded the evolutions of fifty-six squadrons of cavalry, with thirty-two guns, which took place near Berlin, before the late Emperor Nicholas of Russia, who personally expressed to the general his warmest approbation of the thorough efficiency of the troops under his command. Three years after King Frederick William IV. reviewed the 2nd Army Corps under Wrangel's command. He was so delighted with the splendid appearance of the corps, that he presented Wrangel with the

3rd Regiment of Cuirassiers as a mark of his royal satisfaction.

At the outbreak of the war between Germany and Denmark in 1848, General Wrangel was appointed commander-in-chief of the Prussian and German confederate forces, in which capacity he gained a victory over the Danes at Schleswig on the 23rd of April, 1848. He subsequently invaded Jutland, but the war was conducted languidly by Prussia, and the authorities in Berlin did everything to impede and thwart the military operations in the Elbe Duchies and in Jutland. So Wrangel was glad indeed when he was appointed commander-in-chief in the Marches in September, 1848.

It had at that time become perfectly clear that the revolutionary party, who had so easily succeeded in the spring of the year in overthrowing the old absolutist government, had played their cards badly ever since, and had now finally lost the game ; and the only question was how to triumphantly lead the inevitable reaction back to Berlin without incurring the risk of those deplorable scenes of bloodshed and cruel oppression which, unhappily, but too often attend "victories" of this nature.

The task required a man of proved energy and good sense, with a certain amount of kindly feeling in him.

Wrangel was selected for the post, and a better choice could hardly have been made.

Having carefully made all necessary preparations, and collected a sufficient military force to make the utter futility of attempted resistance perfectly clear to the common sense of all but the most exalted of the revolutionary leaders, the general marched into Berlin on the 9th of November, 1848, proclaiming the state of siege. He speedily restored the authority of the government, without disgracing his name and fame by the establishment of murdering courts-martial and Satory shambles.

For his eminent services on this critical occasion, King Frederick William IV. made him general of cavalry, and conferred upon him, in addition to his command in the Marches, also the command-in-chief of the 3rd Army Corps.

In 1856 General Wrangel celebrated the sixtieth anniversary of his service in the Prussian army, on which occasion he was raised to the highest military rank of field-marshal (15th of August). The honour thus conferred was the more distinguished, as Field-Marshal Wrangel was then the only officer of that highest rank in the Prussian army (Prince Charles, the king's brother, was Master-General of the Ordnance, and Prince William, the present German emperor, was Colonel-General of Infantry, two high military charges held to rank equal with the field-marshalate).

In 1864, when the war broke out between Austria and Prussia and Denmark, Wrangel, then eighty years old, took the command of the allied Prussian

and Austrian forces. He retained it till after the storming of Düppel, when he asked to retire on account of his great age. He had, in fact, originally accepted the proffered command with reluctance ; but these were the days when venerable age was still, occasionally at least, thought an indispensable condition in a commander of the forces in the field.

The subjoined historic reminiscence may serve to show how far this strange notion was occasionally carried :—

In 1813, when the question was mooted of appointing General Blücher to the command of the Silesian army, there were objections urged on the king from all sides against the proposed appointment, some declaring the general to be a man of oversanguine disposition, and much given to boldness, bordering dangerously on temerity ; others that he was too old and too cautious (!), and too much given to act upon the advice of others. But the strangest objection urged against him certainly was, that he was too young, the general being about seventy-one at the time.

Old Field-Marshal Möllendorf, a veteran then nigh upon ninety years old, felt particularly sore upon the excessive juvenility of General Blücher. "Sir!" he exclaimed to a high officer with whom he was discussing the appointment, then just completed, of the general to the command of the Silesian army—"Sir! the service is going to the dogs—to the dogs,

sir, I say. What but defeat and disgrace can be expected in the field when they intrust high command to a mere youth like Blücher?"

It must be admitted, however, that in stiff old Möllendorf's notion General Blücher had at the time only had twenty-six years' service in the army. Captain Blücher had been passed over in a promotion by Frederick II., a younger and by no means a meritorious officer having, thanks to his powerful family influence, been made major over Blücher's head. This had led to the fiery captain's resignation of his commission (in 1772); and it was only in 1787 that Frederick II.'s successor, Frederick William II., succeeded in inducing Blücher to re-enter the service as major.

In the instance of the Dano-German war, moreover, Wrangel was the only officer whose appointment to the chief command would not be likely to rouse international jealousies and heartburnings between the allies.

With his resignation of the command of the allied forces in the Elbe Duchies, Field-Marshal von Wrangel, though still nominally retaining his seat in the state council and the chief command in the Marches, with the governorship of Berlin, may be said to have retired from the political and military stage, but certainly not from the busy scenes of active life, in which even now, with the snow of ninety winters upon his brow, he is found to the fore.

In 1866, when the war between Prussia and the Austro-German coalition broke out, nothing would satisfy the old man but he must accompany the army to the field—as a volunteer !

The writer remembers having seen the green old man on one occasion at Nachod, in the military hospital, where he was dispensing kind words of sympathy and encouragement, and trifling money gifts to the unhappy wounded.

The writer saw him again on the 20th of September, the day of the triumphant entry of the Prussian army into Berlin, high on horse, firm in the saddle, riding with the nerve and skill of an accomplished young cavalier, and gallantly blowing kisses to every pretty girl his lively eyes could espy in his ride along the Linden.

And five years after, in 1871, the well-nigh nonagenarian was still to the fore, on horseback, and still gallantly blowing kisses !

In January, 1872, the late Count Bernstorff, then German ambassador to the Court of St. James's, made a temporary stay at Berlin, where he had taken up his quarters at the Hôtel Royal. Here the old field-marshal paid the count a friendly visit. He came on foot. It was one of the coldest winter days—something like twenty degrees of cold. Yet there the old man was in his thin military undress coat, without great-coat or wrapper about him, and with his spiked helmet, which must really begin

to weigh heavy upon his head, tightly fixed on as usual.

The day after, he went to visit the crown prince, this time in an open carriage, in which he might be seen sitting stiff and grim, with the same scanty protection against the cold as the day before, yet apparently not the least heeding the cutting, icy wind blowing right through him!

His last public appearance was at the funeral of the late Queen Dowager Elizabeth, when he is said to have looked just the least little bit shaky, but for all that, likely to live long enough to add another instance in confutation of the anti-centenarian theory.

Field-Marshal Wrangel is Knight and Chancellor of the Order of the Black Eagle in brilliants, Knight of the Order of St. John, of the *Ordre pour le Mérite*, and a heap of others too numerous to mention; Chief of the East Prussian Cuirassier Regiment, No. 3, and of the Brandenburg Fusilier Regiment, No. 35; proprietor of the Imperial and Royal Austrian 2nd Regiment of Dragoons, and of the Imperial Russian 33rd Infantry Regiment. He had only one son, Frederick, born in 1821, who died in 1867, leaving an only son behind, Gustavus von Wrangel, born the 21st of October, 1847, who is now an officer in the Prussian army.

On the 13th of April last, Field-Marshal Wrangel celebrated his *ninetieth* birthday, when he is reported

to have looked as green and as jolly as ever. The emperor and empress, the crown prince, and all the princes of the royal house, the ministers, &c., and the municipal council of the city of Berlin sent their hearty congratulations to the veteran. Observing that one of the members of the municipal council, who came with the burgomaster to present the congratulations of the city, did not look quite well, "My dear sir," said green old ninety, "you must take care of yourself. I hope you will be in better trim when you are deputed again next year upon the same pleasant errand to me,"—taking it as a matter of course that he would have to be congratulated upon his ninety-first birthday! Where does the old man intend to stop?

VI.

**THE CROWN PRINCE OF PRUSSIA AND
GERMANY.**

THE arduous and perilous match for the great "German Unity" stakes had to be played chiefly on the battle-field. At least two out of the three great military powers of Europe had to be overthrown by Prussia and cleared off the ground ere the foundations of the new German empire could be securely laid. The accomplishment of this feat required the highest military leadership.

Now Prussia had, indeed, an almost incalculable advantage on her side in the stupendous struggles with Austria and France, in the possession of the greatest military strategist the world has ever yet seen. Still, this was not of itself sufficient to secure victory to her arms. War nowadays is a game of the nicest combination—every possible contingency had to be foreseen and provided for, and it is indispensable to be equally armed at all points.

The supreme chief and leader of the host may be a strategist of transcendent genius, yet to secure the

success of his plans he requires the support of a sufficient number of sub-leaders of the highest tactical ability. Failure on the part of even only one of the sub-leaders may seriously compromise, if not altogether imperil, the whole plan of campaign.

The defeats of Oudinot and Ney at Grossbeeren and Dennewitz more than counterbalanced Napoleon's half-victories of Bautzen and Lützen—Macdonald's defeat at the Katzbach overthrew all the emperor's ingenious combinations. Vandamme's blunder at Kulm made Napoleon lose all the prospective brilliant fruits of his great victory at Dresden over Schwarzenberg, and Marmont and Macdonald's failure at Möckern decided the defeat of the French at Leipzig.

Moltke has enjoyed, in his two great campaigns, the singular—one would almost be tempted to say the phenomenal—good luck of being supported throughout by military commanders of the highest ability, who always thoroughly understood their instructions, and knew how to carry them out most effectively. Indeed, with the single exception of Bonin's blundering at Trautenau, the work intrusted to the tactical leaders of the Prussian and German host in the Austro- and Franco-German campaigns of 1866 and 1870-71 was neatly and cleverly done throughout, though partial failure might perhaps be imputed alone to Herwarth von Bittenfeld and Manteuffel. The tactical leaders of the Prussian and German armies in the two great wars are therefore justly entitled to

claim a place among the men who have made the new German empire. The principal of these leaders are the Crown Prince of Prussia and Germany, Prince Frederick Charles, King Albert of Saxony, General Vogel von Falckenstein, Field-Marshal Herwarth von Bittenfeld, Steinmetz, and Manteuffel, General von der Tann, and Generals von Göben and Werder.

First and foremost among these ranks the Crown Prince of Prussia and Germany, not because he happens to be the heir apparent of the Emperor William, but simply because he is really the greatest and most genial of the German generals—with the single exception, perhaps, of the great Vogel von Falckenstein, who affords a most rare combination of the highest strategic genius with the highest tactical ability.

The house of Hohenzollern is one of the oldest and most renowned houses in Europe. The Hohenzollerns trace their origin back to the end of the eighth century, when, as family tradition avers, Count Thassilo, one of the Suabian magnates of the time, built the strong castle of Zolre, upon the summit of the Zolrenberg or Zollernberg, which lies about an English mile south of the present town of Hechingen. The Zollernberg rises 2,663 feet above the level of the sea, and about 900 feet above the level of the city of Hechingen. One tradition, as just now mentioned, attributes the building of the castle to Count Thassilo; another tradition, which may claim a safer foundation, says

the castle was erected in the eleventh century. The old chapel of St. Michael, which exists to the present day, forming part of the castle, belongs to the style of architecture of that century. In fact, it was in the eleventh century that the Counts of Zolre were first heard of in history.

Burchard and Wenceslas of Zolre were slain in 1061, in the troubles which distracted poor Germany during the minority of Henry IV. From Burchard descended Frederick I. of Zolre, who was the ancestor of the first Zollern Burgraves of Nürnberg. Frederick III. of Zolre was one of the most intimate friends and councillors of the Emperor Barbarossa and Henry VI. He espoused Sophy of Rätz, daughter of Conrad, last Burgrave of Nürnberg, of the Austrian family of Rätz. Sophy brought her husband, besides the burgraveship, the rich allodial possessions of the Rätz family in Austria and in Franconia. As Burgrave of Nürnberg this Frederick III. is called Frederick I. In the old documents of the period he figures first as burgrave on the 8th of July, 1192. He left two sons, Frederick II. (1218) and Conrad I. (1230), who, according to the custom of these old times, enjoyed their paternal estates in common, and were both of them jointly Counts of Zolre and Burgraves of Nürnberg. It was only eight years after Frederick's death, in 1226, that Conrad divided the estates with his nephew.

There were now two distinct lines of Zollern, the

Suabian and the Franconian. Conrad, of the Franconian line, was the first Zollern who styled himself simply Burgrave of Nürnberg. His son, Frederick III., married Elizabeth, one of the allodial heiresses of the last Count of Meran, who brought her husband the greater portion of the Meran estates, more particularly Baireuth, with its rich mines.

From the earliest times of their known history the Zollerns have been famous for their frugal lives and their wise economy. Frederick III. was therefore already possessed of much cash, which the proceeds of the Baireuth mines increased considerably. He was mainly instrumental, in conjunction with Archbishop Werner of Mayence, in placing Rudolph of Hapsburg (Hawksburg) upon the imperial throne of Germany (1273). He was also mainly instrumental in inflicting the crushing defeat of the Marchfield upon the Bohemians and their King Odoaker, or Ottokar (1278). He bore the banner of the empire in this battle. Some historians assert that the Emperor Rudolph had promised to bestow the Austrian Duchies upon him, which the death of Frederick of Austria, basely butchered, together with Conradin of Hohenstaufen, by the monster Charles of Anjou, had rendered vacant.

However this may be, Rudolph thought better of it, and gave fair Austria, with Styria and Carniola, to his own sons, indemnifying the burgrave for the disappointment of his brilliant hopes by bestowing

upon him a considerable number of estates and privileges, to which that wise and far-seeing prince added many more estates, purchased with the fruits of his own and his ancestors' wise economy. He died in 1297. His son and second successor, Frederick IV., continued the same policy. He cleverly used the necessities of the Emperors Albrecht, Henry VII., and Louis the Bavarian, to increase his possessions and strengthen his influence. He bought Ansbach of Count Œttingen, and many other towns, castles, and estates. He was the most powerful dynast in Franconia. Frederick V., called the Conqueror, largely increased the possessions of the Franconian branch of the Hohenzollerns, and prevailed at last upon the Emperor Charles IV. to raise him to the highest dignity of an hereditary prince of the empire. His son, Frederick VI., lent the Emperor Sigismund a large sum of money, for which the emperor gave him the Electorate of Brandenburg, at first in pledge (1411), but a few years after, in 1415, upon a further advance of cash, in full legitimate possession. The purchase-money amounted altogether to 60,000*l.*, a most moderate sum, even making the fullest allowance for the high value of money in the early part of the fifteenth century. As first Elector of Brandenburg of the house of Hohenzollern, Frederick VI., Burgrave of Nürnberg, ranks as Frederick I. He was one of the shrewdest men of the age. Not content with his new acquisition, he

aspired actually to acquire the Electorate of Saxe in addition to it; but so soon as he found the matter more difficult and perilous than he had anticipated he wisely withdrew. After the death of the Emperor Sigismund he put himself forward as a candidate for the imperial throne, with very fair chances of success at first; but when the Archbishop of Mayence began to exert his powerful influence in favour of Albrecht of Austria, the son-in-law of the late emperor, the Elector of Brandenburg gracefully abandoned his pretensions, and spent the money which he had intended to bestow in electoral manœuvres upon the acquisition of a number of additional estates. He died in 1440.

Some eight years after his removal to the banks of the Spree, the old ancestral castle of the Hohenzollerns came to grief. It was taken on the 8th of May, 1423, by the league of the Suabian cities, and was demolished, with the exception of the Chapel of St. Michael. The castle was rebuilt some thirty years after, the foundation stone being laid by Margrave Albrecht of Brandenburg on the 24th of May, 1454. Being considered a point of the greatest strategic importance, it was repeatedly besieged and taken in the course of the Thirty Years' War by the Swedes and by the Würtembergers, and was in the end demolished, with the exception of the chapel. King Frederick William IV., with his mediæval predilections, had the castle rebuilt in the style of the fourteenth century. The famous architect Stüler

designed the plan of the building. It was begun in 1850, and completed in 1855. It is a magnificent royal castle, with five towers, and contains, besides the restored old Catholic chapel, an elegant small Evangelical church. It was strongly fortified by General Prittnitz, and fully armed in 1856. The notion of using it as a fortified place has, however, been abandoned since, and no garrison has ever been sent to it.

Nearly all the successors of Frederick I. in the Electorate of Brandenburg were men of considerable ability. Even George William, the father and predecessor of the great elector, who is generally represented by historians as a weak and vacillating prince, managed, with singular prudence and success, to keep his electorate comparatively free from the worst plagues and terrors of the Thirty Years' War, and to hold aloft the banner of the Reformation. All these princes added more or less to the possessions of the house, until the eleventh successor of the first Frederick (Frederick III. of Brandenburg) found himself actually powerful enough to place the royal crown of Prussia on his head. This was King Frederick I. of Prussia, twelfth Elector of Brandenburg of the Hohenzollern line. The Emperor William is his sixth successor.

The Crown Prince is the eighteenth in the line of succession from the Elector Frederick I. Of the eighteen Hohenzollern princes who have preceded

him, five at least may be truly called great men, to wit, the first Frederick, the founder of the line, the great elector, King Frederick William I., King Frederick II., and the Emperor William. To say, then, that the Crown Prince fairly promises to be the greatest of all Hohenzollerns may seem extravagant praise. The brief sketch of the Crown Prince's past career, which it is intended to give here, will show, however, that the fact simply is so.

Frederick William Nicholas Charles, Crown Prince of the German Empire and of Prussia; Field-Marshal-General, Inspector-General of the Fourth Inspection of the Army of the German Empire; Field-Marshal-General in Russia; Chief of the 1st Grenadier Regiment Crown Prince, of the 5th Westphalian Infantry Regiment, and the 2nd Silesian Dragoons; First Commander of the 1st (Berlin) Battalion of the Landwehr Guards; attached to the 1st Regiment of Foot Guards, and to the 2nd Regiment of Silesian Grenadiers; Chief of the 11th Regiment of Russian Hussars (Isum); proprietor of the Austrian Infantry Regiment, No. 20; Lord-Lieutenant of Pomerania; Doctor and Rector of the University of Königsberg; Grand Master of the Grand Lodge of Germany; Knight Grand Cross of the Iron Cross of the high Military *Ordre pour le Mérite*, &c., and member of the honourable craft of Typos, was born on the 18th of October, 1831, at the new palace in Potsdam. He is the

eldest and only son of the Emperor William and the Empress Marie Louise Augusta Catherina, one of the daughters of the late Grand Duke Charles Frederick of Saxe-Weimar. His only sister, Princess Louise Marie Elizabeth, born the 8th of December, 1838, was married on the 20th of September, 1856, to Frederick William Louis, reigning Grand Duke of Baden. Like all the princes of the royal house of Hohenzollern, the young prince had to embrace the military career from his earliest boyhood. His uncle—the then Crown Prince, afterwards King Frederick William IV.—had been married since 1823. However, as direct issue from this marriage seemed very doubtful, the young prince was most carefully educated, with a view to his ultimate accession to the throne. He had the best masters in every department of learning, and he amply requited their labour and care by the most unwearying diligence and industry. It is not too much to say that there is barely a branch of human lore in which the Crown Prince of Prussia does not excel. History he has made his special study, and it may be fairly hoped that Germany and the world will one day reap the benefit of the lessons inculcated by that study. He is a doctor of the University of Königsberg, of which university he is also rector. History tells us that the Persian princes of old used to be taught some handicraft, so that they might not be quite helpless in the not altogether

impossible event of their being driven into exile and misery. The royal house of Hohenzollern has always acted upon the same wise rule. At the age of fourteen, Prince Frederick William chose typography for his trade. He learned the business practically at Hænel's Royal Printing Office in Berlin, and it is said that he is a first-rate compositor. Some years ago the writer met one of Hænel's old hands at the office of the *Elberfeldes Zeitung*, who told him that he had had the distinguished honour of setting up a triglot book (German, Greek, and Latin) jointly with his royal highness, and that he had found it no easy task to hold his own against his exalted competitor; so that the Crown Prince of Prussia will not find himself thrown helpless upon the world and without resources, even should the French communists, the Marxes, Hasenklevers, Bebels, Mendes, &c., of Germany, and our own radical reformers ever succeed in sweeping away the old fabric of society.

The young prince led a quiet, studious life, diligently preparing himself for his high vocation. His name has never figured in the *Chronique scandaleuse*. In fact, except in court and military circles, it was hardly ever prominently mentioned; although all who had the happiness of coming in contact with him spoke enthusiastically of the kindness of his disposition, his frank cordiality, his simple and unassuming manners, his vast and varied know-

ledge, and the charm of his society and conversation. On the 28th of January, 1858, he married Victoria, Princess Royal of England—a happy union in more than one respect, but more particularly as forming a new fast bond between the two great Protestant powers of the world, and the two natural champions of the safe and gradual development of freedom of thought and conscience, and of political, social, and religious liberty and progress. The royal houses of England and of Prussia are the two oldest houses in Europe. Our own Victoria can trace her descent back to Egbert of Wessex, and through him to the old Anglo-Saxon princes. Prince Albert was also descended from a very ancient and most renowned house, and the Guelphs can go back to the Frankish Count Warin of Altorf, who flourished in the time of Charlemagne, and whose son Isenbrand had bestowed upon him by his contemporaries the, in our view perhaps, by no means flattering nickname of Whelp, or young hound, on account, it is said, of his quarrelsome and somewhat currish disposition. In those days, however, when might was right and force was law, the name might have been held in very different estimation. At all events, Isenbrand of Altorf had his eldest son and heir christened Welp, or Welf (Guelph), who figures in history as the first of the name. We are justified, then, in saying that the royal houses of England and of Prussia are indeed

the oldest houses in Europe. The descent claimed by the houses of Hapsburg and Lorrain from the Frankish Duke Eticho of Alsatia, who died about the year 690, is very doubtful at the best, and the Bourbons and Delmenhorst-Romanoffs date not very far back, comparatively. We may also take some pride and pleasure in the fact that the descendants of our own beloved Queen will one day rule over the great German empire, and that the two countries, united by the strong and lasting bond of community of religious faith and political interests, may be expected to march together for centuries to come at the head of Europe in the path of progress and enlightenment.

In the year 1864 the Crown Prince had the first opportunity afforded him of gathering actual military experience on the battle-field. He had then reached the grade of lieutenant-general, and commanded the first infantry division of the Guards. His position in the Dano-German war was, however, almost purely observant, the chief command being intrusted to Field-Marshal Wrangel, and subsequently, after the resignation of that commander, to the Crown Prince's cousin, Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia.

It was two years after, in 1866, that the Crown Prince was permitted to appear on the field as a leader of armies, and to afford the world brilliant proof of his high military genius.

The Prusso-German war was certainly not of his

seeking, nor of his liking. He looked upon that war as a fratricidal contest, and there was a strong feeling in him of honourable repugnance to imbrue his hands in the blood of his German brethren. Moreover, it may be taken for granted that he was sincerely opposed at the time to Bismarck and his policy. The great minister had not yet been able to show to the world the true side of his character, and to reveal the true tendency of his political ideas wishes, and aspirations.

Heirs to the crown are proverbially apt to profess unbounded liberalism, though, as a rule, their conduct after they have come to the throne is equally apt to give the lie to their former professions. Now, indeed, the case is very different with the Imperial Crown Prince of Germany. Although he is in his forty-third year, it would be difficult indeed to say, from any "professions" ever made by him, what his true political creed may happen to be. He has always scrupulously abstained from all interference in state matters—at all events, from all overt interference. His profound filial piety and his unbounded reverence for his great father, who is known to be jealously tenacious of his supreme power, have always sufficed to suppress all outward manifestations at least of any antagonistic feeling he might harbour against that father's policy. So it would appear a very difficult question to decide whether the Crown Prince's political leanings and tendencies are liberal

or otherwise. But it is known that in his religious belief he is an advanced member of the Reformed Church, of large and enlightened views on all questions of faith, and a most uncompromising foe equally to popery and Romish pretensions and superstitions, and to Muckerdom and "evangelical" bigotry, from which even men like Roon and the great Moltke are not absolutely free. The Crown Prince has not the slightest pietistic taint in his composition. He is also a freemason—not one who simply plays at freemasonry, but an earnest, sincere, and active brother of the craft. He is Grand Master of the Prussian Lodges and of the Grand Land Lodge of Germany. The latter celebrated its first centenary on the 24th of June, 1870, on which occasion the Crown Prince, in his capacity of master of the order and representative of the protector of the lodges—his father the king—delivered a remarkable address, to which we shall have occasion to recur more at length in the course of this memoir, when it will be clearly seen that the large views and enlightened sentiments of the speaker would be altogether incompatible with his holding narrow political ideas, and being chained to mediæval, illiberal, feudalist, and absolutist notions and principles.

However, be this as it may, this much is certain, that the Crown Prince did not like the projected war against Austria and the German Confederation. The anecdote-mongers of the time made capital out

of the prince's patent repugnance to the war: they invented a cock-and-bull story about a stormy encounter between the prince and Bismarck in presence of the king, in which the minister was stated to have actually advised his majesty to send his royal highness to the fortress of Spandau! It need hardly be stated that there was not a semblance of foundation for this pretty little tale. The Crown Prince's honourable repugnance to the war never rose to such a height or intensity as the "story" would indicate. Any difference of opinion on his part anent the "propriety" of the intended war notwithstanding, the Crown Prince nobly did his duty to his king and country. There is also every reason to believe that he soon learned to appreciate more correctly the true position of affairs, and the honesty and patriotism of his father's great minister. It was even currently reported at the time, that the Crown Prince and Bismarck had had a meeting before the battle of Sadowa, at Miliutin, in Bohemia, where a perfect and cordial understanding was arrived at between the two eminent men. It may safely be averred that this understanding has never been disturbed since, and that the Crown Prince has not a more loyal friend than Bismarck, nor the great chancellor a more sincere admirer and well-wisher than his imperial and royal highness.

The Austrian army, under the supreme command of Feldzeugmeister (Master-General) Benedek (at

least nominally, although not in reality, for the emperor and his military cabinet were constantly interfering with the plans of the commander-in-chief), consisted of the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 6th, 8th, and 10th corps, numbering altogether some 200,000 men, with 762 guns. Besides these forces, Benedek could draw reinforcements from the garrisons of Cracow, Olmütz, Theresienstadt, Josephstadt, and Königgrätz, numbering altogether close upon 60,000 men. And in the night of the 15th–16th of June the Saxon army of some 40,000 excellent troops, well found in every way and amply provided with artillery, crossed the Saxon frontier into Bohemia and joined Benedek's forces. Some 10,000 Austrians had been sent also to swell the hosts of the German Confederation, calculated in the rough at about 100,000 men.

Against this formidable hostile array Baron Moltke, the chief of the Prussian staff, had formed four distinct armies, to wit, the so-called first army, under the command of Prince Frederick Charles, consisting of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th corps of the Prussian army, and one cavalry corps; the so-called second army, under the command of the Crown Prince, consisting of the Guards, and the 1st, 5th, and 6th corps of the army; the army of the Elbe, under the command of General Herwarth von Bittenfeld, consisting of the 8th corps of the army, the 1st division of the 7th corps, and a reserve

corps of Landwehr; and the army of the Main, under the command of General Vogel von Falckenstein, consisting of the other division of the 7th corps, the Prussian garrisons withdrawn from Mayence and Rastatt, reserves, and a variety of other troops.

The Crown Prince was the youngest of the four chief commanders of the Prussian forces, his cousin Frederick Charles being his senior by three years. To him was intrusted the arduous task of leading his army through the so-called three gateways to Bohemia — the mountain defiles of Trautenau, Braunau, and Nachod.

He collected his forces in a camp round the strong fortress of Neisse. On the 22nd of June this camp was broken up. About noon that day the writer had the pleasure of listening to one of the prince's most telling simple speeches, which was delivered to the military and civil authorities of the fortress and city of Neisse in the courtyard of the War School. Every word of that brief patriotic address went home to the hearts of the hearers.

A series of elaborate manœuvres, and marches and counter-marches, intended to puzzle and mislead the Austrians in Bohemia, occupied the time from the 23rd to the 26th June. On the evening of that day the 6th corps, under General Mutius, had taken up its position about Habelschwerdt, in the Glatz district, which was then threatened by

the 2nd Austrian corps under Count Thun's command. The 1st corps, under General Bonin's command, was ready to march into Bohemia through the Trautenau defile. The Guards, under the command of Prince Augustus of Wurtemberg, through the Braunau Pass; and the 5th corps, under the command of General Steinmetz, through the Nachod defile. The 10th Austrian under the command of General Gablentz, had been detached by Benedek to guard Trautenau; the 6th corps, under the command of General Ramming, had been directed to Skalitz to protect Nachod; and the 8th corps, under the command of the Archduke Leopold, to Jaromierz, to support Ramming in case of need. Subsequently Benedek sent the 4th corps, under the command of General Festetics, to the same point.

On the morning of the 27th of June the Guards and the 1st and 5th corps effected their entry into Bohemia through the three passes of Braunau, Trautenau, and Nachod.

The comparative failure of the 1st corps, under General Bonin, has been related in the memoir of Moltke, so we need not further recur to it here.

The vanguard of the 5th corps, under the command of General Löwenfeld, had hardly passed the narrow defile of Nachod into Bohemia when it found itself confronted by vastly superior forces forming part of the 6th Austrian corps under Ramming. A

desperate struggle ensued. Two squadrons of Prussian cavalry had to encounter the fierce onset of the celebrated Windischgrätz regiment of riders and of another cuirassier regiment. The two squadrons were driven back into the defile just at the very time when the Prussian artillery was somewhat slowly and painfully wending its way through the pass.

This was a most critical moment. The Austrians might have improved the advantage gained by them, and crushed the small force under Löwenfeld, in which case it might afterwards have been found impracticable for the 5th Prussian corps to force the pass.

It is related that it was General Steinmetz's coolness and excellent tactical command which saved the day.

But the writer heard another version of the affair at the time. He was told by some officers that at the critical juncture when the Prussian cavalry had just been swept back into the defile, the Crown Prince, attended by General Blumenthal, his chief of the staff, arrived on the spot, and that his royal highness passed some severe strictures upon the curious tactics of blocking up a narrow mountain defile with artillery when it must seem of the utmost importance to push the infantry and cavalry through; but his highness forbore adding another word the instant he was informed that the general commanding the corps was responsible for the arrangement.

His royal highness dismounted, clambered over the guns, made his way to the front, ordered the artillery back, pushed a few battalions of infantry rapidly through the cleared pass, and ordered them to occupy certain commanding knolls at the Bohemian outlet of the defile, with instructions to hold and defend these positions to the last extremity. Battalion after battalion of infantry was then marched through the pass in the most beautiful order. Two regiments of cavalry followed, which made short work of the two Austrian cuirassier regiments, whose two standards were taken by the victorious Prussians.

Up to this time there had been considerable apprehension in the Prussian army, lest their cavalry should not be able to hold its own against the Austrian crack riders. From the day of Nachod this fear was dissipated for ever. The Austrian light cavalry did not fare much better in subsequent encounters with the Prussians, although a distinguished war correspondent of a leading English journal would persist in scoring victory after victory for their commander, Edelsheim—a pity only that every one of these “victories” should have eventuated in a more or less rapidly-accelerated retreat of the victorious forces.

So soon as the Prussians had once secured a fair hold of the other side of the pass, the needle-gun began to tell fearfully upon the Austrians. But it was not this new formidable weapon alone which decided the fate of the day; it was also the bayonet.

The strong positions of the Austrians were carried one after another, and in the evening of the day Ramming found that his corps had sustained such fearful losses in the desperate struggle that he would be unable to hold Skalitz, the next station on the Austrian line of defence, unless very largely reinforced.

The despatch to this effect, which he sent off in the evening to the Austrian headquarters, was intercepted by the Prussians. However, Archduke Leopold came up to Ramming's aid with the 8th Austrian corps from Jaromierz (suburb of Josephstadt). The two corps combined took up strong positions around Skalitz, where they were attacked next day by the 5th Prussian corps under the command of the Crown Prince and General Steinmetz.

That corps had suffered much the day before at Nachod, and the odds seemed largely in favour of the Austrians, who greatly outnumbered the Prussians, and had, besides, a large proportion of fresh troops to oppose to their harassed and jaded assailants. But the noble Poseners went into the fight undismayed; they drove the Austrians from all their strong positions, and carried ultimately the important stronghold of the railway station, and the town of Skalitz. On the evening of the 28th of June both the 6th and the 8th Austrian corps might be considered fully accounted for.

On the same day, the 28th of June, 1866, the

Guards, under the command of Prince Augustus of Wurtemberg, went in for *their* innings, and a pretty game they played. Gablentz, who had been victorious the day before against Bonin and the 1st Prussian corps, had made his position at Trautenau as strong as circumstances would admit ; he had also taken up very strong positions at Alt-Rognitz, Neu-Rognitz, and Burgersdorf.

When the Prussian Guards made their first onset they found sixty-four Austrian guns opposed to twelve of their own pieces, and they had the odds very much against them, too, in infantry and cavalry. But the men of this truly splendid corps carried everything before them in fine style. They took the positions of Burgersdorf and Alt-Rognitz, and finally carried Trautenau by storm, despite the most desperate resistance of the enemy.

Of the magnificent 10th corps, which Gablentz had led forth to battle on the morning of the 27th, to the number of nigh upon 50,000 men, there remained on the evening of the 28th only a mass of some 25,000 men that could claim to be considered anything like a compact body.

On the 29th of June the same irresistible Prussian Guards stormed Königinhof (*Dwor Kralowé*, Queen's Court), a most important position. This opened the way to a proximate union of the second army, commanded by the Crown Prince, with the first army and the Elbe army, under the command severally of Prince

Frederick Charles and General Herwarth von Bittenfeld, which had entered Bohemia from the side of Saxony, and were fighting their way up to Königgrätz.

On the same 29th day of June the 5th Prussian corps advanced from Skalitz upon Schweinschädel, where a fresh Austrian corps, under the command of the brave General Festetics, had taken up a strong position. This corps, the 4th of the Austrian army, shared the same fate with the 6th, the 8th, and the 10th. It was badly beaten.

The general commanding, Festetics, was so severely wounded in one of his legs, that the limb had to be amputated. The operation had just been performed, and the nerves of the poor sufferer were still writhing with the pain of the saw slowly biting its way through the acutely sensitive bone membrane, when the general caught sight of his servant, a brave old Magyar Honved, whose eyes were suffused with tears, which the poor fellow tried to hide by turning his face the other way. "Ah, you rascal," said Festetics, with a good-humoured shake of his finger at the old soldier, "ah, you pretend to weep, when your heart is actually leaping with joy at the happy thought that you will now have only one boot to clean for your maimed master."

On the 30th of June the 6th Prussian corps, under the command of General Mutius, then one of the most distinguished officers in the Prussian service, and the *beau idéal* of a *preux chevalier* of ancient times,

came up to join the 5th corps at Gradlitz. Poor General Mutius, who a few days after did eminent service at Sadowa, was not permitted to see the end of this war. Soon after the battle of Königgrätz he was carried off by an attack of cholera.

The 6th, or Silesian corps, which General Mutius commanded, was then, as it continues to the present day, one of the best in the Prussian army, and the two sub-commanders at the time, Generals Zastrow and Prondzynski, ranked even then already among the most accomplished officers in the service.

On the same day that the union of the 5th and 6th corps was effected, the dragoons of the Guard, sent on by Prince Frederick Charles to open communication with the second army, came upon the right wing of that army, thus fully establishing the connection between the two hosts.

Next day, the 1st of July, a section of the second army reached Miliutin, or Miletin, where the famous interview between the Crown Prince and Bismarck is said to have taken place in the night from the 1st to the 2nd of July. (This alleged meeting between Bismarck and the Crown Prince is looked upon by many as a mere historic fiction. The writer will not undertake to decide whether it really did take place or not. He can only say that at the time he heard the statement repeatedly upon good authority.)

Benedek, half stunned by the great successes of the three Prussian armies, now fairly established in the

heart of Bohemia [the exploits of the first Prussian army and the Elbe army will be found recorded in the memoirs of Prince Frederick Charles and General Herwarth von Bittenfeld], resolved to concentrate the whole of his forces in a well-chosen position near Königgrätz, and leaning upon that strong fortress.

Here the Austrian positions along the line of the Bistritz were attacked early in the morning of the 3rd of July, at Sadowa, by Prince Frederick Charles, at Przim and Nechanitz, by General Herwarth von Bittenfeld.

In the memoirs of these two commanders we shall have occasion to give a brief description of this part of the operations. Suffice it here to state, that the Elbe army made only slow progress on the left flank of the attack, and that Prince Frederick Charles fought desperately all the morning in the centre, with but indifferent success upon the whole.

The prince had, in fact, occasion to wish by noon for the advent of the Crown Prince on the right flank, as ardently as Wellington wished for the promised arrival of his Prussian allies at Waterloo.

It was, indeed, said at the time that Prince Frederick Charles had rashly begun his attack upon the Austrian positions in the centre two hours too soon.

The Crown Prince, who had had to dispose first of the corps of Legeditch, in his advance over Kukus, and had had to contend against formidable difficulties

of the road, arrived at last on the right flank in the early part of the afternoon.

With the eagle eye of the born commander in the field he took in the whole position at a glance. With prompt decision he ordered the 6th corps under Mutius to cross the Trotina brook, and two battalions of the Guard to storm the hill of Chlum, which his inborn military genius perceived to be the true key of Benedek's position, instead of Sadowa, which Prince Frederick Charles had been so fiercely assailing all the morning.

Mutius executed the order given him with brilliant success. He forced the passage of the Trotina, and compelled Benedek to change and shift the position of his right wing—in itself a difficult operation, and a hazardous proceeding in the face of a brave and skilful enemy.

The Guards, on their part, carried Chlum in fine style, capturing some thirty Austrian pieces defending the position, and killing most of the gunners at their pieces. The two storming battalions lost fearfully. Out of some 1,600 men, 884 were left on their way up, killed or wounded. But the capture of Chlum decided the fortune of the day.

The victorious Crown Prince was decorated on the battle-field by his enraptured father with the highest Prussian military order, *Pour le Mérite*.

Had Herwarth von Bittenfeld with the Elbe army been as brilliantly successful as the Crown Prince, the

fate of Benedek's army had been sealed. The bulk of it could barely have escaped capture; a few straggling bands alone might have found their way into Moravia. (It must once more be observed here that the fault was generally said at the time to have lain at the door of Frederick Charles, and not of Herwarth von Bittenfeld.)

Even as matters actually stood, it is difficult to account for the extreme laxness and supineness of the Prussian pursuit of the defeated enemy.

After Waterloo the Prussians drove the fugitive French before them in merciless, never-ceasing, never even relaxing, chase throughout the fearful night of the 18th-19th of June, hurling them in headlong flight over the bridge and through the village of Genappe, through Quatre-Bras, and beyond Frasnes, and leaving them at last to regain the left bank of the Sambre only as a thoroughly broken and disorganized mob; whereas, after Königgrätz, the defeated Austrians were almost tenderly left to a comparatively safe retreat.

After Waterloo the British army was so thoroughly exhausted by its stupendous toils and sufferings during its Titanic struggle on that appalling field, that it was physically incapacitated for further exertion in pursuit of the enemy. Moreover, the Prussians were quite fresh, and the pursuit might well and safely be handed over to them.

But at Königgrätz, although two out of the three

Prussian armies engaged had severally suffered in the long and arduous contest, and the third army, besides some most severe fighting, had done much hard marching that day, there surely remained some reserve force to push the victory achieved to its extremest consequences.

Dis aliter visum, it would appear, however: and so Benedek was permitted to effect his retreat with comparative ease.

Still the Austrian losses were enormous. Some 180 guns fell into the hands of the victors, and what with killed, wounded, and prisoners, and the somewhat large item of missing, the day of Königgrätz cost Benedek some 60,000 men.

Altogether the seven days' campaign had knocked off more than one clear half of the powerful host which a few brief weeks before had so proudly taken the field.

Benedek was truly a great general. It may even be left a moot question for future historians to discuss whether the Bohemian campaign would have eventuated as it did had the master-general been left perfectly free to act as he listed, and had he not had, among other impediments, three archdukes thrown in his path as sub-commanders, not to mention Thun and Clam-Gallas.

His retreat, at least, after the battle, was masterly. He led the bulk of his forces in rapid marches sideways to Olmutz, leaving only the 10th corps, under

Gablentz ; the Saxons, under Crown Prince Albert ; three divisions of heavy cavalry, and the light horse, under Edelsheim, to proceed in the direction of Vienna.

He expected to draw the whole Prussian army after him. He was grievously disappointed, however, in this expectation. Moltke simply directed the second army, under the Crown Prince, to follow Benedek, and pushed the first army, under Prince Frederick Charles, rapidly on to Brunn, and the Elbe army, under Herwarth von Bittenfeld, to Iglau, on the direct road to Vienna.

Although the battle of Königgrätz had terminated the famous seven days' Bohemian campaign of 1866, the war continued a few weeks longer.

General La Marmora had disloyally communicated to the French emperor the plan of campaign which had been recommended to Italy by the chief of the Prussian staff (through the Prussian ambassador to the Italian court)—a plan which, taken in connection with the Prussian convention with Klapka and other Hungarian leaders, must have totally destroyed the power of Austria had it been implicitly followed by the Italian chiefs.

The immediate result of La Marmora's act had been, that Louis Napoleon had urgently advised the Emperor Francis Joseph to consent to the cession of Venetia. The emperor had taken the advice, and had thereby set free the Austrian army

of the south, and its skilful commander, the victor of Custoza.

The Archduke Albrecht, named by the emperor commander-in-chief of the whole of the Austrian forces, had given general Benedek imperative orders to leave Olmutz with the troops under his command, and endeavour to make his way to Florisdorf, to join there in the defence of the Austrian capital.

The Crown Prince had, as already stated, been sent, with the greater part of the second army, after Benedek.

The prince sent the cavalry division Hartmann and the infantry division Malotki to Prerau to cut off Benedek's line of communication with Vienna. A severe fight ensued, on the 15th July, at Tobitschau, in which the Prussians, who had found before them the 8th Austrian corps, suffered severely, but defeated the enemy with great loss. It was here that the 8th Cuirassiers took twenty Austrian guns in fire.

Large masses of troops (the 1st Austrian corps) being observed in the act of marching off, General Hartmann advanced at the head of eight squadrons to reconnoitre. It was here where the Prussian forces, having ventured too far forward, ran considerable risk of being cut off, and where their retreat was so nobly covered by the regiment of hussars of the Landwehr.

Benedek's line of march to Vienna was, however, cut off at another important point—Lundenburg—on

the 16th of July, by Horn's division of the first army, under command of Prince Frederick Charles. Benedek was forced to cross over to the left bank of the river March, and to try to make good his retreat to Vienna over the lesser Carpathian mountains. This retreat the Austrian general effected successfully with consummate skill.

Soon after, the armistice and peace preliminaries of Nikolsburg, followed by the treaty of Prague, put an end to the war, leaving the Crown Prince free to return once more to the enjoyment of his quiet and happy family life.

On the 24th of June, 1870, the Grand Land Lodge of Germany celebrated its first centenary. On this occasion the Crown Prince, in his capacity of Grand Master of the order and representative of the protector of all Prussian lodges, his father the king, delivered a remarkable address to the brethren assembled, full of the noblest sentiments and the largest and most liberal views, and breathing throughout an exalted spirit of enlightenment.

He spoke of the lodge in its connection with the Swedish Parent Lodge, from which it had sprung, and with the Universal Lodge of St. John.

He pointed out to the brethren how, in the age of general progress in which we were living, it was indispensable that the venerable order should also advance beyond certain antiquated notions, and, more particularly, should not so persistently continue to

cultivate mystery as had been the case through the past.

He invited the brethren to strive to the best of their power and ability to shed the rays of the higher intelligence and knowledge possessed by them over a wider field than certain antiquated narrow rules would now seem to allow. The entire tenor of the prince's speech showed, in fact, that liberty, progress, and enlightenment could have no warmer and no more powerful champion than his royal highness.

A few weeks after the delivery of this address, the Crown Prince had to tear himself away once more from his household gods. France had rashly declared war against Germany, and the prince had intrusted to him the chief command of one of the three great armies directed upon France by Moltke, and the leadership of the south German contingent.

The Crown Prince left Berlin on the 26th of July travelling by Leipzig, Munich, Stuttgart, and Karlsruhe to the head-quarters of the third army. The people received him everywhere with enthusiastic acclamations. The manliness of his character, his frank cordiality, and his affable manner, quite free from all studied or ostentatious condescension, gained him all hearts. The south German soldiers more particularly, whom he came to lead against the hereditary enemy of the great Fatherland, were delighted with him, and felt proud to be commanded by the true victor of Nachod, at least, and Chlum.

On the 2nd of August three French divisions, under the personal eye of the Emperor Louis Napoleon, had made a fierce onset upon the town of Saarbrücken, the centre of the famous coal-basin, which, if all the truth of the matter were fully known, would have to be held chiefly responsible for the outbreak of the Franco-German war. At least there can hardly be a reasonable doubt that if Prussia had consented to the cession, or even to the sale, of these rich coal mines to France, the Hispano-Hohenzollern imbroglio might have been peaceably settled.

The town was held by a few companies of the Hohenzollern Fusiliers, who fought so bravely, and with such consummate skill, that it took the assailants several hours to force this handful of gallant men to retreat at last.

The telegraph had played strange pranks with this very small military achievement, trumpeting it forth to the world as a most signal French success, the herald and pledge alike of many others to follow.

On the 4th of August, a little after five o'clock in the morning, the Crown Prince of Prussia left Landau, attended by his staff and suite. The army under his command had been directed to advance upon Weissenburg.

Weissenburg had always been held a point of considerable importance, and some of the fiercest fights had been fought for its possession in the French revolutionary war.

On this occasion the city was occupied by the division of General Abel Douay, who had the reputation of being one of the best leaders of the French. The division belonged to the corps of Marshal M'Mahon, to whom two flukes, in the Crimea and at Magenta, had given an exaggerated reputation of high tactical skill. It numbered sixteen battalions of very excellent infantry, among them two battalions of Zouaves and one of Turcos, and had a numerous, powerful, and well-served artillery.

The important eminence of the Gaisberg, which commands Weissenburg from the south side, had been very strongly fortified, and was held by a large body of troops.

A little after nine o'clock in the morning, the Crown Prince arrived on the heights at the east of Schweigen, just when the vanguard of the German division Bothmer were making their first attack upon the city.

About half an hour or so later the 17th Infantry Brigade (of the famous 5th corps, that had fought so well in 1866 at Nachod, Skalitz, Schweinschädel, &c.), having crossed the Lauter, made its appearance at St. Remy and Waghäusel, and proceeded to assault the heights opposite.

Soon after, the 18th brigade of the same corps took its position on the right of the 17th brigade, attacked and carried Altenstadt, and, making its way to the southern bank of the Lauter, prepared to attack the Gaisberg.

The 9th division having thus crossed the Lauter, it became practicable to attack the town of Weissenburg also from the south-east. Two battalions of the 57th regiment and one of the 58th were sent forward from Altenstadt for the purpose of this operation. At twelve o'clock the town of Weissenburg was vigorously assailed by these troops and by Bothmer's division, and, after a desperate struggle, carried.

Half an hour later, the 18th Infantry Brigade, of the 5th corps, and the 41st, of the 11th corps, delivered a fierce assault upon the Gaisberg, the King's Grenadier Regiment leading the van.

The Germans suffered severely, more especially from the chassepot fire of the French tirailleurs, who occupied the vineyards all around.

The superior carrying power of the chassepot, as compared with that of the needle-gun, was made clearly manifest here, whilst the much-vaunted mitrailleuses were found wanting.

The Prussian infantry, however, marched up the steep height steadily and without flinching, and carried the fortified farm and the castle behind at the first onset, despite the desperate resistance opposed by the French.

At one o'clock in the afternoon the Gaisberg had changed masters. Half an hour after, the Crown Prince rode up the heights to express to the noble infantry of the 5th and 11th corps

his warmest acknowledgments of their undaunted bravery.

The Gaisberg being the centre and key of the French position, after its plucky capture by the Germans there was nothing left for the defeated corps to do but to effect its retreat in an orderly manner. This the French succeeded in accomplishing, moving off in three columns in a south-westerly direction, pursued by the two cavalry regiments of the 5th and 10th divisions.

General Douay had been killed in the fight. The loss of the French amounted to some 1,200 killed and wounded. The victorious Germans, whose losses in killed and wounded were even more considerable (no wonder, considering the strength of the positions captured and the superiority of the chassepot over the needle-gun), captured some 1,000 unwounded prisoners, with thirty officers, the French camp, baggage, &c., and one gun, taken by the 5th battalion of rifles.

The capture of the Gaisberg and the lines of Weissenburg was the first real deed of arms in the campaign.

The day after the battle the Crown Prince advanced to Sulz, to follow up his first success.

Marshal M'Mahon with his entire corps, reinforced by divisions from De Failly and Canrobert's corps, had taken up an advantageous position all along the hilly ground surrounding the small town of Wörth.

The village of Froschweiler formed the centre and key of the French position.

The Crown Prince had under his command the two Bavarian corps, the Wurtemberg division, and the 5th and 11th Prussian corps. The battle began at nine in the morning, and lasted till night, though Froschweiler had been carried before four o'clock in the afternoon, by a combined attack of the Bavarians from the north, the Prussians from the east and the west, and the Wurtembergers from the south.

The French army was totally routed. It suffered enormous losses in killed and wounded and war material. Six thousand unwounded prisoners, two eagles, some thirty guns, and six mitrailleuses fell into the hands of the victors.

At Reichshofen the Wurtemberg cavalry cut in upon the French line of retreat and inflicted further losses upon the fugitives, taking from them four guns, vast military stores, &c.

The Germans also had suffered most severely, the French having defended their positions with desperate bravery.

Prussians, Bavarians, and Wurtembergers alike had fought with the same steady determination.

When the Crown Prince took occasion, after the victory, to express to the Bavarians his very particular satisfaction with their admirable conduct in the battle, a Bavarian sergeant told the prince it was all a

question of leadership. "Under your royal highness's command we can go anywhere and do anything," said the simple-minded soldier; then added naïvely, "Had we been commanded by you in 1866, instead of by a muff, we should have given those Prussians the greatest hiding they ever got!"—a curious comment, apparently, upon the union of all Germany, just cemented on the battle-field.

The Crown Prince pursued his victory with the most consummate skill. He gave M'Mahon no breathing time.

Besides, after the crushing defeat inflicted upon General Frossard's corps at Spicheren, on the day of the battle of Wörth, by Generals Kameke and Göben, the French marshal had really no chance left him of making a successful stand anywhere on the Alsatian side of the Vosges. So, there remained nothing for him to do but to save the remnant of his army by a rapid retreat, and to re-form it at the Châlons camp.

In the great Bohemian campaign of 1866 the victories achieved by the Crown Prince were by many entirely placed to the credit of General Blumenthal, the Crown Prince's chief of the staff.

Now there can be no doubt that General Blumenthal is one of the most highly accomplished military leaders of the day; in fact, he ranks immediately after Moltke and Vogel von Falckenstein, with such men as Voigts-Rhetz, Stiehle, Göben, and

Werder. Notwithstanding, it would be gross injustice to say that he had organized the Crown Prince's victories.

Blumenthal himself never advanced any such pretension: he is a truly great man, who knows that he need not covet the palm justly belonging to another. The writer has good reason to know that General Blumenthal often spoke with enthusiastic admiration of the high military genius displayed by his royal chief in the Bohemian campaign.

The general, who is a thorough soldier every inch of him, would occasionally complain, indeed, of what he was pleased to call the Crown Prince's indolence in military pursuits. He even once wrote a letter in English to this effect to his wife, who is an English lady, which letter was unfortunately intercepted by the Austrians, who were mean enough to publish a German translation of it.

With a smaller man than the Crown Prince, this might have tended to produce a certain coldness between the chief of the army and the chief of the staff. Not so with the Crown Prince, who quietly admitted to Blumenthal that he was quite aware of his laxness and personal laziness in military matters; but he must beg the general's indulgence for his shortcomings in this respect, as he really could not help it. He did not like the occupation sufficiently well to give his whole soul and mind

to it. With this the matter was passed over, and the cordial friendship between the prince and the general suffered no interruption or diminution.

In the French campaign General Blumenthal was again chief of the staff to the Crown Prince ; yet, with all due respect to the high talents of the general, it certainly did not occur to anyone to attribute the organization of the victories of Weissenburg and Wörth to the chief of the staff, at the expense of the genial leader of the host.

The third German army followed in the wake of the retreating French, although it would appear that touch with the latter was soon lost.

The small fortress of Lichtenberg, in the Vosges, was summoned to surrender by a corps of Wurtembergers on the 8th of August. Upon the commandant's refusal a heavy destructive cannonade was opened upon the place. It capitulated two days after.

Another of the small fortresses in the Vosges, Lützelstein, or La Petite Pierre, was hastily abandoned by the French, and occupied by troops of the 2nd Bavarian corps on the 9th of August. In such hot haste had the French evacuated the place, that large stores and much war material were found there by the conquerors.

Nancy was abandoned by the French on the 12th of August, and soon after taken possession of by four German lancers. The small fortress of Marsal also

was speedily reduced by troops of the 2nd Bavarian corps.

On the 16th of August the Crown Prince took up his head-quarters at Nancy. Here he remained with his army, to cover the operations of the first and second German armies before Metz, and to be ready at hand in case of need.

After the battle of Gravelotte, when Bazaine was securely shut up in Metz, the Crown Prince moved on again, westward, over Commercy, Bar-le-Duc, Point-du-Jour, and Vitry, upon Châlons, which was reached on the 24th of August, when it was discovered that the camp on the Mourmelon had been abandoned by the French. Vitry capitulated on the morning of the 25th of August.

It was speedily ascertained that Marshal M'Mahon was not retreating upon the French capital, but was moving, at the head of 150,000 men, in the direction of Rheims and Rethel, with the evident intention of endeavouring, in co-operation with Bazaine and his host of 200,000 then shut up in Metz, to fall upon the Germans before that great fortress, and to crush them by the force of overwhelming numbers. The plan of this campaign had been bunglingly conceived in Paris by Palikao (Montauban). Its execution was attempted still more bunglingly by the present chief of the French government.

The Crown Prince retraced his steps with the utmost rapidity, and effected his junction with the

newly-formed army of the Meuse, under the command of the Saxon Crown Prince Albert, the present King of Saxony, in ample time to contribute to the victory of Beaumont, and share in the "crowning mercy" of Sedan.

The future impartial historian alone, who can keep his pen equally free from personal predilection as from prejudice, will be able to assign to the memory of the Crown Prince of Prussia the due share of glory that ought to fall to his name in connection with this most marvellous achievement. Here we need say simply, that the Crown Prince's excellent tactics contributed largely to crown Moltke's splendid strategy with the fullest success.

M'Mahon had set out from the camp of Châlons with a fine army of 150,000 men. Of all this formidable host there escaped only a small fraction of some 3,000 across the Belgian frontier. About 115,000 men, including about 4,000 officers, fell into the conquerors' hands as prisoners of war in the battles of Beaumont and Sedan, and by the subsequent capitulation. Fourteen thousand wounded were also found in Sedan. The rest lay stretched stiff and cold on the bloody fields of Beaumont and Sedan, and at Nouart and Mousson.

From Sedan the united victorious German armies (the 3rd under command of the Crown Prince of Prussia, and the army of the Meuse under command of the Crown Prince of Saxony) moved

on in the direction of Paris, under the personal leadership of King William, who established his head-quarters in the old French coronation city of Rheims on the 5th of September.

It is an incalculable blessing for Germany and Europe that the Crown Prince of Prussia—as has been more than once before observed in the course of this memoir—is not a soldier through and through, and from natural inclination.

He goes to the field of battle as a matter of duty. Under the conscious inspiration of his deep sense of duty, he, indeed, gives the widest and fullest scope and play to his high military genius; but the fight once done, he is not the man to revel in the intoxication of victory. He shudderingly beholds the stern realities of the unspeakable miseries of war, and instead of insatiably striving, like a Napoleon Bonaparte, to add fresh leaflets to the laurel crown encircling the victor's brow, he bethinks him only of how to soften the miseries, how to assuage the sufferings inflicted by the awful deity whose dread rites he has just been solemnizing as hierarch.

So, no wonder that we should find the Crown Prince of Prussia, five short days after the storming of Sedan, issuing a pleading and warm appeal to every German man and woman in the great Fatherland to put their shoulders energetically to the wheel to establish a general fund for the relief of

invalided warriors and their families—an appeal so gloriously seconded by his august wife, our own Princess Royal.

On the 17th of September the vanguard of the Germans reached Paris. With the same strange, wilful blindness to the most patent facts which characterized the Austrians in their Bohemian campaign of 1866, when, to give one instance out of many, they ruthlessly destroyed a wooden bridge leading over the Elbe at Kukus, where the width of the river is not quite that of a moderately-sized brook, and the depth about knee-deep, the French had sternly sacrificed all bridges, viaducts, and other facilities of communication on roads and railways, without being able to impose thereby one single hour's delay upon the irresistible advance of the foe.

On this day (17th of September) a portion of the 17th brigade overthrew several battalions of the French to the north of the Brevannes forest; on the day after the French were driven back again at Bicêtre; and on the 19th the Crown Prince effected the inclosing of Paris all along the line from Versailles to Vincennes, having on the afternoon of that day beaten off three divisions of General Vinoy's army, which had taken up a strong position on the heights of Sceaux.

The 2nd Bavarian corps and the 5th Prussian corps were engaged in this feat of arms, under the

personal command of the Crown Prince. The French suffered heavy loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, besides leaving seven guns in the hands of the conquerors. General Vinoy was the French commander on the occasion.

From this day, the 19th of September, forward to the termination of the siege of Paris, the Crown Prince held the line Bougival, Sèvres, Meudon, Bourg l'Hay, Chevilly, Thiais, Choisy-le-Roi, and Bonnevil. He again in person directed the fight against Vinoy on the 30th of September, when the French were driven back with heavy loss.

On the 27th of October Metz capitulated to the besieging German army under Prince Frederick Charles. The momentous importance of this event, taken in connection with the glorious days of Weissenburg, Wörth, and Sedan, induced King William to depart, for the first time in the history of the Hohenzollerns, from the old traditionary custom of the family, which excluded princes of the reigning house from attaining the highest military grade.

King William himself, when Prince of Prussia, had only held the position of Colonel-General of infantry, whilst his brother, Prince Charles, had been made Master-General of the Ordnance, both with the rank of field-marshal, indeed, but without the full title. Now, the king resolved for the first time to raise the Crown Prince and Prince Frederick

Charles to the full rank and title of general field-marshal in the army.

In the several desperate attempts made by the French in the course of November and December, 1870, and more particularly on the 19th of January, 1871, the Crown Prince firmly maintained the position before Paris intrusted to his keeping.

The day before the last effort of General Trochu to break through the iron lines which the Germans had drawn round Paris, to wit, the 18th of January, 1871, his majesty King William of Prussia, having on that day assumed the imperial crown and sceptre of the ancient German empire, issued a decree raising the Crown Prince of Prussia to the high state of Crown Prince of the German empire.

After the happy conclusion of peace, the Crown Prince, always eager to bid adieu to war and strife, left Versailles on the 7th of March, 1871. On the 11th of March he passed through Rouen, on the 14th through Nancy, and so on, in a veritable blaze of triumph, which his unassuming and unpretending modesty would gladly have eschewed, to the Prussian capital, where his happy royal father bestowed upon him, on the 22nd of March, the high insignia of Grand Cross of the Order of the Iron Cross.

On the 16th of June he took the lion's share of popular enthusiasm and admiration in the triumphal

entry into Berlin, and, exactly one month after, in the triumphal entry into Munich.

Since that time the imperial and royal Crown Prince of Germany and Prussia has once more—and how gladly!—effaced himself, as it were, from the great political stage, and taken a happy refuge from its troubles and turmoil in the bosom of his family, where his wife and his children are all the world to him.

There is no need to dwell here upon the deep devotion which all under his genial command have ever borne him, and how the hearty “Good morning,” with which he likes to greet the assembled regiments, finds an equally hearty responsive echo in all ranks of the great host. Nor need we expatiate upon the affectionate love felt for him everywhere by the people of Germany. The profound, racking anxiety with which his illness last year was watched throughout the land afforded ample proof of this.

In the love and affection of the people, his wife, our own Princess Royal, shares most fully and most deservedly. This august lady, unassuming and unpretending, like her noble husband, delights only in setting a bright example to all the women in the land, in her household, in her nursery, in the schoolroom of her children, and in that glorious little model farm of hers and her husband’s at Bornstadt, near Potsdam, a delight in which her

imperial and royal highness has inherited from her great father, the late Prince Consort. The august lady has also given to Berlin a museum of art, in imitation and emulation of the South Kensington Museum in London ; and she is always striving in every way to improve the condition of the poor and suffering of her own sex, and to devise new means and channels of female occupation.

Need any excuse be pleaded here for thus introducing the name and person of the Crown Princess in this memoir? May it not be honestly affirmed, indeed, that her beneficent influence has also largely contributed to the making of the new German empire?

VII.

PRINCE FREDERICK CHARLES OF PRUSSIA.

PRINCE FREDERICK CHARLES is unquestionably a great military commander, who deserves to be placed high among the tactical leaders who have so largely contributed to make the new German empire. But to claim for him, as some military writers have attempted to do, the first and foremost rank among the successful commanders in the wars of 1864, 1866, and 1870-71, seems really an exaggerated stretch of appreciation of the merits of the man.

With some of these adulatory admirers of the prince it has, indeed, become the fashion to throw sneering doubts upon the high military capacity and tactical genius of the Crown Prince, who, to believe these would-be detractors, has simply reaped what his chief of the staff had sown.

In the memoir of the Crown Prince I have already demonstrated the utter groundlessness of this gratuitous assertion, and I have also shown that "Our Fritz," as the old emperor so affectionately calls his first-born, has not committed a single blunder in

the campaigns of 1866 and 1870-71, but that he has, on the contrary, displayed a rare aptitude for repairing the grievous mistakes of others, including, for instance, Prince Frederick Charles's patent miscalculation at Sadowa.

The Crown Prince is a born general, with no war-like predilections ; his cousin is a soldier through and through, with the most emphatic military proclivities.

Prince Frederick Charles Nicholas was born at Berlin on the 20th of March, 1828. He is the eldest and only son of Prince Charles of Prussia, only surviving brother of the German emperor, and Princess Marie of Saxe-Weimar, sister of the Empress Augusta.

As a prince of the house of Prussia he was, of course, from early infancy, intended for and brought up in the military career.

His education was most carefully attended to. He enjoyed in his military and scientific studies the guidance of the most eminent and most renowned teachers, more particularly of Major Roon, subsequently Minister of War.

The major was expressly selected by Prince Charles to attend the young prince in his studies at the University of Bonn, where Frederick Charles remained about two years, from 1846 to 1848.

An intimate friendship was formed here between the brilliant major and his young charge, who, it is not too much to say, formed himself almost exclusively

upon the model of his teacher, in his high qualities as well as, unhappily, also in his glaring defects. The prince's somewhat exaggerated notions of his high princely rank and position, and his slightly extravagant insistence upon the blindest and most absolutely submissive obedience to his will and command on the part of all who happen to be placed under his rule, may truly be said to have been instilled into his mind by Roon.

In 1848 he was made captain of cavalry, and appointed in that capacity to the staff of General Wrangel, whom he attended accordingly in the Schleswig campaign. A valiant soldier, like all Hohenzollerns, and a fearless rider, he gained some personal distinction in the fight of Schleswig.

In 1849 he was raised to the rank of major, and attached to the staff of his uncle, Prince William of Prussia, whom he attended in the Baden campaign. In the fight of Wiesenthal (June 20), where Franz Sigel was very near snatching a victory over the Prussian troops opposed to him, the young hussar officer made several brilliant charges at the head of his squadron.

Here he was severely wounded in the arm and shoulder. His recovery was rather long and tedious. He, however, turned the time of this enforced leisure to most excellent account; he studied hard, more particularly military sciences and history, the lives and campaigns of Frederick the Great and of the

first Napoleon forming the subject of his special predilection.

After his recovery he returned to his military duties, and advanced gradually to the rank of lieutenant-general of cavalry.

In 1854 he married Princess Maria Anna, daughter of Duke Leopold Frederick of Anhalt Dessau, one of the wealthiest of the princes of Germany.

In 1859 his uncle, the Prince Regent, placed him at the head of the 3rd army corps.

Francis Joseph's obstinate dislike of Prussian assistance deprived Frederick Charles of the eagerly anticipated chances of trying conclusions with the French. But, although thus compelled to look on as an idle spectator of the deeds of others, he yet managed to turn the Austro-Italian campaign to the most profitable account for his military schooling. He eagerly watched the French tactics in this war, and, with the lessons of his great teacher (Roon) impressed on his mind, he easily detected their palpable defects.

He clearly saw that it was certainly not the superior prowess of the French or the high military ability of their commanders which had overthrown the Austrians in the field, but that it was chiefly, if not even exclusively, the gross incapacity of Giulay, and the still grosser incapacity of Francis Joseph himself and the gentlemen of his military cabinet, which had led to the catastrophes of Magenta and Solferino.

The prince gathered round him a somewhat extensive circle of superior officers, to whom he explained his views, and with whom he discussed the many important questions arising therefrom or in connection therewith. Those privileged to join in the prince's dissertations on strategic and tactical questions soon began to entertain the highest opinion of this young general's ability.

Some of the most prominent of his military essays Frederick Charles had lithographed for private circulation among his own circle.

However, one of these essays obtained a wider publicity, much against the will and wish of the prince.

It appeared at Frankfort-on-the-Main, in 1860, with the unpretending title, "A Military Memorial, by P. F. C." It was simply an essay on the ways and means of the Prussian army to overcome the French in fight. It created great stir, more especially in France, where it made much bad blood, it would seem, and provoked several "victorious refutations," *en attendant* the chance of teaching the presuming Prussians better at the first opportunity on the field of battle.

Frederick Charles himself was greatly annoyed by the unauthorized publication of his essay. He even, against the advice of his friends, brought an action against the publisher, who had taken the unwarrantable liberty to add a preface of his own manufacture

to the prince's essay—a preface thoroughly alien to Frederick Charles's own personal views. The action ended in the prince's discomfiture; the publisher being triumphantly acquitted.

In 1861 Frederick Charles attained the high rank of general of cavalry in the Prussian army.

When the Danish war broke out in 1864 the prince had intrusted to him the command of the right wing of the Prussian corps.

Wrangel was appointed commander-in-chief of the allied Austro-Prussian forces. Considering the great age of the old marshal, it was almost transparent that the command was meant to be more nominal than real, and that it had been bestowed upon the old man simply to guard against hurting Austrian susceptibilities.

At all events, Prince Frederick Charles might fairly be considered to be almost independent in his sub-command, and to have pretty free hand to devise and execute his own plan of campaign, so that the unsuccessful attempt upon Missunde (2nd of February) must be put down entirely to the debit side of the prince's account.

However, he soon retrieved this first failure by turning off to the right and marching on Arnis, where he successfully crossed the Schley on the 6th of February—a clever strategic move, which compelled the Danes to evacuate the famous Dannewerk.

The prince now marched upon the fortified position

of Düppel, which he found a very hard nut to crack. It took, in fact, a regular siege of two months' duration to prepare the way for the final storm upon the Düppel lines, which were gallantly carried at last on the 18th of April.

Preparations had now to be made to cross over to Alsen ; this operation, however, was not executed by the prince, for after Wrangel's resignation (the old man thought he had no business there), the prince succeeding to the command-in-chief, General Herwarth von Bittenfeld, his successor in the command of the right wing of the Prussian corps, effected the capture of the important island of Alsen.

All things duly considered, and taking into account also, and more especially, the very great disproportion of the forces engaged on both sides, no conscientious historian would venture to claim a very large laurel wreath for Frederick Charles because of his high deeds in the Danish campaign of 1864.

But two years after, in 1866, the prince had a much better and more promising opportunity afforded him to gain the reputation of a great commander, and it must be conceded by all, even by those whose belief in the prince's military ability is by no means absolute, that Frederick Charles fully and most successfully availed himself of this opportunity.

He was intrusted by the king with the command of the first Prussian army, formed of the 2nd,

3rd, and 4th corps, numbering altogether 93,000 effectives. With this army the prince started from his head-quarters in Saxon Lusatia on the 22nd of June, and crossed into Bohemia the day after, where he was speedily joined (28th of June) by General Herwarth von Bittenfeld with the army of the Elbe, numbering some 46,000 effectives, so that the prince had under his supreme command altogether about 140,000 men.

Three days before the junction of the two armies the prince had defeated part of the Austrian forces opposed to him at Liebenau.

This first encounter was almost entirely limited to an artillery fight, and of no very great importance. But the day after (26th of June) he attacked the Austrians again at Podol, where a most obstinate and bloody fight ensued, which ended only at midnight, when Podol was at last finally taken by the Prussians.

It was at Podol where the needle-gun for the first time came into terrible play. An entire battalion of Austrian rifles was annihilated here almost to a man.

On the 28th the prince, having now effected his junction with the army of the Elbe, made a grand attack upon the corps of Clam-Gallas and the Saxon army which had joined it.

The battle took place at Münchengrätz. It ended in the defeat of the Austrians and Saxons, and in their retreat to Gitschin, where they took up a formidable position on a steep rock before the town.

Next day (29th of June) the prince had this position attacked by two Prussian divisions, which, after a most obstinate and bloody fight, in which heavy loss was inflicted and suffered on both sides, drove the Austrians from it headlong into the town of Gitschin. The victorious Prussians relentlessly pursued the defeated enemy, and continued the fight in the streets of Gitschin. After one of the fiercest struggles in the history of this war the Austrians were ultimately driven out, and compelled to retreat to Horziz.

The corps of Clam-Gallas had suffered fearfully in these battles. It was almost disorganized. But the Austrian general had bravely done his duty. Benedek's faulty dispositions had contributed most largely to bring about the catastrophe.

But Benedek was unfortunately, to the grievous damage of his own reputation, mean enough to endeavour to cover his own responsibility by sacrificing his sub-commander, whom he accused in his reports to Vienna of having, by his want of military capacity, caused the overthrow and dissolution of his corps, adding that this grievous failure of Clam-Gallas alone had compelled him (Benedek) to relinquish offensive operations, and to concentrate his army rearward upon Königgrätz.

This false charge led to the summary dismissal of poor Clam-Gallas from his command, which he had to hand over to Count Gondrecourt. Clam-Gallas

afterwards succeeded in proving the "unfairness," to use no harsher word, of Benedek's conduct to him in the affair.

On the 2nd of July, King William, attended by Roon, Moltke, and Bismarck, arrived at Gitschin.

It had been intended to give the Prussian army one or two days' rest, but on the evening of the 2nd of July General Voigts-Rhetz, chief of the staff to Prince Frederick Charles, and, *soit dit en passant*, one of the most brilliant and accomplished officers of the Prussian army, reported to his chief that the Austrians were crossing the Bistritz over to Sadowa.

This report decided General Moltke to bring on a general engagement the next day.

Orders were immediately despatched to the Crown Prince to come up from Kukus, and to take up his position on the right flank, Prince Frederick Charles occupying the front, and General Herwarth von Bittenfeld the left flank or wing.

The ball was opened by Prince Frederick Charles in the centre early in the morning of the 3rd of July; indeed, report will have it, two hours sooner than General Moltke had contemplated, and in the very teeth of the general's injunctions to that effect.

The prince, it is asserted, is a man of towering ambition, and not without jealousy of his royal cousin, the Crown Prince. He was eager, it is said, to snatch a complete victory over the Austrians

before his cousin should be able to come up to share in the laurels gained by him.

The time has not yet come, nor are all the requisite materials at hand, to decide whether there is actually some foundation for this accusation made against the prince, or whether it ought to be relegated into the extensive domain of historic fictions.

It has been pleaded that it was not the premature attack upon the Austrian position made by the prince, but the "unforeseen" delay of the Crown Prince in his advance from Kukus to Chlum, that imperilled for a time the fortune of the day. This plea is peremptorily rejected by Prince Frederick Charles's critics, who maintain that there was nothing unforeseen in the delay of the Crown Prince's march, but that Moltke had previously, in fullest anticipation of such delay, fixed the time of attack at two hours later.

If Prince Frederick Charles really allowed himself to be led away in the matter by his ambition, he certainly must have discovered, at an inconveniently early period of the day, that ambition is a most unsafe guide, and he must have longed for the advent of his royal cousin on the right flank as ardently as Wellington did for the coming of Blücher's Prussians at Waterloo.

It must be conceded, however, by all parties, even those with a strong bias against the prince, that he bore himself right valiantly throughout the

fierce fight of Sadowa, and that his tactical dispositions were most masterly.

His army, also, did its fighting with desperate valour, and with unswerving, toughest firmness throughout. General Fransecky's division, more especially, gained high distinction in the battle, and the heroic courage of the 26th and 27th regiments (Magdeburgers), in the capture of the small wood of Sadowa, was truly beyond all praise.

Still the fate of the day remained suspended in the scales of Fortune, and as noon came there was clearly a preponderating incline to the Austrian side. Herwarth von Bittenfeld advanced but slowly from the left wing, and the king, who acted as commander-in-chief of the combined armies, was overlong detained on Probus-hill, where he had taken up his station early in the morning. His majesty also ardently longed for the arrival of his son and heir, but did meanwhile his best to keep the fight in suspense, at least, by the most formidable display of artillery.

To this latter splendid branch of the Prussian service belonged unquestionably a considerable share of the glory of the ultimate victory, which, as has been stated already in the memoir of the Crown Prince, was finally gained by the magnificently-executed movement of the Silesians under Mutius across the Trotina—compelling Benedek, at a most critical juncture, to change the position of his right

wing—and by the heroic capture of Chlum, effected by the Augusta and Elizabeth battalions of the guard.

To return once more to the precipitation of the attack in the morning imputed to Prince Frederick Charles, the prince's critics maintain that it was owing in a great measure, at least, to the exhaustion of his and Bittenfeld's forces that the battle did not eventuate in the total destruction of the Austrians, which might have led to more surprising results even than those achieved in the end.

The prince's alleged "mistake, or miscalculation" has by some of his critics been compared in its issue and results with the famous blunder of General Manstein, at Colin, in the Seven Years' War.

Now I must candidly confess that this seems to me a stretch far beyond anything ever yet before attempted to throw discredit upon the achievements and reputation of a truly great commander in the field.

To make this clear I will give a brief sketch here of the political and military position of affairs at the battle of Colin.

At the time of that battle, Frederick the Great, having just before (6th of May, 1757) gained the great victory of Prague, with the prospect of compelling the surrender of the beaten Austrian army, which had taken refuge in that city, held apparently a most promising position, politically and militarily.

Of the great coalition formed against him, one

of the most important members, Saxony, was absolutely in his hands. The French were only just making their appearance on the scene, the Russians were still far off, and the princes of the Holy Roman Empire were just being frightened into the speediest withdrawal from the anti-Prussian coalition by Colonel Meyer's expedition into Franconia.

Had the great king succeeded in defeating the other Austrian army in the field, which was commanded by Marshal Daun, and had taken up a formidable position at Colin, Prague must have surrendered; the Holy Roman Empire must have accepted any conditions of peace it might have pleased the victorious Borussian king to impose upon its members; France and Russia would have thought twice before they had gone on with the war; and Maria Theresa would have been compelled to make peace again, at the additional sacrifice, perhaps, of another province ceded to the conqueror.

I have said Marshal Daun had taken up a formidable position at Colin. The Austrian front, or centrum, looking to the north, was, in fact, unassailable to all intents and purposes. Not so the right wing, which, if properly attacked by overwhelming forces, could hardly avoid being rolled up and forced upon the centre.

The execution of this tactical manœuvre was intrusted by the king to Generals Ziethen and Hülsen,

who commanded the left Prussian wing. The Prussian centre, under Maurice of Dessau, and the right wing under the Duke of Bevern, were strictly ordered by the king to abstain from all offensive operations upon the Austrians opposed to them, and to hold themselves in readiness to give the most energetic support to the attacking left wing of the Prussian army.

One of Prince Maurice's sub-commanders in the Prussian centre, a General Manstein, a man of towering ambition, under pretext of an order from the king alleged to have been brought him by M. de Varennes, a French refugee in the king's service, engaged the fight in the centre, where the Austrian position was absolutely unassailable.

This gross blunder proved fatal. The Prussian army was badly defeated, despite the most heroic courage and endurance; it suffered enormous losses, and the siege of Prague had to be raised at once and Bohemia evacuated by the Prussians.

General Manstein had committed a similar blunder at the battle of Prague, but with less dire results, and the king, in the joy of victory, had forbore to visit with deserved punishment the general's want of strict obedience to commands.

To pretend to detect the least similarity between Prince Frederick Charles's premature attack on the morning of the 3rd of July, even admitting the justice of this charge against him (which I for one

will not concede), and Manstein's bold defiance of orders at Colin, seems to me positively monstrous.

After the battle of Königgrätz, Prince Frederick Charles moved with his army into Moravia upon Brünn, Herwarth von Bittenfeld being directed upon Iglau, both in the direct road to Vienna.

The Archduke Albrecht, having meanwhile taken the chief command of all the Austrian forces, ordered Benedek up from Olmütz to Florisdorf, to see whether Vienna might not be successfully defended there.

The Crown Prince tried to cut off Benedek's direct line of march to Vienna, but he failed, as has been stated already in his memoir. Prince Frederick Charles was more successful. He sent the division of Horn to Lundenburg, where he succeeded (16th of July) in forcing Benedek to cross to the left bank of the March river. The Austrian general had therefore to effect his retreat to Vienna across the lesser Carpathian mountains.

The last deed of arms performed in this war by the army of Prince Frederick Charles was the battle of Blumenau. Here General Fransecky vigorously attacked the Austrians in front (22nd of July), whilst General Bose undertook to turn them by a masked march over the hills. This operation succeeded fully, and there was every prospect of another great victory, which would have laid Hungary open to the Prussians, when, at noon, the news was brought of the conclusion of an armistice at head-quarters.

Four days after followed the preliminaries of peace.

In the Franco-German war of 1870-71, Prince Frederick Charles had the command of the Second German Army intrusted to him.

He left Berlin on the 26th of July for his headquarters.

He first appeared actively on the scene on the 16th of August, in the fierce fight of Mars-la-Tour. He had been moving swiftly upon the French line of retreat. In co-operation with this movement, General Steinmetz had, on the 14th of August, engaged the retreating French at Courcelles, and had forced them back behind the fortifications of Metz. This had given the prince an additional day, which he had turned to the best account.

The 3rd corps, under the command of General von Alvensleben II., bore the brunt of this engagement at Mars-la-Tour, which was one of the fiercest and bloodiest battles of the war. It stood opposed for hours to overwhelming French forces; at last it was supported by part of the 10th corps, and of the 8th and 9th corps, under the personal command of the prince. Even then the French forces were numerically greatly preponderating over the Germans. Yet, after twelve hours' incessant struggle, the French were thrown back into Metz.

It was in this terrible battle of Mars-la-Tour that six squadrons of German cavalry (7th Cuirassiers and 16th Lancers) made the famous dashing attack upon

the French centre at Vionville, which delayed Canrobert's attempt to break through until it was too late.

Surprise has often been expressed how this attack, however dashing, made by so small a force, could possibly have hindered the French centre, consisting of two entire corps, from forcing a way through its Prussian opponents.

Quite lately the *Milit. Wochenblatt* contained a query in this same sense, with a suggestion added, whether the leaders of the French were not perhaps completely confounded and misled by the dash of the attack.

To this Count Schmettau, who had himself commanded one of the two attacking regiments (the 7th Cuirassiers), replied in the same military journal, that he had had occasion, some time after the capitulation of Metz, to discuss this very affair with the French General Henri, who was chief of the staff of Marshal Canrobert on the 16th of August, 1870 (the day of the battle of Mars-la-Tour), and who was present in the field during this attack. General Henri, in reply to a question addressed to him by General Schmettau, said, "We could not think that two regiments would so madly ride into the open jaws of death unless they knew themselves powerfully supported."

It would seem, accordingly, that it was the slender force of the attacking horse which misled the French,

and made them hesitate at the very time when they might have succeeded in their object, since the weak Prussian forces then opposed to them could not possibly have hindered them, as Count Schmettau fully admits. The count claims for the commander of the Prussian corps, General Alvensleben II., the high credit of having with prompt decision made up his mind to incur the risk of the certain loss of two regiments of cavalry—but of only two—to purchase thereby, perchance, a very great success.

At Gravelotte also the prince was present, and contributed much to the favourable result of the day.

Personal dissensions between the prince and General Steinmetz, which will be found mentioned more at length in the memoir of the general, led to the latter's withdrawal from the army before Metz, leaving the prince in undivided and undisturbed command of the German besieging forces.

Here, with some 120,000 men, he kept Bazaine shut up in the fortress and fortified camp of Metz, with close upon 180,000 men, victoriously repulsing the repeated most desperate attempts of the French marshal to break through the iron circle he had drawn round him and his host.

The two most formidable of these French sorties were made on the 31st of August and the 1st of September, and on the 7th of October, the former, in which the fight raged almost incessantly from the

morning of the 31st of August till noon of the 1st of September, is known in the history of the war as the battle of Noisseville. In this, as well as in the latter sortie, when the French attacked from the direction of Woippy, the noble division Kummer had the lion's share of the fighting.

At last, on the 27th of October, Bazaine capitulated with his whole army, some 173,000 men, including three marshals of France and over 6,000 officers, whilst the conquerors did not much exceed 110,000 effectives at the time of the surrender—a capitulation unique in the annals of history; for at Sedan the circumstances were vastly different, and the surrender of Paris also affords no true point of comparison.

The day after the capitulation of Metz the king raised both Prince Frederick Charles and the Crown Prince to the highest rank in the army, that of field-marshal-general.

In the oldest traditions of the house of Hohenzollern the attainment of this highest military position had never before been open to a prince of the royal family. The king's brother, Prince Charles, the father of Frederick Charles, figures in the rank list of the army simply as master-general of ordnance, and the king himself, when Prince of Prussia, had only held the position of colonel-general of infantry. But the extraordinary events and the stupendous successes of the French war might well be deemed by the king to fully justify

this double departure from the old traditionary rule of the family.

The surrender of Metz was a most opportune event ; for just about that time Gambetta's patriotic exertions were beginning to succeed in sending fresh French armies into the field.

On the 9th of November General d'Aurelle de Paladines forced the Bavarians, under Von der Tann, to evacuate Orleans. Although he was himself compelled to stop the pursuit, as General Wittich, Prince Albrecht (father), and the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg rapidly joined Von der Tann, yet this new army of the Loire became a real danger to the Germans besieging Paris.

To meet this threatening peril effectively, Frederick Charles received orders from head-quarters to march as rapidly as possible from Metz to the Loire.

On the 2nd of November already the prince had transferred his own head-quarters from Corny, where they had been since the 7th of September, to Pont-à-Mousson. On the 10th of November he was at Troyes. He advanced rapidly over Sens, Rambouillet, Nemours, and Pithiviers, until he came in collision, on the 28th of November, with d'Aurelle's army (the army of the Loire), at Beaune-la-Rolande.

He here inflicted a severe defeat on the French, who lost some 5,000 killed and wounded, and about 2,000 unwounded prisoners.

On the 3rd of December the prince, in conjunction with the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, defeated the French again at Chevilly and Chillyers-aux-Bois, driving them back upon Orleans, which important city was re-taken by the Germans on the 5th of December.

On this grand occasion more than 10,000 unwounded prisoners were made, and close upon eighty pieces of artillery taken, together with four gunboats, each of them armed with a 24-pounder.

The prince continued his advance upon Tours. On the 12th of December he transferred his head-quarters to Beaugency, where the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg had had several days' hard fighting against vastly preponderating French forces. Blois was occupied on the 13th of December, Vendôme on the 16th of December.

By this time the Loire army, commanded now by General Chanzy, had been reduced to about half its original formidable strength. On the 4th of January, 1871, Prince Frederick Charles, having completed his preparations, moved forward to meet General Chanzy.

He came upon the army of that general advancing on Vendôme, and threw it back beyond Azay and Montoire (6th of January).

The day after, the French were, by a series of obstinate fights, driven successively back to Nogent-le-Rotrou, Sargé, Savigny, and La Chartre, and on the 8th beyond St. Calais and Bouloire. On the 12th

of January, finally, Le Mans was taken by the victorious prince, who also carried the French positions at St. Cornille, to the north-east of Le Mans.

The losses of Chanzy's army in the seven days' incessant fighting, from the 6th to the 12th of January, were enormous. Twenty thousand unwounded prisoners fell into the hands of the victors, together with many guns and large war stores, &c.

The famous camp of Conlie was occupied on the 14th of January.

With this last successful operation we may fairly close here our brief account of Prince Frederick Charles's glorious campaign on the Loire.

On the 28th of January the armistice was concluded, which was followed, less than a month after, by the signing of the preliminaries of peace.

On the 22nd of March Prince Frederick Charles received from the emperor and king, as a crowning proof and most signal mark of his high regard and his full appreciation of the prince's great achievements in the field, the Grand Cross of the Iron Cross.

The prince is now in his forty-seventh year, in the prime and vigour of manhood. He is one of the most prosperous among the prosperous, one of the most fortunate among the fortunate.

Although, owing no doubt to his somewhat haughty bearing towards those placed under his command, and his rigorous enforcement of the sternest and most

unbending discipline, it cannot be said that he enjoys the devoted love of the army as the Crown Prince does, yet officers and soldiers alike look up to him with the most respectful esteem, and they will follow his lead blindly, and with the most absolute confidence in his high military capacity.

They have bestowed upon him the name of the "Iron Prince," but he is more generally known still as the "Red Prince," from the colour of the hussar uniform which he most affects to wear.

What may the future still have in store for this favourite of Fortune? Who can tell? Of late his name has been brought forward again more than once and in several quarters, with evident intention, in connection with the throne of Spain. Well, *Quien sabe?* Of course his truest friends can only wish the prince a lucky escape from such a windfall of fortune as the glittering bauble of the Spanish crown and sceptre; but ambition is a strange and most dangerous passion—and so again, who knows?

VIII.

KING ALBERT OF SAXONY.

THOUGH placed here third in our list of leaders of the German host in the ever-memorable Franco-German war of 1870-71, yet ranking second to none in that glorious galaxy of great commanders, King Albert, a namesake of our own unforgotten and never-to-be-forgotten Prince Consort, springs also from the same most ancient and most noble house of Wettin.

Wettin is now only a small, wholly unimportant place, of some four thousand souls. Yet a thousand years ago it was the (legendary) cradle and chief seat of power of the mighty Wettinkind, or Widukin, the antique Saxon hero, who for thirteen years nobly withstood the overwhelming giant power of the Frankish King Charles, dubbed Carolus Magnus by that capricious jade Clio, who so dearly likes to adulate success.

However little substantial foundation in truth there may be for the legendary connection between Wettin and Wettinkind, thus much is certain, at all events,

that Wettin was the ancestral seat of the Thanes, or Counts, of that ilk, to whom all the royal and ducal Saxon and Thuringian houses of the present day trace their origin and pedigree.

King Albert's father, the late King John of Saxony, played an important part in the great events of the last few years. It was more especially dread of his action in the matter which induced King Louis of Bavaria to be beforehand with him in tendering the crown of a new German empire to King William of Prussia. Had the Bavarian not taken time by the forelock on the occasion, there can be little doubt that the new empire would have been established at the time at once upon a much more rational and satisfactory basis than that on which it happens to stand now, and without the wretched trammels of those foolish reserved sovereign rights of its kinglets and princelets, which may yet unhappily prove the fruitful source of internal convulsions and foreign intrigue complications. For this reason King John may well claim a place among the men who have been instrumental in creating the new German empire. A brief biographic sketch of the father may therefore serve here as a suitable introduction to the memoir of the son.

THE LATE KING JOHN OF SAXONY.

It is a trite old saying, that the people have rarely cause to mourn when kings die. Still there are excep-

tions from time to time, just to prove the rule. One of such rare exceptional instances had to be chronicled in the annals of history on 29th of October, 1873, when King John of Saxony departed this life.

The deceased monarch was not a great king in any of the generally received senses and acceptations of the term. His dominions did not quite cover the limited area of six thousand English square miles, whilst the number of his subjects fell far short of the figure of the population of the British metropolis. No warrior-king was he ; no new provinces annexed he to his realm. He did not gather round him poets, artists, and musicians, that he might bask in second-hand reflected "intellectual" glory ; ay, he did not even start an international exhibition of works of industry and art, that his name might thereby be made great and renowned among men.

But he was emphatically a noble specimen of the noblest work of the Almighty Father of all—an honest man, and a worthy king of men. Indeed, of him and of his life and deeds the truth may be recorded undisguisedly, without fear of offending against the spurious old canon that naught should be spoken of the dead but the things redounding to their praise.

John—for a truly great man such as the father of the present King of Saxony needs not the benefit of that full string of baptismal belongings which is generally bestowed upon Catholic princes ; and with

his people "Our King" and "Father John" had for many years past become interchangeable terms—was one of the younger sons of Duke Maximilian of Saxony and Caroline Maria Theresa of Parma, of the Italian-Spanish branch of the house of Bourbon. He was born on the 12th of December, 1801, and had the misfortune of losing his mother when not much more than two years old. His father, Duke Maximilian, was not a great prince, but he was an excellent parent, and he bestowed the utmost care and solicitude upon the proper education of his children.

Prince John's instructors were distinguished officers and scholars, such as Generals Forell and Watzdorf, Councillor Stübel, the famous criminalist and legist, who fired his young pupil with his own ardent love for the law, and that noblest priest of the *non-Romish* Catholic Church, Baron Ignatius Wessenberg, Vicar-General of Constance, the intimate friend of the great Chancellor Dalberg, and the man who strove so hard to establish in Germany a National Catholic Church—a *German* Catholic Church, under an independent *German Primate*, and free alike from all connection with the Baal of Rome and the poisonous teachings of the Vatican. He failed: the time was not ripe for his high and noble aspirations. But, happily, a greater and stronger man than he has taken up the glorious work anew, and, with God's blessing, will carry it to a glorious consummation. Bismarck is

the St. Patrick who will ultimately chase the Romish vipers out of the fair land.

Under the intelligent guidance of these and other kindred teachers, Prince John gathered a rich store of sound knowledge in nearly every field of human lore and branch of human knowledge. The great and wise men who presided over the political and social department of his studies used their best endeavours to teach him practical statesmanship in preference to mere hollow statecraft. And they succeeded marvelously well in their endeavours. Ere yet he had reached the twentieth year of his life he was fit to enter the Board of Finance as an adept, and he there soon shone as one of the most clear-headed and hardest workers.

His assiduous labour affecting his health, his anxious father insisted upon his accompanying his elder brother Clement on a journey which the latter was then just about to make to their deceased mother's native land (1821). The two Saxon princes made a long stay in Italy, where the elder of them died.

It was here where Prince John imbibed that passionate admiration and love of Petrarch, Ariosto, and more especially of the divine Dante, which he retained through life.

After his return to his native land he resumed his old position on the Board of Finance (1823), of which he became vice-president a few months after.

Even the surprising amount of sterling work which

he did in this department, and of which the little kingdom reaped the benefit, did not satisfy his eager craving for doing. In his rare leisure hours he produced a German version of the first ten cantos of Dante's *Inferno*, done in blank Hendecasyllabics, with critical annotations that fully showed the ripe scholar. This work was printed for private circulation among his personal friends. It was signed "Philaethes," a signature which soon became known as that of a distinguished contributor to several of the leading literary periodicals of Germany.

It was about this time that the Saxon Antiquarian and Archæological Society was formed, which he eagerly joined, and of which he was soon made president, a position held by him for many years after—not in the mere honorary way in which so many princes accept titular positions of this nature, but truly and actually as the *facile princeps* of the members.

About this time he found that his estate of Jahnishausen did not yield him a revenue corresponding to what practical landowners obtained from their properties; so he threw himself, with his accustomed ardour, upon the study, theoretical and practical, of farming and rural economy, and with such brilliant success that his Jahnishausen estate in a few brief years, from worse than indifferent, as it had long been, leaped to the high position of a perfect model farm on a large scale.

On the 21st of November, 1822, Prince John married

Princess Amelia Augusta, one of the daughters of King Maximilian I. of Bavaria, who survives him. By her he had issue three sons and one daughter. One of the sons is dead. The Crown Prince, now King Frederick Augustus Albert, was born the 23rd of April, 1828; his sister Maria Elizabeth, Dowager Duchess of Genoa, was born the 4th of February, 1830, and his only surviving brother, Frederick Augustus George, who also distinguished himself in the late Franco-German war, and commanded the Saxon corps after his brother Albert had been appointed general-in-chief of the army of the Meuse, was born the 8th of August, 1832.

Prince George is married (since the 11th of May, 1859) to the Portuguese Infanta Maria Anna, daughter of King Ferdinand (of the house of Saxe-Coburg Gotha) and Queen Maria II. da Gloria, by whom he has issue three sons and two daughters. The present king has no issue.

The revolutionary wave which swept over a great part of Europe in 1830 struck also the little kingdom of Saxony.

Old King Anton was not a good king by any means, so his subjects politely requested him to hand the reins of government over to Prince Frederick Augustus, John's elder brother, and the next prince in succession, the father, Duke Maximilian of Saxony, having resigned his claim to the throne, by Act of the 13th of September, 1830. On the same day

Prince Frederick Augustus was named co-regent. Prince John took the command of the Communal Guard, which he retained for many years after. He also entered the Privy Council, and after the dissolution of the latter he accepted the proffered presidency of the Council of State, together with the presidency of the Board of Finance.

In all these high and important offices, his clear, practical mind, his urbane and conciliatory manners, and his immense working capacity, gained him golden opinions from all quarters. He took a most active part and share in the framing of the new liberal and representative constitution of the realm.

After the passing of that constitution he took his seat in the Upper House as a prince of the blood. His statesmanlike views, his simple, natural eloquence, and his power of clear exposition, soon gained him a prominent place in the foremost rank of the leaders of that august assembly. Many of the most practical and liberal measures of the time originated with him, or owed their success to his energetic support.

His wisdom and moderation carried him through the revolutionary excitement of 1848 with his personal popularity undiminished. In 1839-49 he published a splendid German version of Dante's "*Divina Commedia*" in three volumes, with numerous critical and historical notes.

After the death of King Anton, who since September, 1830, had simply continued the nominal head

of the state, Prince Frederick Augustus, the co-regent, succeeded to the Saxon throne, 6th of June, 1836. On the 9th of August, 1854, King Frederick Augustus II. came to an untimely death, universally mourned and regretted by his people. As he left no issue, Prince John inherited the crown.

The new king expressed his firm resolve to tread in the footsteps of his late lamented brother and predecessor; and this resolve he kept religiously from the day of his accession to the last day of his life.

Among the most glorious measures of his reign, most of which proceeded from his own initiative, may be mentioned more particularly the new law organization; an extensive and comprehensive series of codifications of the laws and statutes of the land; the removal of all obsolete and vexatious trammels that impeded the free development of trade and industry, and the extension and improvement of the great Saxon railway net.

Every year, up to the end of his life, he made an annual journey of careful and conscientious inspection through the length and breadth of his small kingdom, more particularly through the manufacturing districts; seeing everywhere with his own eyes, and hearing with his own ears—quite against the ordinary custom of kings—and suggesting and carrying out everywhere measures admirably calculated to benefit the working classes.

No wonder they so affectionately called him "Father John." He was indeed a father to them.

That he was not so successful in foreign politics as in the internal administration of his kingdom was truly not so much a fault of his, but was owing almost entirely to a fortuitous combination of fatal circumstances over which he had but little control.

Both his late brother and he had married princesses of the house of Bavaria, daughters of King Maximilian I. His brother's wife was a twin sister of the Archduchess Sophia of Austria, the late mother of the Emperor Francis Joseph; his own wife was a twin sister of the present Queen Dowager of Prussia.

These four Bavarian princesses exercised for many years a most pernicious action and influence upon German affairs.

Sophia of Austria was the moving and guiding spirit of the palace intrigue which compelled poor Emperor Ferdinand to abdicate, and threw the whole power of the state into her own hands. It was she who committed the horrible murders of the Hungarian patriot generals at Arad, and all those atrocities for which the London draymen assaulted Haynau.

Queen Elizabeth of Prussia had gained complete mastery over the weak and uxorious mind of Frederick William IV. It was her fatal influence which brought the humiliation of Olmütz upon the land that had the misfortune to call her queen.

The two Saxon queens, the dowager and the wife

of King John, worked in all political questions hand in hand with their Austrian and Prussian sisters ; and with them, and inspired and guided by the four, laboured Baron Beust, the leading minister of state of Saxony, and the ministers of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Hesse—all joining in the noble task of curbing and if possible destroying the rising and growing power of Prussia.

King John of Saxony, with his clear mind, saw indeed through their intrigues, and for a time at least did his best to discourage and counteract them.

Thus, in 1862, when the continued existence of the Prussian Customs Union was gravely imperilled by Austria's machinations, he was the first to declare for the renewal of that union, and to give his adhesion to the Franco-Prussian Treaty of Commerce.

He also adhered to the Prusso-Italian Treaty of Commerce, and disregarding alike the solicitations and the remonstrances of the two queens and the wily counsel and insinuations of the minister of state, frankly recognized the new kingdom of Italy.

But King John was a loyal member of the German Confederation, and a sincere professor of the Roman Catholic faith ; for, strange to say, the kings of Saxony, although descended from what may well be called the oldest Protestant house in Germany, and ruling over a Protestant people (the number of Catholics in Saxony barely exceeds 2 per cent. of the population), have been Roman Catholics ever since

the Elector Frederick Augustus of Saxony was beguiled into placing the glittering but worse than worthless bauble of the Polish crown upon his head (1697).

Now the smaller kings and princes of the German Confederation had, from the first, always shown a leaning to Austria and distrust of Prussia. Joining their votes to that of the former power, their anti-Prussian policy could always secure a majority in the councils of the Confederation. The kings of Saxony had always voted with the majority, and King John thought himself in honour bound to go with that majority, at least in all important questions. As a Romanist, also, he preferred the interests of Catholic Austria to those of Protestant Prussia.

Upon the death of King Frederick of Denmark, the old Schleswig-Holstein question, which had been permitted to slumber for a time, came suddenly again to the surface, as lively as ever.

After some ineffectual attempts at a settlement with the new Danish king, the German Confederation passed a resolution to occupy the Duchy of Holstein militarily (7th of December, 1863), Saxony and Hanover being selected by the Confederation to carry out the decree. A mixed Saxon and Hanoverian corps accordingly took military possession of Holstein.

Soon after, Otto von Bismarck made the first great move in his surprising political game, in persuading Austria to join with Prussia in a war against Den-

mark, with a view to settle the Schleswig-Holstein question for ever, by taking the Elbe Duchies away from Denmark.

Austria and Prussia carried matters with a high hand, and paid but scanty respect to the Confederation, which saw itself soon compelled to order the withdrawal of the Saxon and Hanoverian forces from Holstein (by resolution of the 5th of December, 1864).

There can be no doubt that the king felt personally hurt by the slight put upon the Confederation and upon himself, which he attributed almost wholly to the agency of Prussia and of Bismarck.

So when the complications of 1866 arose, he was easily prevailed upon by the petticoat coterie and the whisperings and promptings of Beust to take the side of Austria in the diplomatic conflict roused in the bosom of the Confederation. Beust had perfectly free hand now.

Urged on blindly by his froggy ambition, and endowed by nature with an intriguing spirit and with all the mischievous restlessness of the squirrel Rata-tasker of the mythic fable, this shallow politician, this Brummagem Brühl of the nineteenth century, patted on the back by the four Bavarian princesses, devised a pretty little scheme to bring the house of Hohenzollern to humiliation and grief.

As he was joined in this scheme by Von der Pfordten, Varnbüler, Dalwigk, and the representative of the physically, morally, and intellectually blind

King of Hanover, and, lastly, by the great Victor Strauss, the mighty plenipotentiary of the powerful Prince of Schaumburg-Lippe, he succeeded in splitting Germany into two hostile camps.

The first effect of this success was to drive King John from his kingdom, which was taken possession of by the invading Prussians. Indeed Bismarck, Roon, and Moltke had planned so well that had it not been for the fatal delay of one day's respite granted to Saxony and Hanover (from the 15th to the 16th of June) by King William, in compliance with the vehement prayer of the Dowager Queen Elizabeth, the whole Saxon army of 40,000 effectives would probably have been cut off from Bohemia and compelled to surrender, and the battle of Langensalza need not have been fought.

I have placed the effective strength of the Saxon army which marched into Bohemia to join Benedek at 40,000 men, a figure which I think corresponds with the fact of the case. Certain Saxon historians would appear to place it much higher, from patriotic, but surely most unhistoric, motives. They assert that 60,000 Saxons joined Benedek, although they are compelled to admit that the Saxon army consisted of only two infantry divisions of four regiments each, one cavalry division, and the corresponding force of artillery. The same historians also assert that the Saxons were never defeated in the Bohemian war, but had to retire from the field by Benedek's special orders

—at Gitschin, for instance. This, though not true, might be indulgently passed over, and put down to an excess of laudable patriotic pride. But to exalt the bravery of the Saxons and the military talents of their commander at the expense of the Austrians and of Benedek, and to say, as these historians do, that the Saxons constituted the backbone of Benedek's forces, and were the only troops who fought valiantly and well and were properly led, seems to me a most reprehensible open perversion of the truth and the facts of the case. However, enough of this in this place.

After the defeat of Benedek, King John retired to Vienna; subsequently to Teplitz. When peace was concluded, he returned to his little kingdom amidst the joyful acclamations of his faithful and loving people (November, 1866).

When Saxony had become a member of the North German Confederation, King John showed the most steadfast loyalty to Prussia.

In 1870 he promptly sent his army, under the command of his two sons (Crown Prince Albert, and Prince George), to swell the German host.

The high deeds wrought in France by the Saxon contingent and its heroic leaders are matters of history, and will, in slight part at least, be found recorded also in the memoir of King Albert shortly to follow.

It must indeed have been a proud day for King

John when the 23rd division made its triumphal entry into Dresden (11th of July, 1871), and when he, the happy father, acting as representative and in the name of the German emperor, placed the field-marshal's staff in the hands of the victor of Beaumont, his own beloved son Albert—the same golden staff of command which John Sobiesky had so proudly waved in his chivalrous right hand on his triumphal entry into Vienna, freed by his gallantry and skill from the Turkish besiegers.

A few months later there came another great national celebration—the unveiling of Theodore Körner's statue, 18th of October, 1871, the anniversary of the great victory over the French at Leipzig. And, finally, some thirteen months after, on the 21st of November, 1872, King John celebrated his own "golden" day, the fiftieth anniversary of his marriage with his wife Amalia, amidst the warmest congratulations sent by all the princely houses of Europe, and the heartiest and most loving manifestations of sympathy and kindest wishes of his own true Saxon people.

Altogether, the last two years of King John's life were peaceful and happy.

He now sleeps with his fathers, a good king and a worthy man.

There is small need to perpetuate his memory in stone or marble, or in brass or bronze; he has raised for himself an everlasting monument in the faithful hearts of his loving people.

After this brief biographic sketch of the father, we will now proceed with the memoir of the son.

Frederick Augustus Albert was born on the 23rd of April, 1828. He received a most careful education under the immediate supervision of his royal father and of his grandfather Duke Maximilian, who, however, departed this life ere his young grandson had completed his tenth year.

Albert had for his chief guides in the paths of learning Lieutenant-Colonel Minkwitz and General Engel, both of them highly accomplished officers; Dr. Langern, afterwards president of the High Court of Appeal, one of the leading legists of Germany, as well as one of the most eminent historians of the age; Dr. Schneider, afterwards Minister of State, also an eminent legist, and some other men of the same high intellectual stamp.

Prince Albert showed from a very early age a decided predilection for the military career. When barely fifteen (1843) he entered the Saxon artillery as lieutenant. Two years after, another distinguished officer, Major Mangoldt, afterwards general, was appointed the prince's military tutor; he also went with him to Bonn in the fall of 1847. Here, in this favourite resort of royal students, Prince Albert attended the lectures of Dahlmann and Perthes, and other celebrities, but the revolutionary outbreak of 1848 cut short his stay at that highly-favoured seat of the Muses.

On his return to Saxony he preferentially sought the society and conversation of distinguished officers, such as Fabrice, Stieglitz, Abendroth, Montbé, and others, and eagerly seized every opportunity to increase his store of military knowledge.

In the Schleswig-Holstein war of 1848-49 he was attached to the staff of the Prussian General Prittwitz. It is said he distinguished himself in that most melancholy of all campaigns, that most lugubrious of all farces. His uncle, King Frederick Augustus, bestowed upon him as a reward the military Saxon Order of St. Henry.

In 1849 Prince Albert was advanced to the rank of major, and the year after to a lieutenant-colonelcy and the command of the 3rd infantry brigade. In 1851 he was made major-general, and the year after lieutenant-general and commander of the 1st infantry division. He was then twenty-four years old. It may be remarked here, *en passant*, that princes of the royal house of Prussia do not advance *quite* so fast as this in the Prussian army. Even Prince Frederick Charles, who was born in the same year with King Albert, and whose advancement was exceptionally rapid, had to wait a few years longer for the high rank of lieutenant-general.

On the 18th of June, 1853, Prince Albert married Princess Carola, or Caroline, daughter of Gustavus Prince of Wasa, whom Louis Napoleon had the year before wished to espouse, it was at the time generally

reported, but only to see his suit contumeliously rejected by the proud Lackland of the old Swedish king family. Had Gustavus Wasa been less stiffly proud and more yielding, and had Carola become the modern Cæsar's wife—instead of Eugénie Montijo—how immense would have been the effect upon the history of the last fifteen years or so ! However, *Dis aliter visum*. So there is an end of it, and no use whatever to speculate upon what *might* have been *if*.

In 1861 Crown Prince Albert of Saxony (his father had succeeded his uncle on the throne of Saxony some seven years before) was sent to Königsberg in Prussia, to witness the coronation of King William I. It was here where he met for the first time the then darling of Fortune, M'Mahon, Marshal of France, Duke of Magenta. Nine years after, he was destined to meet him again on the battle-field of Beaumont, the portentous precursor of the cataclysm of Sedan !

In 1866 the Crown Prince of Saxony commanded the Saxon army of 40,000 effectives, in every way well found and equipped, and provided with a well-schooled artillery, which was marched into Bohemia to swell the Austrian host there under Benedek, and to help to break the Prussian columns that were invading the old battle-ground again in the style of the Seven Years' War.

On the 22nd of June the Saxons joined the corps of Clam Gallas, and shared the subsequent grievous

defeats of that corps. The Saxons fought with desperate bravery, and were extremely well handled by their royal leader. This is the simple truth ; but to assert that they did all the fighting, and the Austrians little or none of it, as has been attempted to be done, and that they (the Saxons) would have carried the day repeatedly, more especially at Gitschin, had they not been compelled by Benedek's express orders to retire from the field, victoriously held by them at the time, is really a stretch over-much beyond what is admissible and allowable even in historic fiction. Such things ought to be left to the French.

At Königgrätz Prince Albert and his Saxons again shared the defeat of Benedek and the Austrians. Here also the Saxons fought extremely well, and the Saxon artillery contributed largely to cover the retreat of the defeated army.

The royal family of Saxony, the Crown Prince included, now took up their residence in Vienna till the conclusion of peace, after which they returned to Dresden.

The king and the Crown Prince both declared that they would henceforth be as loyal to the North German Confederation, under the leadership of Prussia, as they had proved themselves to the now defunct old German Confederation. The Crown Prince showed such vigorous good will in aiding in the reorganization of the Saxon army as an integral

part of the great North German host, that King William I. at once bestowed upon him the independent command of the 12th (Saxon) Army Corps.

The Crown Prince and his friend, General Fabrice, the Saxon Minister of War, were both indefatigable in doing everything to bring the Saxon Contingent to the highest state of perfection, and their efforts succeeded to the fullest extent, as the Franco-German war amply proved.

In this war Crown Prince Albert continued at first simply in the command of the 12th corps. His orders were to bring up his force to Mayence by the 2nd of August. He and his men were on the appointed spot in perfect readiness two days before the time fixed!—no mean achievement, considering that the exacting demands made by the general staff of the Prussian army upon the physical and moral powers of doing and enduring of the soldiers do not leave much margin for the performance of such *tours de force*.

Prince Albert, with his corps, reached the great army before Metz on the 16th of August, in the evening, and just when he was presenting himself before King William at Pont-à-Mousson, news of the hard-fought glory of Mars-la-Tour came in.

On the day of Gravelotte the Saxons had their first innings: here the Crown Prince of Saxony had the first real opportunity given him to make good his claim to the title of a great military commander.

Both he and his troops came gloriously out of the ordeal.

The Saxons fought at St. Privat with the same death-daring boldness and the same unconquerable tenacity as their forefathers of old had combated under Widukin and Alboin against the ruthless Franks ; under great King Henry, the builder of cities, and his son, the Emperor Otto, against the savage Magyars ; under Duke Magnus against the united power of all other German tribes, and on so many other occasions. Prince Albert proved himself a consummate commander. He closed up the last possible loophole through which Bazaine's army might have crept away from the trap in which Moltke's sublime skill and the unyielding bravery of the Germans had caught the great French host of the Rhine, ere it had fairly set out yet on its anticipated triumphal *promenade militaire à Berlin* !

King William knew how to appreciate at their true value the immense services rendered to the German cause by Prince Albert and his Saxons on the decisive day of Gravelotte. When he met the prince in the evening of that hot day, he affixed to his breast with his own hand the Order of the Iron Cross ; and the day after he intrusted to him the command over a new army, formed of the Saxon corps, the Prussian guards, under their glorious chief, Prince Augustus of Wurtemberg, the 4th corps, commanded by General Alvensleben, and the cavalry

divisions Rheinhaben and Duke William I. of Mecklenburg. This new army, a true *corps d'élite* in the fullest sense of the term, received afterwards the name of *Meuse army*. For his chief of the staff Crown Prince Albert had assigned him General Schlotheim, the very same staff officer who, some four years back, had, under Herwarth von Bittenfeld, stood opposed to him at Prim and Probus in the battle of Königgrätz. In sober truth, the whirligig of time performs strange gyrations, and brings with it marvellous changes and wonderful mutations!

At the time it was believed at the German headquarters that the whole of the disposable French forces would be found concentrated for the protection of Paris. So the so-called third army, under the Crown Prince of Prussia, was pushed on rapidly to the old Catalaunian fields, where, in 450, Theodorick the Visigoth had gained for the Roman Aëtius his decisive victory over Attila the Hun, the scourge of God.

The so-called fourth army, under Prince Albert, was ordered to cross the Meuse and move on in the same direction. More than half the march was done already, when Lieutenant-Colonel Verdy du Vernois, of the general staff, one of Moltke's most distinguished and most trusted aids, suddenly, in the night of the 25-26th of August, appeared at the prince's headquarters, with the startling news that M'Mahon was marching over Rheims in the direction of Mezières,

with the evident intention of raising the siege of Metz.

It was imperative then to make a complete change in the disposition of the army, and to march off, with the utmost rapidity, northward, to the right, a movement which was executed by the seven corps comprised in it with a skill, swiftness, and precision unparalleled in the history of war.

On the 26th of August Prince Albert took up his head-quarters at Clermont-en-Argonne ; a little later on in the evening King William established his own head-quarters general in the same place.

At 10 o'clock that night Schlotheim had an interview with Moltke, upon whom he waited again, in company this time with Prince Albert, at 7 o'clock in the morning of the 27th of August. Here the prince and his chief of the staff received their last instructions from the great strategist.

On the 27th occurred the brilliant cavalry encounter of Buzancy, when the French were taken completely by surprise. They clearly had not expected to meet an enemy in their path here.

On the 29th the vanguard of the Saxons had a successful fight with the French at Nouart, and the day after the Meuse army gained the most important victory of Beaumont, which decided the fate of M'Mahon's army. It was here where Failly allowed himself to be completely surprised by the advancing Germans, and where M'Mahon showed that the lesson

of Wörth had been taught him in vain. Yet Faily has not been called before a court-martial, and M'Mahon sits in the presidential chair of France, whilst poor Bazaine, who at least has shown himself vastly superior in every respect to these men, after languishing in prison, is an exile with tarnished honour. The French are indeed a queer people.

A few days after, on the ever-memorable 1st of September, 1870, Crown Prince Albert gloriously completed at Sedan what he had so brilliantly initiated at Beaumont.

On the 4th of September the prince went to King William's head-quarters general at Vendresse, where the old warrior received him with a warm and cordial embrace, and, with the heartiest acknowledgment of his high deeds at Beaumont and Sedan, presented to him the rare distinction of the Iron Cross of the first class. Prince Albert also received the warm congratulations of General Moltke upon the brilliant manner in which he had carried out the conceptions of the great strategist. It was on this occasion that the distinctive name of "Army of the Meuse" was given to the several corps combined under the prince's chief command.

On the 5th of September the Germans moved once more forward upon the French capital. Before Prince Albert left, he went to express his warm regretful feelings of sympathy to poor Marshal M'Mahon who was lying grievously wounded in Sedan. The

statement, said to have been made by the wounded French marshal on the occasion, that he had intended on the 1st of September to break in through the direction of Montmédy, instead of Mezières, as had been erroneously thought at German head-quarters, cannot be discussed here. It would be travelling beyond our record; and the avowed sketchy nature of these brief memoirs must necessarily preclude all attempts of the kind.

On the forward march on Paris there occurred, on the 9th of September, the sad catastrophe of Laon, where a maddened French artillery sergeant, Henriot by name, treacherously blew up the powder magazine in the duly surrendered citadel, killing and wounding thereby about one hundred Germans and some three hundred of his own countrymen.

On the 19th of September, 1870, the Meuse army took up its position in the great iron zone of inclosure thrown round Paris by Moltke. The right wing of the Meuse army, formed by the 4th corps, embraced the western part of Paris, from Chatou, Bezons, Argenteuil, Epinay, Pierrefitte, to the ridge of the high road from St. Denis to Luzarches; the guards extended from Stains, over Dugny, Le Bourget, and Blanc-Mesnil, to Aulnay; the left wing (the Saxons), from Sevrans, over Sivry, Clichy, and Montfermeil, to Chelles.

The Crown Prince of Saxony took up his headquarters at Grand Tremblay, where they remained

till the 8th of October, when they were transferred to Margency.

Prince Albert justified most fully the high confidence which King William reposed in him. Throughout the long and tedious siege he was never once caught napping, and the vigour and decision of his character served more than once to nip in the bud what might otherwise have proved later on an annoyance or even a danger to the besieging army. Thus, when the French had, in the morning of the 28th of October, succeeded in carrying the village of Le Bourget, and it was represented to the prince that the position was barely of sufficient importance to justify the expenditure of many human lives upon its recapture, he, seeing at once, with his clear military mind, how dangerous the place might turn out in the end should the enemy establish powerful and well-supported batteries there, gave peremptory orders to re-take it at any cost—orders which were brilliantly executed by the guards, unhappily with heavy loss.

On the 30th of November the Saxons and the Würtembergers (who had by this time been added to the forces constituting the army of the Meuse) had to bear the brunt of the fierce sortie made by General Ducrot. About 1,000 Saxons and 1,500 Würtembergers fell, killed and wounded, in that most hotly-contested encounter, which still left the important positions of Brie and Champigny in the hands of

the French. This was the so-called first battle of Villiers-sur-Marne.

Two days after, on the 2nd of December, Ducrot made his second great effort to break through the besieging lines. It was on this occasion that the French general, in French theatrical fashion, parodied the Spartan mother's farewell address to her son departing for the battle—"With this shield, or on this shield"—by a grandiloquent proclamation that Paris should see him return victorious, or brought back dead ! He returned neither victorious nor dead, but in a perfectly satisfactory state of comparative physical well-being. The great effort may be said to have been doomed to failure from the first, as the Crown Prince of Saxony was not only fully prepared to receive the onset of the enemy, but had even been beforehand with the French, and had already recaptured Brie and Champigny before they came out. But the French *sortie en masse* had been planned with great military skill notwithstanding, and the French fought most bravely, as the great losses suffered by the Germans amply showed. One Saxon regiment alone lost nearly forty officers and nine hundred men in the fight !

The attempts made from the 20th to the 25th of December proved equally fruitless.

On the 27th of December Mont Avron was bombarded, and on the 30th the works erected by the French were destroyed by Prince Albert's troops.

On the 18th of January Prince Albert attended the proclamation of the new German Empire, when the new emperor bestowed upon him the high *Ordre pour le Mérite*, with oak leaves. The day after, the artillery of the 4th corps, under the prince's orders, aided General Kirchbach's 5th corps in repulsing Trochu's last desperate attempt to break through.

On the 9th of March the army of the Meuse and the third army, up to this date led by the Crown Prince of Prussia and Germany, were joined together, and the chief command over the whole force before Paris intrusted to the hands of Crown Prince Albert of Saxony, who took up his head-quarters at Compiègne, where his forty-third birthday was celebrated on the 23rd of April with jousts and quadrilles on horseback, and other similar military rejoicings and amusements.

Prince Albert had to keep his eyes open during the troublous days of the Commune and the fierce struggle between the latter and the Versailles government. On the 17th of May he was forced to retransfer his head-quarters from Compiègne to Margency, to be nearer the scene of the actual conflict.

On the 28th of May he received, the second time within four months, the news of the capture of Paris.

On the 9th of June he set out on his return to Germany. He received most hearty welcome from

the people of Berlin on the day of the triumphal entry, when the emperor bestowed upon him the rare distinction of the Grand Cross of the Iron Cross.

On the 11th of July he held his triumphal entry into Dresden, where he received the staff of a field-marshal general of the German empire, as has already been stated.

After the death of King John, his father, on the 29th of October, 1873, he ascended the throne of the kingdom of Saxony.

Now a few words about the future. It would be a singular misapprehension of the political situation of the present to believe it at all likely that the military career of a general like King Albert can be at an end. He will have to appear in the field again sooner or later. The question may seem of some importance, then, whether he has ever frankly accepted the result of the war of 1866.

There are many people in Prussia, even among the officers of the army, who seem at least to doubt the absolute sincerity of the present King of Saxony in his submission to the lead of Prussia. They *will* not believe that the bitter antagonist of 1866, the man who then threw the whole ardour of his soul into the contest with Prussia, can have altogether dropped and forgotten his former intensely hostile feelings, and taken instead to a frank and sincere friendship *à toute épreuve* for his former foes.

There is to be found in the history of Saxony an

awkward episode—in 1813, at the battle of Leipzig, when the Saxons went over in a body from the French to the German camp in the midst of the fight. It may be called over and over again a daring deed of unconquerable patriotism that they did so; still there is always something revolting to the moral feeling in an act of treachery. If the Saxons had boldly declared before the battle that they would no longer consent to be led into the fight against their own fellow-countrymen, the matter would have stood very differently. But to wait till the battle was fairly engaged, and then to go over to the other side, may be defended, indeed, upon the score of prudence, or rather of serpent wisdom. But before the forum of conscience it must be condemned as a most immoral act notwithstanding.

That the then King of Saxony had no direct connection with this act of treachery of his army seems to have been pretty conclusively established at the time. Personally he remained faithful to the fallen man whose fortunes he had shared in the times of his phenomenal prosperity. Still he did not altogether escape what I, in this particular instance, feel disposed to call the brand of calumny. There were people unbelieving enough in his sincerity to impute to him a crafty calculation to secure a friendly footing in both camps.

Be this as it may, however, to return to the present King of Saxony, there were not few, it appears, who

looked suspiciously upon the dangerous delay which occurred in the attack of the Saxon corps in the battle of Gravelotte. The 1st brigade of the Prussian guards had made desperate attempts to carry the key of the enemy's position at St. Privat; but the French fire had proved too murderous. The Saxony artillery, which was expected to come up from Roncourt, to take the French positions in flank, did not come up for hours, it is said, and the Prussian guards had a most anxious time of it.

He who remembers how the French at the Alma, exposed to a murderous Russian artillery fire, felt much inclined to quarrel with us for our apparent delay in coming effectively to their aid, and how the aides-de-camp of the French commander were riding up to the English lines shouting, "*Mais Dieu de dieux, que faites-vous donc, vous autres? Vous ne voyez donc pas qu'on nous écrase!*"—he who remembers this, I say, will easily understand also the impatient feelings of the Prussian guards before St. Privat; and will not find it altogether inexplicable, perhaps, that a momentary doubt should have taken possession of some minds whether the Crown Prince of Saxony might not be meditating a *coup de Leipzig*.

I, for one, feel most fully convinced that anything more absolutely unfounded could not well be conceived. Yet I have heard the assertion made, and in more than one quarter. The explanation of the delay in

the appearance of the Saxon artillery on the field is very simple. The wood between Malancourt and Roncourt was in the hands of the French, who had to be driven out first, before the Saxon artillery could take up its proper position behind Roncourt. This was accomplished at last by two battalions of the 7th infantry, led on by Colonel Abendroth and Captain Brezecki. So soon as the wood had been taken, sixteen Saxon batteries took the French position in flank, and soon after the Prussian guards and the Saxon grenadiers combined carried St. Privat in right good style.

The least shadow of a foundation for the grave imputation insinuated by some upon the present King of Saxony's secret contingent intentions on the day of Gravelotte may therefore fairly be dismissed.

Still, on the other hand it would certainly be going too far to claim for King Albert any very warm and sincere feeling for the new German empire and for the emperor. King Albert and his brother George—the latter, perhaps, still more than the former—continue to the present day Saxon particularists, omitting no opportunity, fitting or unfitting, to show that they are but lukewarmly-inclined towards the empire, and that they are always ready to go in for the defence of their reserved rights and privileges, both real and fancied.

King Albert continues to the present the very warm friend of the Austrian emperor, and, in the

event of certain contingencies and complications, it might not be altogether wise, perhaps, to intrust this very hot Austrian and Romanist, and warm admirer of Beust and his most fatal anti-German policy, with the command of the *Saxon* portion of the great German army. At least, this seems to be the feeling in more than one German military circle in which the writer of this memoir has had occasion to move.

IX.

FIELD-MARSHAL GENERAL HERWARTH
VON BITTENFELD.

AT the time when the Franco-German war of 1870-71 broke out, the Prussian army numbered only one field-marshal general, to wit, old Father Wrangel, and one master-general of ordnance, to wit, Prince Charles, the only now surviving brother of the present emperor of Germany.

On the 28th of October, 1870, the Crown Prince and Prince Frederick Charles were raised to the rank of field-marshal general. On the 16th of June, 1871, the great Moltke was invited to shed additional lustre upon the highest rank and position in the army by joining his own name to the glorious list. Prince Albert, a younger brother of the emperor, was at the same time named colonel-general of cavalry, with the rank of field-marshal in the army (he died on the 14th of October, 1872). On the 11th of July, 1871, the present King of Saxony received the marshal's *bâton*.

The rank of field-marshal general has been bestowed

also by the emperor-king upon Generals Steinmetz and Herwarth von Bittenfeld, with date of the 8th of April, 1871 ; upon General Roon at the end of the year 1872, and, lastly, upon General Manteuffel and Prince Frederick of the Netherlands.

Field-Marshal Herwarth von Bittenfeld is a scion of the ancient noble house of the Herwarths von Hohenburg, an old Catholic family of Würtemberg. The grandfather of the field-marshal seceded to the Protestant faith in the first part of the 18th century, and took service in the Prussian army. He fell, bravely fighting at the head of his regiment (Prince of Wied), in the murderous battle of Kolin. One of his sons fell in the disastrous battle of Jena, 1806, whilst the other son, the father of the field-marshal and of General Hans (John) von Bittenfeld, was grievously wounded the same day at Auerstädt. He recovered, however, and died afterwards at Berlin as general, in 1832.

Charles Eberhard Herwarth von Bittenfeld, the subject of this memoir, was born on the 4th of September, 1796, at Grosswerther, in the Prussian province of Saxe. At the age of fifteen he entered the then so-called normal infantry battalion in the simple capacity of a private soldier (15th of October, 1811). The year after, he was made ensign, and on the 21st of February, 1813, second lieutenant.

At the outbreak of the war of 1813, the second regiment of the foot guards was formed, Herwarth's

battalion being one of the constituent parts. The young officer gained some distinction in the campaign of 1813, and more especially in 1814, when he was present at the storming of Montmartre, on the 30th of March, and took two French guns near the village of Pantin.

After the definitive conclusion of peace in 1815, Lieutenant Herwarth acted as adjutant up to 1821, when he attained his captaincy. It took him fourteen years to move up another step in the army, so that his advancement could not be called very rapid. It was on the 30th of March, 1835, that he was transferred as major to the Landwehr infantry regiment of the guard (reserve), with whom he joined in the Kalisch manœuvres that same year. Twelve years after, on the 27th of March, 1847, he was made lieutenant-colonel and commander of the 1st regiment of foot guards, having previously held the temporary command of the Emperor Francis regiment.

In 1849 he attained his full colonelcy, and the year after the command of the 16th infantry brigade was conferred upon him.

When, somewhat later on, the signs of the times seemed to point unmistakably to war with Austria, Herwarth received the command of the combined brigade of the division Bonin, concentrated at Kreuznach in anticipation of the event—which after all did not take place, the whole affair ending in smoke and in the disgrace of Olmütz.

Colonel Herwarth exchanged the command of the combined brigade for that of the Prussian garrison of Frankfort-on-the-Maine.

On the 23rd of March, 1852, the king made him major-general; and two years after, the highly important position of governor of the fortress of Mayence was intrusted to him. In 1856 he took the command of the 7th division of the Prussian army. Two years after he was made lieutenant-general, and appointed to the inspection of the Austrian contingent of the German federal army.

In 1860 he was promoted to the command of the 7th corps of the Prussian army (the Westphalians), which he led the year after in the great autumn manœuvres on the Rhine. As a special mark of his satisfaction with the excellent state of his corps, King William bestowed upon General Herwarth von Bittenfeld the chiefship of the 1st Westphalian infantry regiment, No. 13.

On the 27th of March, 1863, Herwarth von Bittenfeld attained the rank of general of infantry.

In 1864 he led a division of his corps in the Danish war, and after the transfer of Prince Frederick Charles to the chief command of the allied Austrian and Prussian forces, *vice* Field-Marshal Wrangel, retired from service, he had the command of the Prussian corps intrusted to his hands.

After the lamentable fiasco of the London Con-

ference, and its final ending in smoke, the 25th of June, Herwarth resolved to take the Island of Alsen. He made his dispositions entirely upon his own personal responsibility, but with such transcendent skill and such absolute foresight of every possible contingency, that the operation was triumphantly accomplished, 29th of June, 1864. This capture of Alsen stands forth brilliantly as one of the rarest deeds of arms in the history of war. It would of itself suffice to establish Herwarth von Bittenfeld's claim to the name and fame of a great commander in the field.

After the conclusion of the peace of Vienna, Herwarth von Bittenfeld was appointed to the supreme command in the Elbe duchies. He took up his residence at Kiel. He had by no means an easy position there, as he found himself brought constantly into collision with the foolish Pretender of Augustenburg, whose overweening conceit, joined to his blind reliance upon Austria and the Frankfort clique, under the leadership of Beust, made it a matter of extreme difficulty to keep on terms of even common courtesy with him.

Herwarth did not see the last of it, however. Even before the conclusion of the convention of Gastein, in 1865, he was recalled from the duchies, and appointed to the command of the 8th corps of the Prussian army, with head-quarters at Coblenz.

In 1866, when General Moltke, in conformity with

his great principle, to march in separate columns, but strike the decisive blow with united forces, formed three distinct armies for the projected Bohemian campaign, the distinguished honour of leading one of these armies, to which Schlotheim and Brandenstein afterwards gave the distinctive name of the army of the Elbe, was conferred upon General Herwarth von Bittenfeld.

The army of the Elbe numbered from 40,000 to 43,000 effectives. The Austro-Saxon army, which had the special task assigned to it to defend the line of the Iser, and interpose between the junction of the Elbe army with the first army under Prince Frederick Charles, exceeded this number by nearly 70 per cent.

The rapidity of Herwarth's movements seems to have disconcerted the Austrian general, Clam-Gallas, under whose chief command the Saxon corps under Prince Albert had also been placed. Already as early as the 26th of June the Prussian general made his appearance with part of his forces at Hühnerwasser, a small place in the Bunzlau district in Bohemia.

The Austrian brigade Leiningen, forming the left wing of the Austro-Saxon Iser army, pushed forward from Münchengrätz, had taken up a very strong position here. Count Gondrecourt, the adjutant of Clam-Gallas (and subsequently his successor), commanded in person.

The fight commenced on the morning of the 26th of June with a most vigorous attack of the Prussians upon the wood situate before Hühnerwasser, in the direction of the frontier. The Austrians were, after hard fighting, driven from the wood into the small town, and from there again into the open beyond, the Prussians having by noon succeeded in taking up an advanced position in the direction of Weisswasser and Münchengrätz. In the evening Count Gondrecourt made several desperate attempts to dislodge the Prussians, which ended, however, in his total discomfiture, his forces being driven back across the Toperberg and beyond Upper Gruppyay.

There was now no further obstacle in the way of an advance of the Elbe army upon Münchengrätz, to effect its junction there with the army under Prince Frederick Charles.

It must be admitted that Benedek's strangely confused and contradictory orders (for which the general was perhaps not altogether responsible, however, as he was driven nearly to his wits' ends by the emperor and his military cabinet's constant stupid interference with his plans and projects) placed Clam-Gallas and Albert of Saxony in an extremely difficult position. They had had orders to hold the Iser line to the last extremity; yet barely had the news of the disaster of Hühnerwasser reached the ears of Benedek, when that general at once gave the opposite order—to wit, that Clam-Gallas and the Saxons should at once

retire upon Gitschin, a most difficult operation, which they were called upon to execute in the face of a victoriously advancing foe.

They had no choice, however. So they accepted the battle at Münchengrätz.

This small town, of about four thousand souls, lies also in the Bunzlau district, on the left bank of the Iser, on the Kralup and Turnau Railway line, some seven English miles south-west of Turnau.

The corps of Clam-Gallas and the Saxons under Albert stood here opposed to a portion of the army of Prince Frederick Charles, and part of the former under Herwarth von Bittenfeld. The latter had to take the Kloster village, the former Musky Hill and the village of the same name. Herwarth crossed the Iser above Münchengrätz on a pontoon bridge, stormed the village, climbed up the steep heights of the Austro-Saxon position before Münchengrätz, and almost entirely turned the corps of Clam-Gallas; whilst Prince Frederick Charles carried Musky Hill, the villages of Musky and Dneboch, and the ruins of Bossin. There remained but little more fighting to be done to occupy Münchengrätz, and to complete the junction of the two Prussian armies and the capture of the line of the Iser. The Austrian losses were very heavy. Fourteen hundred unwounded prisoners fell into the hands of the victors, who paid for their great success the comparatively small price of some 330 men killed and wounded, almost equally

distributed between the first army and the army of the Elbe.

In the decisive battle of Königgrätz, Herwarth von Bittenfeld played a most prominent part. It has been said, indeed, by some critics, that in this battle he had not carried out thoroughly Moltke's instructions, and that the lack of vigour shown by him had subsequently made possible the escape of Benedek's beaten army. It is not easy to see how these critics could support this charge against the marshal were they seriously called upon to prove it. Herwarth von Bittenfeld acted with the utmost vigour throughout that hot day of the 3rd of July. By storming the villages of Probus and Prim (or Przim), he absolutely crushed the Austrian left wing. It seems to me that all these charges brought against different generals and troops may in the end find their answer in Frederick Charles's alleged precipitate opening of the ball two hours sooner than the other leaders had been led to expect.

Be this as it may, King William showed his appreciation of the general's great services on the 3rd of July, by bestowing upon him even in the evening of that glorious day the high distinction of the Order of the Black Eagle, a sad consolation, after all, for the loss of a dearly-beloved son who fell in the attack on Probus.

After the conclusion of peace with Austria, General Herwarth von Bittenfeld was placed *à la suite* of the

second regiment of foot guards. He resumed his command of the 8th corps.

In 1870 the king intrusted to him the highly responsible and most important charge of governor-general on the Rhine and of all the western provinces of the kingdom. He proved himself worthy of the high trust reposed in him, by organizing with the utmost vigour and rapidity, and with consummate skill, an effective defence of the land placed under his protecting care. Happily, the war took a very different turn; but the excellent defensive measures taken on the Rhine by Herwarth von Bittenfeld excited the admiration of all men able to judge of such matters; and they would no doubt have brilliantly stood the test of an actual French invasion.

Herwarth von Bittenfeld had lost a son in 1866, at Probus, as we have seen. In 1870 he was doomed to suffer other most grievous losses. A second son fell at Vionville, a third at St. Privat, whilst a fourth was grievously wounded at Courcelles. Military glory is an expensive luxury, and the price to be paid for it is occasionally most bitter.

On the 8th of April, 1871, Herwarth von Bittenfeld was finally raised to the highest rank in the army, and permitted to rest at last on his well-earned laurels.

He took up his residence at Bonn, where he celebrated, on the 15th of October, 1871, in rare bodily

and mental vigour, the jubilee of the sixtieth anniversary of his taking service in the army. Congratulations poured in on him from all sides on this festive occasion.

The field-marshal, who is now in his seventy-ninth year, continues still in vigorous health. His younger brother, John, who is seventy-five, is also still a healthy, active man. He retired from the service some time since, as general of infantry. In 1866 he was military governor of the province of Saxony. He has taken up his residence in the Prussian capital.

A cousin of the two, Frederick Adrian, who is also seventy-four, retired from the service some time ago, as general of infantry. Up to 1870 he was governor of Königsberg. He now lives at Merseburg.

X.

FIELD-MARSHAL STEINMETZ.

CHARLES FREDERICK VON STEINMETZ was born at Eisenach, on the 24th of December, 1796. He was a mere youth of sixteen when the momentous events of 1812-13 called him, along with thousands upon thousands of other sons of Germany standing equally on the very threshold of youth, under the glorious banner of liberation, unfurled to free the great fatherland from the vilest and most crushing yoke an insolent conqueror had ever yet in the history of the world attempted to fasten upon a noble people.

Having been originally destined and educated for the military career, he entered the Prussian army as lieutenant. His daring bravery gained him the rare distinction of the Order of the Iron Cross (1814).

When peace was at last concluded, in 1815, young Steinmetz eagerly and assiduously took up again the pursuit of his military studies, interrupted by the war. His advancement in the service was by

no means rapid, as we find him in 1835 still a simple captain, in command of a company of grenadiers in the Emperor Francis regiment.

A few years after he was promoted to the rank of major, and placed in command of the Düsseldorf Landwehr battalion of the guards. This position he exchanged soon after for the command of the reserve battalion of the guards, then in garrison at Spandau.

In 1848 we find him lieutenant-colonel in command of the 2nd regiment of infantry. At the head of two battalions of this regiment he took his fair share in the Berlin street fight of the 18th of March. He afterwards went with his regiment to the war in Schleswig-Holstein.

After the armistice of Malmö, Colonel Steinmetz was appointed Governor of the Berlin Cadet-house, and promoted to the rank of major-general. He commanded for a time a brigade of the guards, then a division in the army, being raised to the rank of lieutenant-general, until he was finally named general of infantry, and had the command of the 5th Prussian corps bestowed upon him, with head-quarters at Posen.

It was only in 1866, when he was near seventy years old, that the first real opportunity was afforded him to justify the high trust reposed in him. His 5th corps formed part of the second army, under the command of the Crown Prince. With this corps,

aided only by a brigade of the 6th corps, General Steinmetz defeated successively at Nachod, Skalitz, and Schweinschädel, the 6th Austrian corps under Ramming, the 8th under the Archduke Leopold, and the 4th under Festetics, taking from them two banners, two standards, eleven guns, and six thousand unwounded prisoners. Altogether the losses inflicted upon these three corps, which constituted nearly the half of Benedek's army, were most crushing; and it may well be said that the three days of Nachod, Skalitz, and Schweinschädel, so disastrous to Austria, prepared and initiated as it were the great final defeat at Königgrätz.

The battles of Nachod, Skalitz, and Schweinschädel have been sufficiently recorded already in the memoir of the Crown Prince. The meed of glory justly claimed there for the royal commander of the second army does not detract, however, from the high merit of General Steinmetz, which was indeed most fully acknowledged by the noble chief himself, who demanded and obtained for the general the rare distinction of the Order of the Black Eagle, gained on the field of battle.

After these hard days Steinmetz and his corps were placed in the reserve, so that they took no active share in the battle of Königgrätz. Steinmetz was one of the generals upon whom the gratitude of the king and nation bestowed a handsome dotation after the conclusion of peace.

Soon after the termination of the war of 1866, he attended the Crown Prince on his visit to St. Petersburg, where the Emperor Alexander II. bestowed upon him the Order of Alexander Newskji in brilliants.

In 1867 General Steinmetz was elected a member of the constituent assembly of the North German Confederation. He represented the district of Züllichau-Krossen. He took his seat on the Conservative benches, but did not join very actively in the discussion of the business before the assembly. He was also subsequently elected a member of the first Diet of the Confederation.

In the Franco-German war of 1870, Steinmetz was intrusted with the command of the first army, which consisted of the 1st corps under General Benteim, the 7th corps under General Zastrow, the 8th corps under General Göben, and the 1st and 3rd cavalry divisions. The 1st corps was, however, at first retained in Germany (along with the 2nd and 6th), as the intentions of Austria looked sufficiently doubtful then to justify every possible measure of precaution against an Austrian surprise. Subsequently, about mid-August, when this threatening danger might be considered at an end, the 1st corps joined Steinmetz's army before Metz, together with the division Kummer, and (temporarily) the Mecklenburg division.

The first great feat of arms which fell to the

share of the army under Steinmetz was the capture of the heights of Spicheren, near Saarbrücken, and the crushing defeat of a French army of four divisions, under command of General Frossard. This battle was fought on the 6th of August, on the same day as the battle of Wörth.

Frossard's corps, supported by nearly the whole of two more French divisions, and by a most powerful artillery, had taken up a strong position on the Spicheren heights and in Spicheren wood.

The 7th German corps was on the morning of the 6th of August stationed at Guichenbach, some six English miles from Saarbrücken on the German side. About noon the cavalry division of Rheinhaben passed through the town of Saarbrücken, which had been evacuated by the French. The 14th division of infantry, under command of General Kameke, followed. The Germans having passed through the town, and issuing from the other side, were received by a warm artillery and infantry fire.

General Kameke at once ordered the attack on the heights. The German troops had to make their way to the foot of the hills, across an open which afforded no protection whatever against the fierce French fire from the heights ; notwithstanding which formidable obstacle, they advanced steadily and with the utmost intrepidity from the Winterberg southward upon the steep heights held by the French.

They made some progress up to three o'clock in

the afternoon, although fighting against fearful odds. At last the thunder of the cannons brought portions of the divisions of Barnekow and Stülpnagel to the aid of the desperately struggling, sadly overmatched 14th division.

General Kameke now tried to take the French in the left flank, moving down upon them over Stiring. This attempt was frustrated by the French. Fortunately General Göben arrived with further reinforcements, and took the command.

At this time the French had, indeed, been driven from Spicheren wood, but powerful reserves coming up, the Prussians had to give way again for a time.

Soon after six o'clock in the evening, the French left wing began to press hard upon the Prussians round Stiring, when the arrival of a few regiments of Brandenburg infantry, belonging to the second army (Prince Frederick Charles), changed the face of affairs, the Prussians now succeeding at last in carrying the rocky wood-covered declivities of the heights.

Spicheren wood was taken once more, and General Göben ordered the final attack upon the top of the Spicheren hill. The 6th division succeeded in getting two batteries along a mountain path up to this top, and the assault was crowned with complete success.

It was at this period that General Steinmetz arrived on the field of action. He completed what

his great lieutenant, Göben, had so gloriously begun. The defeated French were forced to retreat.

At first Frossard retired in good order. He intended to fall back upon St. Avold, where due preparations had been made for such a contingency. But Steinmetz rapidly pushed forward the 13th division (Glümer), which cleverly managed to interpose between the French general and St. Avold.

Complete demoralization set in now in Frossard's corps. The orderly retreat degenerated into something very like wild flight, so that important military magazines, the camp of an entire French division, numerous pieces of artillery, a complete pontoon train, 10,000 woollen rugs, some 200 tons of provisions and tobacco, &c., were allowed to fall into the hands of the victorious Germans. Two thousand five hundred unwounded French prisoners were taken by the Prussians.

The French had fifty-two strong battalions in the fight, supported by a most powerful artillery. The Germans had only twenty-seven battalions, with the artillery of a single division; besides which, the French had in their favour the immense advantage of an extremely strong position. Yet the Germans carried the day. Their losses were fearfully heavy; 215 officers and 5,034 men killed and wounded—an enormous percentage upon the numbers engaged.

The French losses in killed and wounded may be estimated at about 6,000, as Frossard admitted a

loss in his own special corps alone of 270 officers and 4,000 men.

The battle of Spicheren gave rise at the time to considerable controversy and comment. It was maintained that Steinmetz had allowed the fight to be engaged in in the very teeth of strict instructions to the contrary received from General Moltke, who, it was said, had intended to cut Frossard's corps off by a series of strategic manœuvres.

In times of excitement the most extraordinary statement will pass current and find believers. I, for one, am convinced that there was no foundation whatever or truth for the serious imputation made upon the old general, that he had deliberately and of malice prepense set at naught an explicit command from head-quarters.

Nor can I believe in the other version of the story, which was started at the time, to wit, that Kameke had attacked the French position without orders, and that Göben, instead of breaking off the attack, had continued it against express orders. Both Kameke and Göben have been brought up in too good a school of military discipline and subordination ever to allow the excitement of the moment to run away with their discretion.

I think these stories had their origin at the time chiefly in the regret naturally felt at the fearful losses suffered by the Germans in this desperate battle.

The French had apparently intended to defend a

carefully-prepared position on the French Nied ; but on the 11th of August, the fifth day after the battle of Spicheren, they retreated to the other bank of the Moselle at Metz, where they took up a new position under the protection of the fortress. Steinmetz followed.

On the 14th of August, the first army under General Steinmetz occupied the following positions :—

The 1st corps, 1st division, was placed at Courcelles-Chaussy, on the road leading from Metz to St. Avold ; the second division at Les Etangs, on the road leading from Metz to Boulay.

The 13th division (7th corps) was placed at Dommaugeville.

The 8th corps was placed in reserve at Varize, near Vionville. The 3rd cavalry division had its station on the right wing, at St. Barbe ; the first cavalry division, on the left wing, at Frontigny. The 14th division and the 18th division, belonging both to the second army, under Prince Frederick Charles, were leaning on the left wing of the first army.

Well, in the afternoon of the 14th of August, the vanguard of the first army thought there were signs of an intended move of the French encamped under the walls of Metz.

Now, as it was a matter of the utmost importance for the Germans to keep the French in their actual position before Metz until Prince Frederick Charles could move upon their line of retreat, Steinmetz at

once gave orders to the brigade Goltz to attack the rear-guard of Decaen's departing corps (which had formerly been commanded by Bazaine).

The attack was made with such spirit and determination that the corps was compelled to halt, and to make front. Parts of Frossard's corps had also to join in repelling the Prussian onset. Immediately General Glümer was sent forward with the brigade Osten-Sacken, to support Goltz. Kameke and Wrangel joined in the fray on the left wing, and the final result was that the French had to abandon for the nonce all notion of moving away from their encampment.

The French corps Ladmirault had meanwhile endeavoured to make an impression upon the right wing of the 1st corps, but the assailants were met by General Manteuffel at the head of his reserves with such determination, that they had also to retire ultimately behind the fortifications. The result of this battle of Courcelles was, that Prince Frederick Charles had an additional day given him to bring his army up, which he turned to most excellent account.

On the 18th of August, Steinmetz and the army under his command again took a prominent share in the glory of Gravelotte.

Steinmetz joined afterwards in the siege of Metz. If the least reliance could ever be placed upon camp reports and military gossip, one might be led to believe that General Steinmetz had given offence at head-quarters by acting too much upon his own

impulse, instead of yielding proper obedience to superior orders.

Other reports, more likely to have some foundation in truth, would simply have it that the obstinate old man (seventy-four) could not be brought to see that he owed obedience to Prince Frederick Charles, to whom the command of the siege of Metz had been intrusted.

Be this as it may, however, it was suddenly discovered at head-quarters that Russian neutrality might after all not be implicitly relied upon, and that it would only be a wise measure of precaution to send an energetic and skilful chief back to Prussia, to watch over the safety of the frontier. General Steinmetz was the very man for it, as the king said. So the old man was graced with the high title and full power of Governor-General of Posen and Silesia—and sent back to Germany.

The new Governor-General of Posen and Silesia must somehow have seen through the matter afterwards, for he repeatedly tendered his resignation to the king.

It was, however, only after the conclusion of peace, on the 8th of April, 1871, that his majesty granted the general's request, bestowing upon him at the same time the highest rank in the army—that of field-marshal general.

Field-Marshal Steinmetz also had his share in the dotations voted subsequently by parliament and

bestowed by the king. He lives now in Görlitz, Lower Silesia, in the enjoyment still of excellent health.

In 1870 he received also once again the high Order of the Iron Cross, which he had received first in 1814 when a mere stripling. He is the only man in the Prussian army who can boast of having had bestowed upon him, at an interval of nearly sixty years, the two classes of the same order.

XI.

FIELD-MARSHAL MANTEUFFEL.

THIS is one of the latest of his German and Prussian majesty's marshal creations, and, as has indeed been the case with every other mark of favour ever bestowed upon Manteuffel by the king and his predecessor, the one most coldly received and most adversely commented upon, not alone by the general public, but also in high and low military circles.

It is, indeed, altogether difficult to account for the very large measure of apparently groundless popular dislike that seems to have fallen to the share of this man. Surely one would think that his very distant relationship, or, perhaps, rather his mere namesakeship with Otto Theodor von Manteuffel, who steered the Prussian state bark, foolishly confided to his guidance by King Frederick William IV., right under the Caudine Forks of Olmütz, should not in itself be deemed such a very heinous offence, and that the enjoyment of even the very highest court

favour could barely warrant the attempted clouding and staining of his name and fame in the estimation of the people.

Yet the fact would seem to be so ; for certainly the life and the acts and deeds of the man, who has throughout his career proved himself a loyal servant of his king and his country, afford no patent clue to this deep-rooted general hostility which the masses bear him, and in which so many persons moving in the higher circles of society seem to join with equal bitterness — unless it be, perhaps, in some slight measure, at least, his action as president of the military cabinet, to which reference will be made hereafter in the course of this memoir.

Karl Rochus Edwin, Baron von Manteuffel, was born at Magdeburg on the 24th of February, 1809. He was intended and educated for the military career. In 1826 he entered the regiment of dragoons of the guard, and he obtained his lieutenancy in the same regiment two years after.

Having served fifteen years as a lieutenant, he was promoted to a squadron in 1843. Soon after, he became adjutant to Prince Albrecht.

In 1848 his good fortune brought him into personal contact with the king. This was in the days of the great March rising in Berlin, during which Frederick William IV. betrayed the whole deplorable weakness of his character. The young cavalry officer stood manfully by the poor trembling king's side, and

tried hard to instil some of his own courage into the king's heart.

When the worst was over, the grateful monarch made Manteuffel his personal aide-de-camp : from this time forward his fortune was secured. Six years later we find him already in full command of the 5th regiment of lancers, then in garrison at Düsseldorf.

As his majesty fancied he could detect under the outer shell of Manteuffel's military ruggedness a fine talent for diplomacy, the cavalry colonel was intrusted with several diplomatic missions, particularly to Vienna, which, it is said, he performed to the perfect satisfaction of the king and the government.

In 1857 Major-General Manteuffel was appointed to the performance of somewhat delicate and rather invidious functions. He was named chief of the so-called military cabinet, in which capacity he had to deal principally with the "personalia" of the army. He had to recommend officers for promotion, and to propose the removal of officers from active service, &c.

If we are to judge General Manteuffel's action and conduct in this most ticklish position by the results of the wars of 1864, 1866, and 1870-71, we shall surely feel inclined to believe that he must have been guided in his weedings—ruthless, no doubt, more particularly regarding the higher ranks of the army—by a most sincere and anxious desire to consult the truest and best interests of the country.

Unluckily for him, people felt little inclined to

believe so at the time ; and even now they will sneer at his assertion, apparently founded in fact, however, that *he* had been the first to clearly and thoroughly discern Moltke's high genius, and that he can justly claim as his doing the appointment of that distinguished man to the highest place on the general staff of the Prussian army.

There are, indeed, many officers who will fully admit the beneficial character of Manteuffel's management of the military cabinet ; but they will add, with a bitter sneer, that the chief had stopped short in his work of salutary weeding, and that, whilst he had avowedly removed many incapable and incompetent officers from the Prussian active service, he had unhappily left himself untouched—the most incompetent, the most incapable, the most inefficient of all—which sweeping assertion they will then proceed to support by numerous references to the patent inefficiency betrayed by the general in the wars of 1866 and 1870-71.

However, the candid historian, who duly examines the material placed before him, soon discovers that most of these proffered references are not references to actual facts, but to more or less baseless and groundless fictions, and that Manteuffel, so far from betraying gross incapacity, as is so roundly asserted by his detractors, has shown himself on several leading occasions a most efficient commander in the field.

At the time of Manteuffel's greatest activity in

the military cabinet, his close connection with the high Conservative military party, and his almost over-ostentatiously displayed feudalist and absolutist professions and tendencies, joined to his singularly inconciliatory, haughty, and arrogant bearing towards political opponents, excited against him the bitterest and intensest hostility of the whole Liberal party, which the circumstance that the prince regent continued to show the general the same favour as his brother the king had done before him, was certainly not calculated to lessen or appease.

Thus, in 1858 Manteuffel was made general *à la suite*; and in 1861, after the accession of King William to the throne of Prussia, he was raised to the rank of lieutenant-general.

It was about this time that Councillor Twesten, one of the leaders of the Liberal party, who, however, was not yet much known at the time beyond his own circle, published a pamphlet, destined to become temporarily famous, under the title, "What may still preserve us." In this pamphlet Twesten, among other things, made a sharp direct attack upon Manteuffel, whom he qualified as "a disastrously fatal man in a disastrously fatal position."

The chief of the military cabinet felt stung to the quick. He sent a friend to the bold councillor to demand satisfaction for his wounded honour. A duel was the consequence, in which poor Twesten was wounded. The general had to suffer a short

imprisonment, but he was left undisturbed in his position as chief of the military cabinet.

In 1863 Bismarck (so it is asserted, at least) turned to the best account the great "popularity"—if such an expression may be allowed under the circumstances—which the general was known to enjoy at the Hofburg of Vienna, where he certainly was looked upon as a *persona gratissima*—not a very strange or surprising fact, indeed, considering the strong pro-Austrian proclivities which Manteuffel professed in common with his cousin Otto Theodor. It is said that Manteuffel had a considerable share in bringing about the temporary alliance between Austria and Prussia against Denmark.

In the early part of 1864, when signs were becoming apparent of a certain lack of vigour in the conduct of the war, the general was sent to Vienna to stimulate the Austrian cabinet. He was successful in so far, that the occupation of Jütland by the allied forces was resolved upon.

After the conclusion of peace, when difficulties arose between the two good allies, Manteuffel was always active in endeavouring to smooth them away. The Gastein convention, which postponed for a time the inevitable final settlement between Austria and Prussia on the field of battle, was in a great measure Manteuffel's work.

From Gastein the general proceeded direct to Schleswig. He had been appointed governor of that

duchy and commander-in-chief of the Prussian army of occupation. Bismarck had willed it so.

The great statesman, who clearly foresaw the inevitable issue of affairs between Austria and Prussia, and was equally conscious of the almost insuperable difficulties in his way to convince King William of the unavoidable necessity of war with Austria, selected Manteuffel, the staunchest Austrophile in Prussia, and the man most after Francis Joseph's own heart, to represent Prussia in the jointly-conquered, jointly-occupied Elbe duchies, and to try to find a *modus vivendi* between the joint-occupants.

There could be no doubt that if even Manteuffel failed in his honest endeavour to find such a *modus vivendi*, the king would take it as the most decisive proof of Austria's determination not to come to a fair and equitable understanding with Prussia. And this conviction once fairly established in King William's mind, the minister might hope to convince the monarch of the absolute necessity of this war from which his majesty was so sensitively shrinking.

Manteuffel had a hard stand in Schleswig. Gablenz, the Austrian commander in Holstein, had a much easier task of it. He might readily enough conciliate the Holsteiners and the Augustenburg pretender, the more readily as the policy of Austria pointed to the ultimate acknowledgment of the latter as sovereign duke of the two duchies.

Manteuffel, on the contrary, had to oppose the

wishes of the people of Schleswig, which were at that time pointing in the same direction. In his dealings with the Augustenburg pretender, who, in his ineffable conceit, dared to treat Prussia with contemptuous disregard, the general had also to show the rough side of his character.

What Bismarck had foreseen came to pass very speedily. Manteuffel's eyes were opened to what Austria really wanted, and the general, who with all his Austrian proclivities had still a very sound foundation of Prussian patriotism in him, was rapidly cured of his illusions anent the noble and chivalrous feelings entertained at the Vienna Hofburg.

He acted with proper spirit and energy to guard the interests of his country. When the Augustenburg pretender, feeling secure of the support of Austria, Hanover, and Saxony, coolly proceeded to have himself proclaimed duke, on the 14th of October, 1865, at Eckernförde, Manteuffel briefly informed his highness, on the 16th of October, that if he did not at once desist from his aggressive proceedings, he (the general) would be compelled to have him arrested.

From this time forward the last spurious shade of the imaginary *entente cordiale* between the two great German powers was gone—irretrievably gone; and matters rushed on henceforth irresistibly to the final appeal to ordeal by battle.

When General Gablenz, in violation of the Gastein

convention, and in most flagrant encroachment upon Prussia's good right, summoned the Holstein Estates to assemble in general meeting at Itzehoe on the 11th of June, 1866, Manteuffel, by order of his king, sent word to Gablenz that, Austria having chosen to tear the Gastein convention asunder, he (Manteuffel) was resolved to assume the co-government in both duchies; and that he would accordingly march into Holstein with his corps on the 7th of June. Upon this Gablenz evacuated Holstein, taking the Augustenburg pretender away with him.

On the 7th of June Manteuffel occupied Itzehoe, which of course put an end to the intended meeting of the Estates.

On the 11th of June Gablenz evacuated Altona, and recrossed the Elbe.

The nice little plan hatched between King George of Hanover, the Austrian Gablenz, and the Augustenburg pretender had been to call the Schleswig-Holsteiners to arms, and to march them jointly with Gablenz's corps and the Hanoverian army direct upon Berlin!

Manteuffel was beforehand with these poor plotters. On the 15th of June he entered the kingdom of Hanover, and on the 18th he occupied Stade, the very place which had been intended for the joint gathering of the "three hosts" that were to march upon Berlin. He found at Stade large stores of munitions of war, &c., which he took possession of.

As he was moving rapidly forward, General Gablenz retreated precipitately over Harburg to Cassel.

General Manteuffel was present at the affair of Langensalza. He was under the supreme command of General Vogel von Falckenstein, with whom he made that marvellous one month's campaign in Hesse and Francony, which must always be looked upon as the most glorious episode in the great war of 1866.

On the 19th of July, 1866, Vogel von Falckenstein, who on the 16th had entered the free city of Frankfort-on-the-Main, was most unsoldierly and unexpectedly recalled from his command, under the very colourable pretext, to say the least of it, that certain circumstances and contingencies imperatively demanded the presence of an energetic Prussian governor-general in Bohemia!

Manteuffel succeeded Vogel von Falckenstein in the command of the army of the Main. It was an unlucky advancement for him, as Falckenstein's strange recall from the scene of his triumphs was by many imputed to Manteuffel's machinations, an imputation which must now be considered to have been utterly groundless, although it would appear that one of the parties most interested in the affair, Falckenstein himself, believed in it.

Years after, in 1871, when the great dotation question was being eagerly and warmly discussed, more especially in connection with the share the king

intended to bestow on Manteuffel, an injudicious friend of the general's ventured to allege, in a paper sent to the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, and to the *Kreuz Zeitung*, among other things, that Vogel von Falckenstein had, in 1866, from personal hostility to Manteuffel, given the latter no chance of exchanging shots, or crossing swords with the enemy.

It became soon patent now to all the world that Vogel von Falckenstein had not forgotten 1866, and that he retained still his original impression of Manteuffel's complicity in his removal, for the article in the two journals at once brought old "rough-and-ready" into the field in full armour and red-hot fighting humour.

In a brief cavalier missive to the *Kreuz Zeitung*, he said, with a covert sneer, that the writer of the Manteuffel laudation was evidently not aware that the general had had the occasion given him on the day of Kissingen, and the day after, to exchange shots with the enemy, and the troops of Manteuffel had also been engaged at Langensalza—in the latter battle, indeed, not by his (Falckenstein's) orders.

To perceive the force of this sneer, it must be borne in mind that the days mentioned ranked not among the most brilliant achievements of the campaign of 1866.

Falckenstein then went on to observe, that if the writer of the article in question could succeed by no

other means in glorifying General Manteuffel than by assailing the reputation of other men, he was certainly rendering no good service to the general. He (Falckenstein) must call upon the writer to produce proof in support of his assertions; and if he should fail to do so, he could only look upon his production in the light of a paid article, written by a hired scribe, and accordingly beneath contempt.

Vogel von Falckenstein is not the only openly-avowed foe of the former chief of the military cabinet. The unfortunate affair with General Gröben also lives still in the public recollection. By the by, the authorship of the famous letter in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, which questioned the soldiership of General Manteuffel in the war of 1870-71, was attributed to General Gröben—rightly or wrongly, it would be difficult to prove; but I believe without a shadow of foundation in fact.

General Manteuffel is said to have borne himself towards the poor conquered Frankforters with undue severity and haughty arrogance. He might, perhaps, plead in justification that he acted upon explicit instructions. Great indignation was at the time felt against the Frankforters in the highest quarter.

Manteuffel was instructed to insist upon a war contribution of some £2,000,000, in addition to about £500,000 already exacted by Vogel von Falckenstein.

A demand of so much hard cash was certainly

not the way best calculated to ingratiate himself with the good Frankforters.

With regard to the war in South Germany, Vogel von Falckenstein had left his successor very little to do.

When the armistice was concluded, Manteuffel was sent on a special mission to St. Petersburg, where he succeeded in conciliating the Russian government, and obtaining its tacit assent to the contemplated annexation to Prussia of Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, Nassau, Electoral Hesse, and Frankfort.

After his return from St. Petersburg, he, for a time, took the command again of the Prussian troops in the Elbe duchies.

Then he temporarily resigned his military functions, and retired to Naumburg, where he happens to enjoy a rich prebend. "One leg in the army, the other in the church, his head in diplomacy, and his heart nowhere"—so runs the bitter sneer of one of his most prejudiced and unjust enemies.

In August 1868, General Manteuffel was appointed to the command of the 1st corps of the Prussian army, *vice* Vogel von Falckenstein retired.

In 1870 he led the 1st corps to Metz, to join the 1st army under Steinmetz. He arrived on the 14th, when he at once joined in the fight of that day, repulsing all attacks made upon his corps by Ladmirault, and driving the French back behind the fortifications of Metz.

In the subsequent siege of Metz, Manteuffel held the eastern line of inclosure. Here it was his good fortune to fight the battle of Noisseville, on the 31st of August and 1st of September, when Marshal Bazaine made his first desperate attempt to break through the iron chain drawn around him and his army.

The French call this battle the battle of St. Barbe. Early in the morning of the 31st of August, Bazaine led the French guards, with the 4th and 6th corps, numbering altogether some 90,000 men, across the Moselle. It took the French marshal nigh upon twelve hours to effect this movement; and the attack upon the German positions began only about half-past four o'clock in the afternoon, languidly at first.

Manteuffel had only the 1st corps, the Division Kummer, the Grand Duke of Hesse division, one cavalry division, and a few regiments of the 10th corps, to oppose to the overwhelming French forces.

At half-past six o'clock in the evening the French carried Noisseville and Nouilly, drove the Germans back upon Retonfay, and occupied Coincy, and subsequently also Servigny.

At nine o'clock in the evening the Germans had retaken Noisseville and most of the other important positions, when General Changarnier (it is said) led another furious French attack at ten o'clock at night, which succeeded in driving the Germans back upon the plateau of St. Barbe. Servigny was, indeed,

retaken by the Germans, but Noisseville, Coincy, and Flanville remained in the hands of the French.

Next morning, the 1st of September, the 1st corps and Kummer's division held the first line on the battle-field of the day before; the 25th division (the Hessians) and the 9th corps (Mannstein) held the second line. The 7th and 8th corps were placed in *à cheval* south and west of the river. The 2nd, 3rd, and 10th corps held the left bank of the Moselle, in the direction of Montmédy.

At four in the morning the Prussians began their attack upon Noisseville, which in the space of four hours was taken and retaken three times. The French directed all their efforts upon the plateau of St. Barbe, which they were evidently resolved to carry by storm.

Prince Frederick Charles, from his head-quarters at Malancourt, ordered the 7th corps up to Noisseville, the 8th being directed to take up the position left vacant by the 7th. Kummer was ordered to place himself at Manteuffel's disposition with his entire division.

Flanville and Coincy were carried by storm; Noisseville was partly burned, and, after seven hours' hard fighting, the valiant 3rd French corps, which this day had joined in the attack upon the German positions, was finally forced to retreat.

At four in the afternoon the French were driven back everywhere, at Noisseville, Mercy-le-Haut, in the centre and on the right wing, and soon after the

Germans fully re-occupied the same positions which they had held on the 31st of August before the French *sortie en masse*.

The losses of the Germans in this fierce fight were 120 officers and 2,358 men killed and wounded. The French lost 141 officers and 2,664 men.

After the capitulation of Metz the old first army was formed anew (1st, 7th, and 8th corps, 3rd reserve division, and three cavalry divisions), Manteuffel being appointed commander-in-chief over it.

Leaving the 7th corps behind, Manteuffel started on the 7th of November over Rheims, in the direction of Compiègne, when he suddenly turned off, and marched rapidly upon Amiens. Here he defeated a French army of 30,000 men on the 27th of November, throwing them back across the Somme upon Arras. On the 30th of November the citadel of Amiens surrendered.

La Fère had been taken on the 27th already.

On the 5th of December General Manteuffel occupied Rouen. He then concentrated his army, and, after a series of hard fights on the Hallue, to the north-east of Amiens, on the 23rd and 24th of December, he defeated the French north army under Faidherbe, compelling the enemy to retire into the northern fortresses.

Upon a renewed attempt of Faidherbe, Manteuffel gained another victory over him, at Bapaume, on the 2nd-3rd of January, 1871.

In all these battles the French army of the north, whose object it was to march to the relief of the besieged Parisians, outnumbered the forces under Manteuffel in the proportion of two to one.

On the 8th of January, 1871, the king intrusted to General Manteuffel the command over a newly-formed army, called the army of the south, whose arduous task it was to be to march across the mountains to the aid of General Werder, then threatened by overwhelming French forces under General Bourbaki.

That General Moltke should ever have given his consent to intrust the command of an expedition of such momentous importance as this to an "inefficient, incapable, and incompetent" leader, is really a little too much to be asked to believe.

Moreover, the brilliant manner in which the trust reposed in him was justified by Manteuffel, ought surely to be held a sufficient answer to the calumnies of his detractors.

Despite the severe cold and the heavy snowfalls, the general led some 45,000 men with marvellous rapidity over the Côte d'Or (*Mons Duranus*) and the Jura, cut off the French army of the east under Bourbaki from all its lines of retreat upon Lyons, and forced it finally, by the fight at Pontarlier, where the Germans took two eagles, nineteen guns, and some 15,000 prisoners, to cross over into the neutral territory of Switzerland.

It was this final catastrophe which determined Gambetta to give way, and may thus be said to have had a leading share in the conclusion of peace.

The king appreciated General Manteuffel's great services at this critical juncture. The Grand Cross of the Iron Cross and the Order of the Black Eagle were bestowed upon him.

After the dissolution of the army of the south, Manteuffel was appointed commander of the second army (30th of March), and subsequently, on the 20th of June, 1871, commander-in-chief of the German army of occupation remaining on French soil. His head-quarters were established at Nancy.

In this position General Manteuffel certainly proved himself the right man in the right place.

After the final evacuation of France, his majesty the emperor and king raised Manteuffel to the highest military rank, and bestowed upon the new field-marshal also the important post of Governor of Berlin.

XII.

GENERAL VOGEL VON FALCKENSTEIN.

NEXT to Moltke this is unquestionably the greatest strategist and the most accomplished staff-officer of the Prussian and German armies, also the most consummate tactical leader in the field, and altogether the first of the great military captains of the age, though not yet a field-marshal.

Ernest Frederick Edward Vogel von Falckenstein was born at Breslau (I believe) on the 5th of January, 1797. His father was a retired Prussian major, who unfortunately died early, leaving his family in extremely embarrassed circumstances. The widow having no means to pay for the education of her son, was forced to claim the assistance of a relative of the family, who occupied the high position of Prince-Bishop of Breslau.

The worthy prelate willingly consented to take the boy off the poor mother's hands, but on condition only that he should devote himself to the clerical profession, for which the unhappy lad had not the

least vocation nor the slightest liking or inclination. Seeing no other way before him, however, the boy consented, and devoted himself eagerly and assiduously to those studies which were to prepare and fit him for his intended future career.

Meanwhile came the great year 1813, with the universal uprising of the Prussian people to shake off the detested French yoke. Young Edward, though only sixteen then, felt that he was a Prussian and the son of a soldier. He was resolved to join in the war of liberation. With rare firmness he resisted the bishop's most powerful arguments, and even his mother's passionate prayers and tears.

After a hard struggle he at last succeeded in extorting his family's reluctant consent to enter the army. But here again he had to contend against formidable difficulties. The boy looked sickly, and his appearance clearly betrayed a weak constitution. He was therefore rejected by corps after corps to which he applied for admission.

At last Colonel Klöse, an old friend of his late father, took compassion upon young Falckenstein, and obtained for him admission as volunteer in the West Prussian Grenadiers. From the instant he had the chance given him the new volunteer proved his nature and character as a true soldier by the calm, resolute courage which he showed on every occasion.

After the battle on the Katzbach he was made ensign, and in December, 1813, lieutenant.

With Blücher he crossed the Rhine at Caub, in the New Year's night of 1814. He distinguished himself on every occasion, more especially in the affair of Montmirail, where every officer of his battalion fell, so that the command ultimately devolved upon him. Here the youth of seventeen conducted himself with the cool self-possession of an old officer, and showed the most consummate skill in the handling of his men. By way of reward he was made first lieutenant on the spot, besides receiving the rare distinction of the Iron Cross Order.

When the war was over, there was of course no more talk of the clerical profession. Young Falckenstein stuck to the army. He was, however, painfully conscious of his nearly total lack of everything in the shape of military training, and of all technical knowledge of his profession. He therefore threw himself with ardour upon the study of the military art and science in all its branches, and he succeeded so well in his efforts that he was soon sent to the topographic bureau.

Here he suddenly discovered that he had a real talent for design and also for painting. This talent he cultivated with his accustomed ardour and assiduity. He tried his hand more especially at oil-painting. His really excellent productions in the various branches of the art attracted the attention and gained the young officer the favour of the then Crown

Prince, who subsequently ascended the Prussian throne as Frederick William IV.

By orders of this prince, Falckenstein established at a later period the Royal Institute for Painting on Glass, of which he himself remained for a time the distinguished head. The magnificent painted window in the church of St. Mary, near Dantzic, is a sample of Falckenstein's art-productions in this line.

His military advancement was rapid at first, for we find him as early as 1818 in command of the battalion of the Emperor Francis Grenadiers, which, jointly with a battalion of the Emperor Alexander Grenadiers, formed the guard of honour of the monarchs at Aix-la-Chapelle during the congress which assembled there on the 29th of September of that year.

After this he had to wait a long time for further promotion, for in 1848 he was still only a lieutenant-colonel. On the 18th of March of that year he was wounded in the great Berlin street fight, which did not prevent him, however, from joining in the Holstein campaign.

Soon after, he obtained his full colonelcy, together with the command of the rifles of the guard. He subsequently was appointed chief of the staff to General Wrangel.

In 1864 Vogel von Falckenstein, who had meanwhile attained the rank of general, was Wrangel's chief of the staff in the Schleswig-Holstein war, till after the capture of Düppel, when he was

appointed Governor of Jütland,—Moltke taking his place as chief of the staff.

It was in this Danish campaign that Vogel von Falckenstein first had the opportunity afforded him of displaying his rare strategic and tactic gifts on a wider field. Up to this time he had simply been known as a most meritorious, hard-working, and painstaking staff-officer, and a most excellent artist on glass and porcelain. Now he suddenly jumped to the foremost front rank of leaders in the field.

After the conclusion of peace with Denmark, General Vogel von Falckenstein was intrusted by the king with the command of the 7th army corps.

In 1866 the danger which threatened Prussia from the side of the Austrian allies in the German Confederation was real and formidable, though the plot hatched between Gablenz, George of Hanover, and the Augustenburg pretender had been stifled ere its possible full development.

There remained, however, the Hanoverian army, numerous, brave, and well appointed and provided in every way—except in its direction and guidance—and the armies of the south German states, which, on paper, reached the formidable figure of above 200,000 men, and numbered even in sober reality some 120,000 to 130,000 effectives.

Vogel von Falckenstein was the general chosen to meet this formidable danger. The forces placed at his disposal were simply one division of the

7th corps, the Prussian garrisons withdrawn from Mayence and Rastatt, and a few regiments of the reserve, with some Thuringian and other troops, the whole never exceeding 50,000 effectives at any one time whilst he held command, and falling most of the time considerably short of this figure.

He succeeded first in disposing of the Hanoverians, whose surrender he compelled. This was no doubt a very good beginning; but it was not all—far from it; for the immensely hard problem was now placed before the general, how to wedge himself between two hostile armies, each of them very greatly exceeding in numbers the whole force at his command.

Falckenstein's campaign in 1866 was so crowded with marches and countermarches and manœuvres of every kind, and with actual encounters in the field, that even a mere outline, to be at all intelligible to the reader, would occupy considerably more space than we can afford to give here. Besides, a brief sketch of the campaign will be found in the memoirs of Generals von der Tann and Hartmann. Let it suffice then to say in this place, that Vogel von Falckenstein in this marvellous campaign, where he literally stood always one to three on the assumption most favourable to his forces, displayed the highest genius as a military captain.

The boldness of his plans, the precision of his operations, the rapidity of his movements, the skill

of his dispositions, and the vigour of his attacks, more than neutralized the formidable advantage of threefold numbers and of excellent positions on the other side.

He wedged himself successfully between the two opposing hosts, badly beating each of them alternately in detail. When, on the 16th of July, about one month after he had first taken the field, he entered the ancient free city of Frankfort-on-the-Main as conqueror, there remained very little to be done to complete the utter discomfiture and military annihilation of Austria's south German allies.

It has been said that Vogel von Falckenstein, in his dealings with the conquered Frankforters, showed over-ostentatiously the very roughest side of his character. However, there would seem to be good reason for the probable supposition that he acted in this upon express instructions from the highest quarter, and that he did so with the greatest reluctance only. Nay, it would even appear that he took upon himself to lower the demand of twenty-five millions of florins war contribution, which he had been instructed to make, to six millions, and that he gave thereby great offence in the highest quarter.

Whatever may be the real facts of the case, thus much is certain, that on the 19th of July, three days after his triumphant entry into Frankfort, General Vogel von Falckenstein was recalled from his command most suddenly, and upon the very colourable

pretext that the state of affairs in Bohemia absolutely required the immediate presence in that province of a most energetic and skilful commander. General Manteuffel, who was appointed his successor, speedily showed by his harsh and haughty bearing towards the Frankforters, and by the infliction of a war fine of £2,000,000, in addition to Falckenstein's demand of £500,000, that the old general had certainly not been removed from the command he had held so gloriously on account of any reprehensible roughness in his behaviour to the citizens that had excited disapprobation in the higher quarters.

Take it as we may, we cannot but look upon it as a very strange proceeding, to say the least of it, to remove from his command an approved general after a most brilliantly successful campaign, with all the work fully accomplished by him, and nothing remaining for him to do but to cull his hard-earned and well-deserved laurels.

After the conclusion of peace, Vogel von Falckenstein was of course included in the list of commanders to whom the grateful king and nation voted and gave dotations. With the sum voted to him he purchased the Dolzig estate.

In the autumn of the year he exchanged the command of the 7th corps for that of the 1st, on which occasion the troops up to this under his command manifested their high regard for him by presenting him with a magnificent testimonial.

The city of Königsberg, the head-quarters of his new command, elected him for its representative in the constituent assembly of the North German Confederation. He took his seat on the Conservative benches.

In the debates upon the organization of the confederate army, he strongly insisted upon the three years' term of service in the line, declaring it to be of the utmost importance in war that a commander should know and feel that he had under his command soldiers who fully knew the service and could be absolutely relied upon. The consciousness of this would inspire a commander with courage to dare even venturesome enterprizes, as he (Falckenstein) could tell the house from his own personal experience.

In 1868 Falckenstein retired from active service, and went to reside on his Dolzig estate.

But in 1870, when the war with France broke out, the old general, who was then seventy-three, had once more a high trust confided to him.

Prussia had no adequate fleet to cope with the French navy, and it was to be foreseen then that the French would be likely to endeavour to turn their vast naval superiority to the most profitable account, by harassing the North German coasts, and perhaps attempting landings here and there; nay, it seemed even probable that they would try to throw some fifty thousand men upon some inviting spot of the coast, which might have proved a very serious diversion indeed.

It was indispensable, then, to have a most skilful and energetic commander on the spot, to whom the defence of the coast lands might confidently be intrusted.

There was truly only one man in the Prussian army of whom it could be said that he fulfilled all the conditions required for this high and most difficult position—Vogel von Falckenstein.

So he was chosen for the trust. He was appointed governor-general of all German coast lands—that is to say, of the entire region of the 1st, 2nd, 9th, and 10th corps of the army of the North German Confederation.

The 17th division, belonging to the 9th corps, was left behind to form the nucleus of the coast defences. The 25th division (Hessians) took the place of the 17th in the 9th corps.

Vogel von Falckenstein, who made the city of Hanover his head-quarters, displayed all the energy of his character and the wonderful resources of his high military genius in providing, within a surprisingly short space of time, a most efficient system of coast defence. He organized a numerous and effective sea-coast guard; he completely shut up the mouths of the rivers and the entrances to the harbours; and he established so thoroughly efficient a system of communication and rapid connection all along the coasts of the North Sea and the Baltic, that the French fleet did not succeed in even a single attempt to land.

In his internal administration he energetically put down all attempts at socialist agitation, and he also speedily made the French officers interned within the bounds of his government sensible that all attempted misuse or violation of their word of honour was a dangerous game to play with him.

When the war was over, and General Vogel von Falckenstein was relieved from his command, his majesty the emperor and king rewarded the great man by bestowing upon him the Order of the Black Eagle, whilst Steinmetz, Herwarth von Bittenfeld, and Manteuffel were made field-marschals—all three no doubt good men and excellent efficient officers, but assuredly not one of the three the equal, even approximately, of Vogel von Falckenstein.

It must be left to the future historian to find the cause for Vogel von Falckenstein's sudden removal from his command in 1866, and the reason for his being passed over in the marshals' promotion of 1871.

XIII.

GENERAL GÖBEN.

THIS is another of the most highly theoretically and practically accomplished general officers in the German army.

Augustus Charles von Göben was born on the 10th of December, 1816, at Stade, in the then kingdom of Hanover. His father was a retired half-pay captain, who subsequently obtained the honorary rank of major.

When the boy was about ten years old, he was sent to the gymnasium at Celle, which at the time enjoyed a well-deserved high reputation as one of the best educational institutes in the north of Germany. Here he devoted himself most diligently to the acquisition of solid learning in the several branches of knowledge that then constituted a sound education, with special reference to a future military career.

In October, 1833, young Göben entered the Prussian service as a military aspirant. He joined the

24th regiment of infantry (musketeers), then stationed at New Ruppin.

About a twelvemonth after, he attained his ensigncy, and on the 15th of February 1835, he was gazetted lieutenant.

Göben was a born soldier in the fullest sense of the word. His theoretical military studies, which he pursued with the greatest ardour, could not quite satisfy his soldierly craving. He thirsted for an opening that might enable him to practise his darling profession in actual warfare. As there seemed but little hope that the Prussian service would for a long time to come afford any such opening, the young officer resolved, after mature reflection, to resign his commission in the Prussian army, and to carry his sword to Spain, where just at that time Don Carlos and Donna Christina (in the name of her daughter Isabel), or rather their respective partisans, were fighting for the crown. This was in the year 1836.

Considering that of the two pretenders to the thorny throne of Spain, Don Carlos might at least fairly be looked upon as the more legitimate and the more respectable, or rather the less disreputable, young Göben resolved to offer his sword and service to him.

The appearance of an accomplished young officer was hailed with pleasure at the pretender's headquarters. Göben received a commission as second

lieutenant, and found at once employment on the staff.

In the first year of his service he had an opportunity of distinguishing himself at the battle of Fuentarabia, which gained him his promotion to a first lieutenancy.

The year after, he was present at the battles and encounters of Peralta, Zembrano, Segovia, Navrèda, Lerma, Valladolid, and Aranda.

In 1838, he joined as captain in the expedition to Castile, in which he was severely wounded at Sotoca.

In 1839, he served at first in the engineers, but after a time he was transferred to the infantry. He led his company with great distinction in the fights of Chulilla and Carboneras, and in the winter campaign in Valencia and Aragon.

In 1840, Major Göben was again severely wounded at Teruel. He was now promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel in the engineer corps; but with this promotion his promising military career in Spain came to a close. He remained, indeed, faithful and loyal to the last to the cause which he had espoused, and it was only after the pretender himself had given up the struggle in despair that Göben took his leave of him and of Spain.

Besides the two severe wounds which he had received at Sotoca and Teruel, he had been wounded more slightly three times in the course of the war.

He had also twice fallen into the hands of the Christinos, but he had each time been speedily exchanged again.

Ex-Lieutenant-Colonel Göben had to leave Spain almost penniless, and to wander through France on foot. It was a painful journey, full of bitter privations. But he bore all with stoic calm, cheerfully, with the buoyant light-heartedness of a true soldier of fortune.

He reached his father's house in September, 1840.

The year after, he published his war adventures, under the title, "Four Years in Spain." This book created some sensation at the time in military and political circles.

His inborn passionate love of a soldier's life left him no rest until he had succeeded in obtaining permission to re-enter the Prussian service. He had of course to begin *de novo* at the foot of the ladder.

On the 26th of February 1842, he was gazetted to a commission in the 8th regiment of infantry, but ordered at once on the general staff of the army.

The high reputation which he had gained, his extensive and sound knowledge of the military sciences, and his practical experience smoothed the path for him to a more rapid advancement than falls ordinarily to the share of young officers without powerful influence to push them.

In three years he passed through the grades of

second lieutenant and first lieutenant to the rank of captain on the staff.

In 1848, he was sent to the head-quarters of the 4th corps at Magdeburg.

In May 1849, he was attached to the division Hanneken, which was charged to put down the insurrection in Westphalia.

He was afterwards ordered on the staff of the commander-in-chief of the army sent into Baden.

Here he had occasion to prove his high military capacity in the several affairs of Ludwigshafen, Waghäusel, Ubstadt, Bruchsal, Durlach, Kuppenheim, and Rastatt.

After a brief period of service in the 16th infantry regiment, Göben, promoted to the rank of major, was ordered back to the staff.

In 1855, he was made lieutenant-colonel and chief of the staff of the 6th corps, from which he was transferred, in May 1858, to the 8th corps.

In 1860, he was promoted to the rank of colonel, and sent with several other Prussian officers to the Spanish army operating under O'Donnell in Morocco. Here he met many of his former antagonists in the Carlist war.

He remained with the Spanish army throughout the campaign of 1860, and was present at the fights at Samsa and Uad-Ras.

Soon after his return from this expedition he was raised to the rank of major-general, and in 1863,

he obtained the command of the 26th infantry brigade, which he led in the campaign of 1864 against Denmark, before Düppel, in the storm of the fortifications, in the crossing to Alsen, and in the capture of that island, everywhere in such brilliant fashion that he was rewarded with the *Ordre pour le Mérite*, as well as with other Prussian, German, and Austrian orders and war decorations.

He was also promoted to the command of the 10th division, from which he was soon after (in May 1865) transferred to that of the 13th division, with the rank of lieutenant-general.

His advancement was altogether most exceptionally rapid. In twenty-three years he attained the same rank of lieutenant-general which it had taken such men as Vogel von Falckenstein, Herwarth von Bittenfeld, and Steinmetz forty-seven long years to climb up to. Even the so highly-favoured Manteuffel had been quite thirty-five years about it.

This fact, whilst affording irrefragable proof of Göben's brilliant talents and his high military capacity, speaks also volumes in favour of the system which thus permits the most rapid promotion of a deserving officer, though he happens to be altogether unsupported by the accident of rank or wealth, or by powerful family connections.

In 1866, Göben operated first in Hanover at the head of his division; subsequently he was Vogel

von Falckenstein's most efficient aid in the campaign on the Main. That great general knew how thoroughly to appreciate him at his just high value. Göben commanded the forces in the successful affairs of Dermbach, Kissingen, Laufach, Aschaffenburg, Werbach, Tauber-Bischofsheim, and Gerchsheim.

He subsequently published a series of papers on some of these fights (in the *Allgemeine Militärzeitung*), which by competent judges are held to rank among the most sterling productions in the military literature of the day.

When the Franco-German war broke out, Göben, promoted to the rank of general of infantry, had the command of the 8th corps intrusted to him. The 8th corps formed part of the first army under Steinmetz.

In the memoir of that leader will be found a brief record of the great battle of Spicheren, which was fought on the very first day of the opening of the campaign, and in which General Göben again brilliantly proved his high military genius.

General Göben took a glorious part also in the tremendous fights of Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte, on the 16th and 18th of August.

The 8th corps formed part of the army under Prince Frederick Charles, which kept Bazaine shut up in Metz from the 19th of August to the 26th of October 1870.

After the capitulation of Bazaine's army and of the fortress of Metz, the 8th corps formed again part of the first army, which was reconstituted under the command of General Manteuffel, and sent to the north of France, to watch the new French army of the north formed there under the command of General Faidherbe, one of the best and most skilful among the French leaders.

The battles of Amiens, on the Hallue, and of Bapaume were fought and gained by three divisions only of Manteuffel's army, as the entire 7th corps had been left behind at Metz; and out of these three divisions Göben commanded two. The success may fairly be set down then, in great part, to his share.

On the 8th of January 1871, General Manteuffel, having been appointed commander-in-chief of the new army of the south, intended for the relief of General Werder, handed over the command of the first army to General Göben.

The new chief had barely been ten days in command when he dealt the French army of the north the crushing blow of St. Quentin.

The city of St. Quentin had been occupied and held for twenty-four hours by the army of the Meuse, on the 21st of October 1870.

On the 26th of December it was re-occupied by troops of the first army, who had to abandon it again on the 15th of January, when General

Faidherbe, by a strategic move threatening a diversion in the rear of the first German army, compelled General Göben to change his position.

On the 17th of January General Faidherbe took possession of St. Quentin with the bulk of his army, which consisted of the 22nd and 23rd French corps, and greatly exceeded in numbers the forces under Göben, who only had present the 8th corps, part of the 1st corps, part of the 3rd cavalry division, the Saxon cavalry division under Count Lippe, the 6th battalion of Saxon rifles, and the 2nd Saxon horse battery.

On the 18th there was a preliminary encounter between the vanguards of the two armies, which terminated in the retreat of the French from Beauvais to St. Quentin.

On the 19th General Göben attacked the French most vigorously in their positions at Javy, Gougis, Neuville, St. Amand, and Gauchy.

There was a radical fault in Faidherbe's position: the two corps of his army were separated by the canal of Crozal, so that they could only come to the aid and support of one another by the circuitous way through St. Quentin.

After several hours' hard fighting, the villages held by the French were carried by Göben's forces, both wings of Faidherbe's army being turned, and the entire French host being thereby forced back. At two o'clock Faidherbe made a last desperate effort with

the 22nd French corps, supported by a most powerful artillery force, to recover the lost ground; but it was all in vain, and at four o'clock in the afternoon the French were in full retreat, which soon degenerated into wild flight in the direction of Cambray and Guise, Valenciennes and Lille.

The Saxon cavalry contributed to the success of the day by several brilliant attacks.

On the evening of the same day the railway station of St. Quentin was most valiantly carried by the 19th regiment of infantry, under the lead of a younger brother of the commander-in-chief.

In this battle of St. Quentin the German loss in killed and wounded was 94 officers and about 3,400 non-commissioned officers and privates. The French left several thousand wounded behind in St. Quentin. Their total loss in killed and wounded must have been about 6,000. Besides this, 12,000 unwounded prisoners fell into the hands of the victorious pursuers. The French also lost six guns.

The French army of the north, the last hope of besieged Paris, had literally ceased to exist.

Göben's victory of St. Quentin forms, indeed, one of the greatest feats of arms in this war, so rich in glorious triumphs.

In June 1871, when the first army was dissolved, General Göben received, besides many other orders, the Grand Cross of the Iron Cross, and was presented also with the 2nd Rhenan Infantry

Regiment, No. 28. The city of Minden made him an honorary citizen.

General Göben continues still in command of the 8th corps of the German army, and has his headquarters at Coblenz.

XIV.

GENERAL WERDER.

THOUGH placed here among the last in our gallery of glory, this general ranks incontestably in every way the equal of the most distinguished war chiefs of the new German empire—with the single towering exception of Vogel von Falckenstein.

Augustus von Werder, a scion of an ancient, noble family, settled since the fourteenth century in the old Wenden land between the rivers Elbe and Havel, was born on the 12th of September 1808, at Schlossberg, Bailiwick Norkitten, in Eastern Prussia, where the regiment of dragoons in which his father (died in 1837, at Glogau, as lieutenant-general) was then a captain was lying in cantonments after the disastrous campaign of 1807.

The boy received his first education partly at home, partly at the military divisional school in Glogau, the father himself taking a prominent share in the mental and intellectual training of his son. An earnest man, and a hater and despiser of all mere

superficial show, he took the most anxious care that Augustus should be thoroughly grounded in every branch of his studies. The boy had considerable natural gifts, and great facility of apprehension. Assiduous and diligent withal, he soon gathered a rich store of varied, sound, and solid information, so that ere he had yet completed his seventeenth year, he was in every way well prepared for his intended profession—the army.

On the 14th of June 1825, young Augustus von Werder entered the regiment of *Gardes du Corps*, in the initial capacity of *avantageur*, or aspirant.

In March 1826, he got his commission of sub-lieutenant; at the express desire of his father he was transferred at the same time to the 1st foot-guards, where it was probably thought there would not be so many temptations to pleasure, calculated to withdraw the young man from his more serious studies, as in the more brilliant *Gardes du Corps*.

Young Werder remained for seven years in the foot-guards, acquiring a thorough practical knowledge of the service. He continued all the while also his theoretical studies with such excellent success, that in 1833 he was selected as one of the favoured few in the Prussian service who are sent to the General War School in Berlin to finish their scientific military education.

After the completion of the customary course of three years at the war school, young Werder was

sent back to his regiment for two more years' practical service. He was then transferred, in 1838, to the 8th pioneer division, that he might acquire practical knowledge also of that highly important branch of the service.

In 1839 he was attached as instructor to the cadet school in Berlin.

In 1840 he was sent to the topographic bureau, and had several important surveys intrusted to him.

In 1842 he gained his first step in promotion, being made first lieutenant, after stopping sixteen years on the lowest rung of the ladder—another signal instance of slow advancement in the initial stages of the Prussian service.

At this time holy Russia was hard at work civilizing the barbarians of the Caucasus, and endeavouring to overcome the stubborn opposition of the Lesghians, Tschetschenzes, and other tribes, who were clinging to their assailed independence with desperate tenacity.

Here was a splendid opportunity for the new lieutenant to learn something of actual warfare, which his superiors determined should not be lost. So Lieutenant Werder was duly provided with credentials, and sent to the Caucasus as a kind of Prussian military commissioner unattached, that he might study mountain warfare and the mode of fighting of both parties.

He fully justified the choice which had fallen upon

him. He was indefatigable in the fulfilment of the many and varied duties which his position imposed upon him. Thus he would ride or march along with the Cossacks on their reconnoitring expeditions into the inmost depth of the mountains, or attend the Russian infantry and Asiatic militia in their perilous marches through ravines and defiles. Every pause which occurred in the active operations of the Russians he turned to good account by visits to Tiflis, Kertsch, and the Russian coast defences. The lessons which he learnt, more especially respecting the proper mode of using artillery to the greatest advantage in the defence of long lines of mountain positions, he turned some thirty years after to brilliant account in his desperate struggle against Bourbaki's overwhelming forces.

On the 24th of June 1843, he was present at a fight between the Tschetschenzes and Cossacks, near the fortress which the Russians were then erecting on the banks of the river Kefar. Here a ball, fired from an ambush of the Tschetschenzes, struck him in the left upper arm, smashing the bone. This brought his services in these quarters to an involuntary close. He luckily escaped amputation, however, and recovered his health completely by the beneficial healing action of the waters of Pätigorsk and Teplitz.

The Emperor of Russia bestowed the Order of St. Wladimir upon him, to which his own king added that of St. John.

In March 1846, Werder was promoted to the rank of captain, and attached to the general staff of the army. Soon after, he was attached to the general staff of the 1st corps. In August 1848, he was ordered to take his place as captain in the 1st regiment of infantry.

In March 1851, he gained another step, being promoted to the rank of major, and appointed to the command of a battalion of the 33rd regiment of infantry. In October 1853, he was called to the command of the Landwehr battalion Gräfrath (40th regiment), whence he was again transferred, in February 1856, to the 4th battalion of rifles.

In October 1856, he attained the rank of lieutenant-colonel, and about a year after, he was appointed to the command of the fusilier battalion of the 2nd regiment of foot-guards.

In May 1858, he was made deputy inspector (with full performance of the inspectorial functions) of the rifles and carabineers, and also commander of the corps of royal field couriers. The year after, he was promoted to the rank of full colonel, and appointed inspector of the rifles and carabineers, the functions of which office he had performed already since the year before. He was at the same time named also a member of the directorial board of the Central Army Institute of Gymnastics at Berlin.

In January 1863, Colonel Werder was appointed to the command of the 8th infantry brigade, stationed

at Bromberg. Three months after, he was made major-general, and in January 1864, transferred to Berlin as commander of the 4th infantry brigade (guards).

In May 1865, he was charged with the command of the 3rd division, stationed at Stettin, and the year after he was definitely appointed to the command of this division, the appointment being followed a few weeks later by his promotion to the rank of lieutenant-general. It had accordingly taken Werder forty years to reach the same rank which Göben had attained in twenty-three years, or, if we go back even to Göben's first connection with the service, in thirty-two years, a convincing proof of the extraordinary rapidity of the latter's promotion in the army, which I have pointed out in his memoir.

I have given General Werder's promotions and transfers thus minutely here in illustration of the Prussian military system, which sends a promising officer from regiment to regiment, as it were, and from one branch of the service to another. That officers thus trained and schooled must necessarily be superior to others who have not had the same opportunities afforded them to gather experience and expertness in every branch of their profession is self-evident.

It is this excellent system to which Prussia may be said to owe, in a great measure at least, her present military preponderance. In this admirable

practical school the conquerors of 1866 and 1870-71 were formed.

In the Prusso-German War of 1866, General Werder commanded the 3rd infantry division, which took a prominent share in the victory of Gitschin, where it forced the corps of the Austrian General Ringelheim back upon the line of retreat of Count Clam-Gallas. At the battle of Königgrätz, again, General Werder's Pomeranians gained great and well-deserved glory by the cool and steady courage with which they, unshaken and undismayed, withstood a most heavy and destructive artillery fire. General Werder had the *Ordre pour le Mérite* bestowed upon him for his services in this campaign.

After the conclusion of peace, General Werder was sent back to Stettin, as commander of the 3rd infantry division.

At the outbreak of the Franco-German war of 1870, General Werder was specially attached to the staff of the Crown Prince of Prussia, commander-in-chief of the third German army. In the battle of Wörth he commanded the combined corps of Würtemberg and Baden.

General Beyer, to whom the siege of Strasburg had been intrusted, falling ill, General Werder was appointed to succeed him in the command of the army collected before Strasburg, which consisted of the Baden division (eighteen battalions of infantry,

twelve squadrons of cavalry, and ten batteries), the Prussian Landwehr of the guards division, the first Prussian Reserve-Landwehr division (under the command of General Treskow, who subsequently conducted the siege of Belfort), the 37th company of fortress artillery, one battalion of Prussian pioneers, and one company of Bavarian pioneers,—the whole numbering above 50,000 effectives.

It would lead us too far here to give the details of the siege of Strasburg. Suffice it to state that that fortress capitulated on the 27th of September 1870, after a siege of about six weeks. On the day of the capitulation of Strasburg, Lieutenant-General Werder was raised to the rank of general of infantry.

The forces set free by the capitulation of Strasburg were now formed into a separate new corps, the fourteenth of the German army, which was placed under the command of General Werder.

To this new corps was joined also the 4th Prussian reserve division, which had meanwhile been organized at Freiburg, in the Breisgau.

General Werder had the arduous task assigned him to complete the conquest of Alsatia, watch over the safety of the conquered province, and protect the lines of communication of the great German army before Paris.

To this latter end it was indispensable to stifle in the germ, if possible, the organization of fresh

French armies, which was just at this critical juncture beginning to assume tangible shape and substance, and might speedily attain to formidable proportions if not resolutely met at once, and effectually crushed. The fortresses, the natural centres of such organization, were therefore necessarily also the first and chief object of Werder's new campaign.

With a clear and correct appreciation of the actual circumstances and of the foe opposed to him, General Werder determined upon a bold offensive.

The grand total of the forces under his command might reach some 55,000 effectives. But the Landwehr of the guards division had to be left in Strasburg as a garrison ; and the 4th reserve division was required to besiege and reduce the fortresses of Schlettstadt and Neu Breisach. So it was with a comparatively very slender force that the general had to open the campaign.

The first task was to clear the Vosges of the numerous bands of franc-tireurs who were endeavouring to establish themselves in these quarters. On the 1st of October the brigade Degenfeld, which formed the vanguard of the 14th corps, moved forward on its march through the Vosges, closely followed by the main body of the corps. The German troops had to remove enormous abatis and barricades from their line of march through the passes ; but there was no fighting.

The first serious encounter with the French took place on the western slope of the mountain, between Raon L'Etape and St. Dié. Six battalions of Baden infantry, numbering barely 4,000 men, had a hard fight with a portion of General Cambriel's army (French army of the east), newly formed for the defence of the Vosges.

The French forces, commanded by General Dupré, consisted of some 8,000 regulars of the line and about the same number of franc-tireurs; they were amply provided with artillery. Yet, after seven hours' desperate fighting, General Degenfeld, with his 4,000, drove them headlong from the field. The French losses exceeded 2,000 men, of whom 300 were killed, and 600 made prisoners of war. The Degenfeld brigade lost about 400 men in killed and wounded. The discomfited French fled in the greatest disorder to Besançon. The blow had so demoralized them, that Cambriel's corps was in a few brief days reduced, chiefly through wholesale desertion, from 55,000 to 24,000 men !

General Werder had originally been instructed by Moltke to march upon Troyes. However, as Cambriel was making desperate efforts to reorganize his forces under the shelter of Besançon and Belfort, the commander of the 14th corps deemed it the wiser course first to deal effectively with this enemy before starting in search of adventures in the interior of France.

Having obtained General Moltke's sanction to extend his operations to Besançon, Werder marched upon Vesoul, which was occupied by the 14th corps on the 18th of October, the French retreating precipitately to Belfort and Dijon.

Meanwhile the French army of the east, re-organized by Cambriel and considerably increased in numbers, had taken up a strong position on the river Ognon, or Oignon (an affluent of the Saône), at Ruoz and Etuz.

General Beyer was directed by Werder to dislodge them and throw them back into Besançon. Beyer had with him only the Degenfeld brigade, with part of Keller's brigade, and the brigade of Prince William of Baden and two battalions of regiment No. 30. Yet, notwithstanding the very great disproportion of numbers, he defeated Cambriel, carrying all his positions, driving him in disorder across the river, and finally compelling him to seek shelter once more behind the strong walls of Besançon.

This battle, which was fought on the 22nd of October, disposed effectively of the French army of the east for the next fortnight to come at least, in so far as regarded the possible resumption of the offensive by Cambriel. Moltke's latest instructions had directed Werder to march over Dijon to Bourges, a most perilous task even for a much larger force than Werder had with him then, considering, more particularly, the dangerous fact that he would have to

leave in flank and rear the important strongholds of Belfort, Besançon, Langres, and Auxonne.

However, the march to Dijon and Bourges had to be postponed for the time at least, as a new enemy had meanwhile made his appearance on the scene. Garibaldi, to wit, to whom Gambetta had intrusted the formation of a new corps, together with the supreme command over all bands of franc-tireurs and other free corps in the Vosges.

The famous Italian chieftain was just then hard at work at Dôle to put something like organization into his omnium-gatherum mob of *franc-tireurs de l'égalité, du Midi, du Doubs, des Vosges, de Nice, de la croix, &c. ; Compagnies de la revanche, de la demi-lune, des vengeurs, espagnole, polonaise, grecque, égyptienne (!), franco-espagnole, &c. ; Carabiniers de Gênes, Chasseurs de Caprera, de Marseille, d'Oran, du Mont Blanc, de l'Atlas, &c.*

To provide effectively against any danger that might threaten from this quarter, General Werder recrossed the Saône, and took up a suitable position at Gray. This apparently retrograde movement was hailed by the French population around as the result of a total defeat inflicted upon the Germans by the army of the east. So they arose in insurrection. Numerous bands of franc-tireurs and other volunteers were formed.

As this movement among the people threatened to become dangerous, the general resolved to put it

down at once with a strong hand. He proclaimed that he would shoot any man taken with arms in his hands who should be unable to show that he belonged to a corps possessed of some degree of organization and forming part of the French army.

The attempted rising was speedily put down, and the country all around disarmed. Only four men, convicted of having treacherously slain German soldiers, were shot by the general's orders.

Garibaldi not yet having completed his organization, it was not thought prudent at Tours to leave the great Italian chieftain at Dôle, where he was exposed to a crushing attack by Werder. So Garibaldi was ordered with his corps to Autun, to complete his organization there.

Werder was thus left free to resume his advance upon Dijon. As his scouts had brought him certain news of the formation of fresh French armies proceeding rapidly behind the front of the Garibaldians, and as he found the difficulties of the transport of his supplies increasing with every league of advance, he resolved to content himself for the time being with the capture and occupation of Dijon, and the holding of a strong position at Vesoul.

On the 27th of October, Prince William of Baden's brigade came upon the newly-formed *Armée de la Côte d'Or*. This corps, which was commanded by Laval, president of the Dijon committee of defence,

barely awaited the attack of the German vanguard, but retreated at once precipitately to Dijon.

The total effective force of General Werder's expeditionary corps amounted at this time to twenty-three battalions of infantry, twenty squadrons of cavalry, and seventy-two pieces of artillery.

It had before it the *Armée de la Côte d'Or*; to the south the fortress of Auxonne; at Besançon the army of the east, under Cambriel, some 30,000 strong; on the right flank the fortress of Langres, with a garrison of 6,000; in the rear, Belfort, with a garrison of 10,000. Adding the Garibaldians and the numerous bands of franc-tireurs, &c., to these, there were certainly French forces enough to crush the small German corps among them.

On the 30th of October 1870, General Beyer and Prince William of Baden assailed Dijon.

The French had brought up 10,000 men by rail, and the citizens, even the women, joined most energetically in the defence. The resistance was obstinate in the extreme, and the Germans suffered heavy losses. But Prince William of Baden carried the heights of St. Apollinari in gallant style, and occupied the suburbs, from which the Germans ultimately forced their way into the city, where fierce fights from barricade to barricade, from house to house, lasted till midnight.

On the morning of the 31st of October, the ancient

capital of Burgundy was formally surrendered by the mayor. The loss of Dijon was a heavy blow and sad discouragement to the French.

The possession of Belfort being deemed indispensable to the safety of Alsatia, the 1st reserve division under command of General Treskow, was detached to lay siege to this most important fortress.

General Schmeling, who commanded the 4th reserve division, had meanwhile paid a visit to Mühlhausen, and after an unsuccessful attempt to carry the fortress of Neu Breisach by what might be termed a *coup de bombardement*, occupied Colmar, after which he laid siege to Schlettstadt, a most important point on the railway line from Strasburg to Bale, which commands moreover the road to Lunéville and Nancy.

Schlettstadt surrendered on the 24th of October, two days after Werder's victory on the Ognon.

After the capture of Schlettstadt, Schmeling resumed the siege of Neu Breisach with the greatest vigour, and compelled this fortress also to capitulate (10th of November). Fort Mortier had surrendered three days before. Pfalzburg and Bitsch were thus the only two strong places in Alsatia still remaining in the hands of the French.

The fall of Metz having set free Prince Frederick Charles's large army, which was at once pushed on by forced marches towards the Loire, there was no longer need now of Werder's advance into the interior of

France, and the general could freely make his dispositions to encounter the many enemies who surrounded him.

Werder resolved upon a vigorous offensive in all directions. He had only about 22,000 men to oppose to some 70,000 foes.

The French, however, thinking the general had received large reinforcements from the army of Metz, gave way at once on all sides.

On the 14th of November 1870, Werder concentrated his small force about Dijon, ordering the 4th reserve division under Schmeling up to Vesoul.

Garibaldi had meanwhile completed the organization of his corps, and had again advanced from Autun to the Côte d'Or. He meditated a *coup de main* upon Dijon.

Werder, who was admirably served by his scouts, knew that a large French force was being concentrated about Lyons; he also knew that the army of the east, now under command of General Michel, who had replaced Cambriel, was about to resume the offensive. He knew also all about Garibaldi's intended surprise of Dijon, and he took his precautions accordingly. The mayor of Dijon was duly warned that the first attempt at a rising would inevitably lead to the total destruction of the ancient city, and the warning had its due effect.

On the 26th of November, early in the morning, General Degenfeld, out upon a reconnoitring expe-

dition, discovered that Menotti Garibaldi was advancing with a numerous body of Garibaldians from the direction of Pasques.

Just as night was setting in, the outposts of the fusilier battalion of the 3rd regiment were vehemently attacked. They fell back upon the main body of their own battalion, and the battalion Unger. These steady soldiers let the assailants come up to within fifty yards, when they suddenly opened upon them a terribly close and fast fire, which drove the Garibaldians back in disorder.

Three times the same manœuvre was repeated; after the third repulse the Garibaldians took to flight in a complete panic, wildly throwing away their arms and baggage.

Next day, General Werder, at the head of three brigades, assumed the offensive. He came up near Pasques with a rear-guard that turned out to be a portion of the French army of the Loire. The Garibaldians had fled back to Autun. General Keller, sent forward in pursuit of the enemy, found a fresh French corps posted in a strong position at Nuits, south of Dijon. This corps, then some 12,000 strong, was commanded by General Cremer, late captain of the staff in M'Mahon's army. This officer was one of the prisoners of Sedan who had disgracefully broken his plighted parole, and had been raised by Gambetta *per saltum* to the rank of general of division.

Cremer, though he had broken his parole, was yet an excellent officer. He endeavoured, with great skill and pertinacious bravery, to intercept the return of Keller's corps to Dijon; but the men of Baden proved more than a match for the utmost efforts of the French, and Keller brilliantly effected his junction with Werder at Dijon, where the 14th corps was now once more concentrated.

From here Werder despatched General von der Goltz with a small corps to lay siege to the fortress of Langres. This officer came upon the French, strongly posted at Longeau, on the 16th of December. He at once attacked them, and, after three hours' hard fighting, drove them back into Langres, to which he then laid siege.

General Werder's force at Dijon was now reduced to 16,000 effectives, against whom more than 50,000 French, with a large artillery force, were advancing from the south and the Côte d'Or.

The most immediately dangerous foe was Cremer, who had meanwhile raised his force to above 20,000 men, and was holding a naturally very strong position at Nuits and Pesmes, which he had skilfully strengthened still more by field-works.

Werder resolved to dislodge him from this position. The lead of this expedition was intrusted to General Glümer. Werder could only spare him 11,000 men, as he was compelled to retain a firm hold upon Dijon.

On the 18th of December, General Glümer attacked the French, who outnumbered his small force in the proportion of two to one at least. Cremer defended his position most valiantly, and with no mean skill. The battle lasted six hours, and it was only at night that Nuits was finally carried by the Germans, who made some 600 prisoners.

Cremer retreated upon Châlons-sur-Saône, pursued by the victorious Germans. The French acknowledged a loss of 2,200 men. Cremer's corps was so shaken by this blow that it took a long time to make it fit again for offensive operations. The Germans also had suffered heavy losses—amounting to close upon 1,100 killed and wounded, including many high officers. Prince William of Baden also was severely wounded in this battle of Nuits.

It was about this time that Gambetta conceived his truly brilliant and most threatening plan of an invasion of South Germany, which, had it been successful, must not alone have brought unspeakable miseries upon the invaded land, but might have turned out a most formidable diversion, and would have protracted the war for many months.

Long ere it was known at head-quarters that General Bourbaki had commenced his threatening movement, General Werder received authentic information from the German envoy at Berne, Baron von Röder, that the French were concentrating their new army of the east, consisting of the 15th, 18th,

20th, and 24th corps, between Dôle and Besançon, and that it was clearly their intention to relieve Belfort, and cut the lines of communication of the German armies. When General Werder received the alarming news of the imminent approach of Bourbaki with some 160,000 men, he was not quite sure whether it might not be the French commander's intention to march upon Nancy, to break the German line of communication there; or whether he really purposed to endeavour to raise the siege of Belfort, and make his way into Alsatia and thence into the southern part of Germany.

But he fully saw and realized at once the immensity of the danger threatening the cause of Germany from that quarter, no matter which of the two, Nancy or Belfort, might form the proximate object of Bourbaki's intended operations.

With prompt decision he determined to abandon Dijon immediately. He ordered General von der Goltz to raise the siege of Langres, and rejoin him with his corps. On the 27th of December, the Germans left Dijon, and made their way by forced marches to Vesoul.

The 4th reserve division, set free by the capitulation of Schlettstadt and Neu-Breisach, was ordered up to Villersexel, some eighteen English miles to the west of Belfort.

In this well-chosen flank position at Vesoul and Villersexel, which was admirably adapted to meet

all eventualities, Werder resolved to watch the course of events.

General Treskow, in command of the 1st reserve division, had laid siege to Belfort on the 3rd of November. Exactly one month after the German batteries had opened their fire upon the place. To cover the operation of the siege in the west, General Debschitz had been ordered up with eight battalions of Landwehr.

From the 3rd to the 8th of January, 1871, the Germans were victorious in a series of small reconnoitring fights at Vellefaux, Villersec, Lévrency, and Velle le Châtel, from which Werder gained the certainty that the immense army of the east (some 160,000 men) was moving to the right upon Belfort.

It was of the utmost importance that he should arrive there before them. He had already contemplated an eventuality of this nature, and had partly provided against it, by selecting an excellent position on the Lisaine or Luxienne, which was well adapted to cover the siege of Belfort.

On the 7th of January 1871, Werder resolved to attack the enemy's left wing. The French declined the combat, which fully confirmed Werder's opinion that they were moving to the right upon Belfort.

So on the 9th of January, he fell upon Bourbaki's left flank with fierce impetuosity. On the German side the Baden division was chiefly engaged, on

the French side the 18th and 20th corps. Bourbaki commanded in person.

The possession of Villersexel was the chief object of the fight.

Villersexel is a small place in the arrondissement Lure, Haute-Saône. It lies at the confluence of the rivers Ognon and Seey, on the road from Vesoul to Héricourt and Montbéliard.

The German attack was made with extraordinary vigour. Villersexel was carried by storm, Moimay and Marat sharing the same fate. This latter place was taken in the evening. All attacks made by the French, who brought more and more considerable forces into the field, were victoriously repulsed.

The whole French army was brought to a standstill. Bourbaki was thoroughly convinced that the German attack would be renewed in the morning of the 10th, and made his dispositions accordingly.

His conviction that a renewal of the battle was intended for next day was strengthened by the entire apparent bearing of Werder, who actually had a bridge thrown over the Ognon, in Bourbaki's right flank.

Werder, however, having thus craftily misled his antagonist, marched quietly off in the night of the 9th-10th of January, the general with his staff hastening on in advance to the position marked out from Delle to Lure, to make his final preparations for the impending titanic struggle.

A forced march, rendered peculiarly difficult by the deep snowdrifts and the slippery state of the roads, brought the whole of the troops to the intended position on the 11th of January.

On the morning of the 10th of January Bourbaki had found, to his intense amazement and grief, that the Germans were clean gone.

The battle of Villersexel had inflicted severe losses upon the French. Besides many killed and wounded, they lost also two guns, two eagles, and some 800 unwounded prisoners, with two superior officers and fourteen subalterns.

The whole of Werder's forces, with every man counted whom Treskow could possibly spare from the siege of Belfort, amounted to forty-eight weak battalions, with whom the general had to hold a most extended position. The force of the assailants was fourfold stronger. The defence had to be made, moreover, with a strong well-garrisoned hostile fortress in the rear, and under the threatening danger of a *sortie en masse* from that fortress, which would place the German defenders of the extended line from Lure to Delle between two fires.

General Werder was not a whit dismayed, however. His old Caucasian experience of the defence of extended mountain positions stood him in excellent stead now. He knew he could fully rely upon General Treskow, to whom he left the difficult task of watching and engaging the Belfort garrison,

and warding off any danger that might threaten from that quarter.

The position chosen covered not alone the siege of Belfort, but also Alsatia and southern Germany.

The Lisaine, or Luxienne, a brook some three to four feet deep, flanked on both banks by marshy meadows, constituted the principal line of defence, extending some eight English miles in length. The left flank rested on the Allaine and the Rhine and Rhone canal, which runs parallel with it. The left wing found a most valuable point of support in the old castle of Montbéliard, which Werder had mounted with heavy artillery, garrisoned by an adequate force, and amply stored with provisions and ammunition for twenty-one days.

General Werder established his head-quarters at Bréville, near Héricourt, which formed the centre and key of the position.

Héricourt lies in the valley of the Luxienne, which is commanded, in the direction of Belfort as well as in that of Arcey, by thickly-wooded mountains, and through which runs the high road from Besançon to Belfort.

To guard against all chances of being outflanked, the German line of defence had to be extended from Frahier over Echevanne, Chenebier, and Chagey to Lure; thence to Héricourt, the key of the position; from Héricourt southward, over Bussarel and Bethoncourt, to Montbéliard, and from Montbéliard

finally eastward to Delle, or Dattenried, on the Swiss frontier.

General Treskow had sent up thirty-six heavy position guns, which were judiciously placed on Mont les Baragues, at Chalonsvillars, and other important points. Other parts of the line were held by battalions of infantry, with field-batteries placed at proper intervals between them. All villages and places along the line were thoroughly got ready for the most obstinate defence, rifle-pits being dug, and barricades and abatis placed at all suitable points.

By noon of the 13th of January all preparations were fully completed. Whilst the front of the position was defended by the Baden division, the 4th reserve division, and part of the 1st reserve division, eight battalions of Landwehr, under command of General Debschitz, covered the ground south of the Allaine up to the Swiss frontier. Three regiments of cavalry, under Colonel Willisen, were pushed forward in front of the right wing, to harass the left flank of the advancing enemy.

To General von Schmeling, the conqueror of Schlettstadt and Neu Breisach, was intrusted the command of the centre at Héricourt; General von Debschitz commanded on the left wing, General von der Goltz on the right, where General von Degenfeld was placed with the Baden division. Generals Glümer and Keller led the reserves.

General Werder himself took up his position in the centre of the line of defence, near Les Baragues, where he could keep up constant communication with the field-telegraph at Bréville through cavalry relays.

The prelude to the ball was opened on the morning of the 13th of January, when the small German vanguard, which had been stationed on the other bank of the Lisaine, was attacked by overwhelming numbers, and compelled to fall back across the brook.

On the morning of the 14th of January the Germans stood in their position, fully prepared and ready to receive the French onset.

A simple change in the weather had meanwhile, in the course of the preceding night, very considerably altered the aspect of affairs, and changed the prospects of the German defence very much for the worse.

The thermometer had suddenly dropped to zero on Fahrenheit's scale, which means 14 to 15 degrees cold on Réaumur's scale. The Lisaine and the swampy meadows along its banks, which had the day before constituted the chief bulwark of the defence, were now solidly frozen over, opposing thus no further obstacle to the advance of the French.

General Werder correctly estimated the full import of the change. He did not conceal from himself the danger which he might incur of the destruction of

his corps, or, at least, the loss of his artillery, if he accepted the fight in this position against an enemy four times his own numerical strength under the now so vastly altered circumstances of the case.

His mind, indeed, was not shaken in the least. He was not dismayed by the extreme danger of his position. He remained fully resolved to fight to the last man and the last bullet for the safety of South Germany. But he wished not to incur the sole, undivided responsibility of the event; so he telegraphed to head-quarters for instructions. The answer, which fully accorded with his own resolution, reached him only on the evening of the 15th of January, when the first fierce onslaught of the French masses had been triumphantly repulsed.

The struggle began on the 15th of January, 1871.

Bourbaki directed the 20th corps coming up from Villersexel against the right wing of the Germans, the 18th corps, with the 24th corps in reserve, against the centre at Héricourt, and the 15th corps against the left wing. Numerous field-batteries and several batteries of mitrailleuses were brought to the French front.

The French attack was made with the utmost vigour. The artillery played the principal part in it. The battle raged for nine hours—from 8.30 A.M. to 5.30 P.M. Of course, with the overwhelming superiority of numbers on the side of the French, there could be no question of offensive operations

on the part of the Germans, who had, on the contrary, to strain every nerve to hold their extended line of defence, and more especially Héricourt, the key of the position, the fall of which would certainly have led to the most disastrous consequences for them.

After a hard struggle the French succeeded in gaining possession of Champey and some others of the less important points. They also succeeded in establishing field batteries at Blyan and Tavez, and on the wooded heights around, which up to four in the afternoon hailed down an incessant storm of projectiles upon the ground in front of them, the French infantry trying meanwhile their utmost to break through the German positions, but without success. The destructive fire of the German batteries, and the cool, steady bravery of the German infantry, which was brought up incessantly and indefatigably to every point seriously threatened by the enemy, proved too much for the French. They could not even gain an additional foot of ground. Their last attempt was made upon Chagey. It failed like the rest. When night put an end to the struggle, the position of the two armies remained still nearly the same as it had been in the morning.

The Germans had to bivouac on the battle-field, without fire, the whole of the bitterly cold night of the 15th–16th of January, when the thermometer fell to sixteen degrees cold on Réaumur's scale.

At break of day the Germans were ready again in their old positions. A thick fog covered the valley of the Lisaine, which cleared up only at noon sufficiently to permit the artillery to join in the struggle.

But despite the fog, the small-arms fire began at 7.30 A.M. The French tried hard to break through the German positions in the centre and on the left wing. They made most desperate efforts to seize the old Castle of Montbéliard.

At five o'clock in the afternoon the battle was suspended, but at eight o'clock it was renewed once more with the utmost fierceness, more especially on the left wing, where the French tried to carry by nocturnal surprise the positions from which they had been repulsed in the day. Here the fight lasted till two o'clock in the morning of the 17th.

All assaults of the French upon the centre and the left wing had been gallantly repulsed.

On the right wing, however, the assailants had been partially successful. Here the 18th French corps and Cremer's two divisions had thrown themselves upon General Degenfeld's three battalions and three batteries, and had, after ten hours' fierce fighting, succeeded at last in compelling Degenfeld to leave Chenebier and Frahier in their hands, and retreat to a strong position in the rear, which had been provided and prepared for such a contingency.

Werder, who fully understood the disastrous consequences that must result from further successes of the enemy on the right wing, and who had no more reserves to bring up, ordered General Keller to recapture the lost positions without delay by nocturnal surprise. The general's attack proved eminently successful. Frahier was carried by storm, and Chenebier by surprise. In the latter village seven French officers and 400 men were made prisoners.

General Treskow sent also three twenty-four pounder position pieces from Belfort to strengthen the defences on the right wing. These heavy pieces had to be dragged up all the way by men.

On the morning of the 17th of January, at about eight o'clock, the French made repeated attacks upon Chagey, which were repulsed. A vehement assault upon Bethoncourt, and several fierce attacks upon Montbéliard, shared the same fate.

About noon the French offensive began to slacken perceptibly. Columns of the enemy were seen to march off in a westerly direction. Rifle-pits were being dug at many points, and other defensive measures adopted by the French.

At four o'clock in the afternoon the French essayed a last overwhelming attack upon the positions occupied by General Keller. They succeeded in retaking Chenebier, but failed in their most desperate assaults upon Frahier.

Soon after a general advance of the German forces over Chagey and Echevanne ended in the final repulse of the French along the whole line.

Bourbaki, thus foiled in his most desperate efforts to break through the German line of defence thrown between him and Belfort, saw at last that there was naught left him now but to secure a safe retreat.

The fortress of Belfort had remained all the while perfectly quiescent, though the garrison must have heard the incessant thunder of artillery.

On the morning of the 18th of January it was found that the great French host had marched off. General Werder immediately ordered the movements of the retreating enemy to be vigilantly followed.

A pursuit *en masse* was altogether out of the question. The German troops required a few days' rest at least after their almost superhuman exertions. It was only on the 20th of January that the Baden division could start in pursuit, executing a general evolution to the left, in order to compel the French to fall back in the direction of the Doubs.

The French had suffered very heavy losses in this three days' desperate struggle. Their casualties in killed and wounded amounted to some 7,000 men, besides which they lost 2,000 prisoners. Two French eagles and one standard were also taken.

The German losses amounted altogether to some 60 officers and 2,200 men killed and wounded.

The ulterior operations of Werder and his corps were executed in conjunction with the army of the south under Manteuffel, of which the 14th corps formed part since the 9th of January.

Werder had saved South Germany from the unspeakable horrors of a French invasion. Manteuffel completed subsequently what Werder had so well begun. Manteuffel's part of the task was comparatively easy, as Bourbaki's defeat before Werder's line of defence had well-nigh thoroughly demoralized the huge French force commanded by that general.

The Emperor William—the new German empire had been proclaimed at Versailles on the 18th of January, the day after Bourbaki's last desperate attempt to break through Werder's position—appreciated at its just value the immense service rendered to Germany by General Werder through his stubborn and heroic defence.

He tendered his warm thanks to the general in a special letter written with his own hand. He sent him also the oak-leaves to wear with the *Ordre pour le Mérite*, and the Grand Cross of the Red Eagle, with swords; and on the 22nd of March he bestowed upon him, as a crowning distinction, the Grand Cross of the Iron Cross, which Werder shares with only six other leaders of the German army, viz., the Crown Prince of Germany, Prince Frederick Charles, King Albert of Saxony, Field-Marshal Moltke and Manteuffel, and General Göben.

Altogether General Werder is grand cross of eight of the principal orders.

After the conclusion of peace General Werder was definitively appointed to the command-in-chief of the 14th corps of the German army, which consists chiefly of the Baden contingent. The head-quarters are at Carlsruhe.

General Werder is also chief of the 4th Rhenan infantry regiment, No. 30.

The German people, more especially those of the south of Germany, have worthily manifested their deep sense of gratitude to the general.

Many cities have proudly enrolled him among their honorary citizens. The University of Freiburg has bestowed upon him the honorary degree of doctor of laws. Swords of honour, silver helmets, silver shields, silver cups, magnificent editions of the Bible, consignments of rare wines, and other precious gifts have literally rained in upon him.

The sculptor, Moest, of Carlsruhe, is at present engaged upon a memorial monument, which is shortly to be erected at Freiburg in honour of General Werder and his brave troops.

XV.

GENERAL VON DER TANN.

THE Bavarian troops played a prominent part, and had a very considerable share, in some of the hardest-fought fights and the most dearly-bought successes of the ever-memorable Franco-German war of 1870-71. The two commanders of the Bavarian contingent, Generals von der Tann and Hartmann, are therefore justly entitled to figure in the glorious list of the great war-chiefs who have contributed so largely to the creation of the new German empire.

Baron Ludwig Samson von der Tann-Rathsamhausen is descended from one of the principal branches of an ancient baronial family, widely spread through Francony and Hesse.

He was born on the 18th of June, 1815, on the day of the great battle of Waterloo, which finally put to rest all apprehensions of the possible resumption of the detested French sway over the fair land of Germany.

His father, Baron Heinrich von und zu der Tann, who died in 1848, was chamberlain to King Louis I.

of Bavaria, a lieutenant-colonel in the Bavarian army, and one of the chief district inspectors of the national militia. He enjoyed the intimate friendship of the king, who appointed young Louis one of his own pages when almost in his cradle, and had the boy educated with the greatest care at the Pages' Institute.

Young Louis, however, declined to enter the brilliant court career so temptingly opening before him. His mind was set upon sterner and more arduous pursuits. He was resolved to be a soldier, and with characteristic firmness carried his point against the wish of his father and the will of the king.

He was barely eighteen when he obtained a commission as second lieutenant in the Bavarian artillery. Unlike most young officers of noble birth who were serving at that time in the South German armies, more for the allurements of the glittering outer trappings and the charm of an idle, indolent life of pleasure than for love of the service, the young artillery lieutenant took his pursuit *au grand sérieux*, and threw himself into the study of all branches of the profession of his choice with all the ardour of his temperament and all the assiduous steadfastness of his disposition.

He soon gained the reputation of a singularly well-informed officer ; and in 1840 he was, despite his youth, and although he had only attained the rank of first lieutenant, appointed to an important position on

the general staff of the army. His promotion to the rank of captain followed soon after.

In 1844, the king, who by this time had got over his disappointment about the slighted pageship, and who remained to the last day of his life Tann's well-affected patron, made the brilliant young staff officer adjutant to the Crown Prince Maximilian.

This position, in which he was after a time promoted to the rank of major, he held four years, up to 1848, when the German rising in Schleswig-Holstein impelled him irresistibly to devote his sword and his talents to the patriotic cause of the Elbe duchies. He obtained King Maximilian's permission (King Louis having abdicated in March, 1848), and the sanction of the Ministry of War, to take the command of a German free corps in the duchies, where he gained some brilliant successes over the Danes, more especially in the great surprise of Hoptrupp, on the 7th of June, 1848. The government of Schleswig-Holstein bestowed his name upon one of their new gunboats in graceful acknowledgment of his important services in the war.

In 1849 he acted as chief of the staff to Prince Ernest of Saxe-Altenburg, who commanded one of the divisions of the Schleswig-Holstein forces. In 1850 he was made colonel and chief of the staff of the army under General Willisen.

After the sad collapse of the German cause in the duchies, Colonel Tann returned to Bavaria, resuming

his old position as aide-de-camp to King Maximilian, with whom he continued as great a favourite as he had been with King Louis.

He was soon promoted to the rank of major-general, and in 1860 he was made lieutenant-general, and had the command of a division bestowed upon him. His promotion had been exceptionally rapid : it had only taken him twenty-seven years to reach the high grade of divisional commander, whereas it took his friend and fellow-commander Hartmann more than fifty years to achieve the same position ; but then Hartmann, who certainly was in nearly every way as brilliant an officer and as excellent a soldier as Tann, was not so much of a special royal favourite as the latter had the good fortune to be.

King Maximilian, one of the best and most enlightened rulers of the small kingdom of Bavaria, died on the 10th of March, 1864, at the early age of fifty-three. He died, unhappily, at a most critical juncture—just when the temporary forced league between Austria and Prussia for the conquest of the Elbe duchies was laying the germ for the fierce war almost sure to follow between these two most unnatural allies. Had King Maximilian lived, the chances of the possible avoidance of the great intestine contest in Germany, which broke out subsequently in 1866, would certainly have been much more promising than they turned out to be after. King Maximilian would surely have given Von der

Pfordten very different instructions from those given to the Bavarian ambassador to the German Confederation by his son and successor, Louis, who was really too young and inexperienced at the time to fully realize the actual position of affairs, and to understand the true interests of South Germany, and who was surrounded and ear-wigged by a most uncompromising Ultramontanist, anti-Prussian clique.

Baron von der Pfordten finding himself absolutely unrestricted by pacific or cautious instructions from his king and court, joined with Beust, Varnbüler, Dalwigk, and the Hanoverian Platen in the nefarious and ill-considered plot to humble Prussia. The participation of South Germany in the war of 1866 was the natural consequence of this most absurd policy.

General von der Tann, a man of the warmest German feelings, bitterly deplored the share which his beloved country was going to take in this fratricidal war. The Ultramontanist scribblers and gabblers prated insanely of the formidable military force which the South German states, jointly with Saxony and Hanover, could put into the field—exceeding half a million of effectives, it was asserted by those ignorant twaddlers and their aiders and abettors in the British press of that day. Tann knew better. He knew that the boasted South German host was a huge myth and gross deception, and that 150,000 men was the highest figure the South

German states could possibly put into the field. He also knew that, although the soldiering material might do well enough, the command was safe to be placed in such incompetent and incapable hands, that there would be but little chance of success against the Prussians under the leadership of the smartest and most efficient commanders of the age.

He clearly foresaw the whole disastrous issue and result of the affair, and he consented only most reluctantly to take upon his shoulders the highly responsible office and duties of chief of the staff to Field-Marshal Prince Charles of Bavaria, to whom the supreme command over the Bavarian army and the whole of the South German forces, including an Austrian division under Neipperg, had been intrusted, with the stupid Austrian proviso that the commander-in-chief should always act in accordance with the instructions that were to come to him from the Austrian head-quarters and from the Emperor Francis Joseph's military cabinet—a proviso which could not but helplessly lame the initiative of the commander of the South German forces and his chief of the staff.

The command of the 8th corps of the German Confederation army, consisting of the contingents of Baden, Würtemberg, Hesse, electoral and grand-ducal, Nassau, and Frankfort, were given by King Charles of Würtemberg, with whom the appointment lay, to another incapable—Prince Alexander of Hesse,

to wit, who was said to have distinguished himself greatly at Solferino !

Tann knew beforehand how little chance there was of the Bavarian commander-in-chief and his Hessian coadjutor pulling well together, and that there was still less likelihood of concerted action of the mixed host in obedience to his own directions and instructions. He felt convinced, also, that the fault and blame of the disastrous failure which he foresaw would be laid at his door ; so no wonder that he went into the struggle half-hearted, and with the saddest forebodings, destined to be soon realized even beyond the extent of his direst apprehensions.

The first great trouble he had to deal with was the Hanoverian army. The neat little plot hatched between Gablentz, the Augustenburg pretender, and the King of Hanover, to march with united forces upon Berlin, had been nipped in the bud by Manteuffel's rapid and energetic proceedings. The Hanoverian forces, cut off from Stade, where vast stores and supplies had been collected for their use, were marched into the province of Göttingen, with a view to their hasty organization for war.

This Hanoverian army was as fine a body of men as were ever marched into the field. Had they been boldly pushed forward through the Thuringian forest from Eisenach, where they had taken up their station on the 21st of June, they might safely have joined the Bavarian forces, which

were coming up to the Saxon duchies to meet them. But this troop of lions was led by blind King George and his equally blind military advisers. The king had the conceited notion that he could outwit Bismarck in diplomatic negotiations. He rejected Prussia's very fair offers of an understanding with him, yet he kept on treating with the Prussians, in the foolish expectation that the whole of the Bavarian army would come bodily up to him, to drive the Prussians out of the land ; and whilst thus idly negotiating, he led his splendid army in purposeless marches from Eisenach to Langensalza, back again to Eisenach, then once more to Langensalza. Meanwhile, the active Prussians were rapidly bringing up troops from Berlin, Erfurt, and Torgau, until nearly every loop-hole of escape, through which the Hanoverians might have forced their way to the Bavarian army, was effectually shut up.

On the 27th of June, when time and opportunity might fairly be considered all but gone, the king and his advisers resolved at last to make an effort to go to the Bavarians, as it was quite clear the Bavarians were not coming to them. But General Flies, with only 9,000 men under his command, boldly attacked the Hanoverians, who outnumbered his troops in the proportion of two to one at least ; and, although he was defeated by numbers, and by the brilliant valour of the Hanoverians, more

especially their truly splendid cavalry, he succeeded in retaining the Hanoverian forces at Langensalza, whilst Vogel von Falckenstein was closing the net around them. On the day after, the 28th of June, the army of King George, surrounded on all sides, capitulated to the Prussian general.

Among the many false and foolish charges which were subsequently insinuated against General von der Tann, figured, of course, also this, that he had wilfully and corruptly abandoned the Hanoverians to their fate! The general would have deserved to be ignominiously dismissed the service had he advised his commander to march his troops into Hanover. The blame of the failure of the projected junction of the Bavarians and Hanoverians must be laid entirely at the door of King George and his generals, who spoiled everything by their gross incapacity and helpless irresolution.

Having thus satisfactorily disposed of his Hanoverian opponents, Vogel von Falckenstein prepared at once for a most vigorous offensive against the numerically much more formidable hostile hosts of the South German states. He had only three divisions under his command, to wit, the divisions of Manteuffel, Göben, and Beyer, the whole of his available forces not exceeding 50,000 effectives.

The Bavarian army, under the command of Prince Charles of Bavaria, might number some 60,000 effectives. On paper the figure reached 80,000.

The 8th corps, under Prince Alexander of Hesse, numbered between 60,000 and 70,000 effectives. Either host was accordingly much stronger than the entire force of the so-called Prussian army of the Main, whilst the two bodies combined seemed sufficiently powerful to easily crush the Prussians between them.

But the great Prussian commander, after concentrating his forces at Eisenach on the 1st of July, pushed them like a wedge between the two South German armies. The 8th corps under Prince Alexander of Hesse was holding a position at the time to the north of Frankfort-on-the-Main, whilst the Bavarians under Prince Charles occupied the valley of the Fulda, with two divisions pushed forward to Dermbach. A strong body of Bavarian cavalry was ordered to seek to establish a junction with the 8th corps.

This plan, devised by General von der Tann, seemed clearly indicated by the actual position of affairs, and might have placed the Prussians in an awkward strait, had only the execution even remotely equalled the conception. But, unluckily for the chief of the staff, the event turned out far otherwise. Indeed, it may fairly be said that, throughout this campaign, so disastrous to the South German armies, the glaring incapacity and the gross blundering of the tactical leaders in the field thwarted nearly every one of Tann's strategic conceptions.

It was on the 4th of July that the vanguard of Beyer's division, advancing along the high road to Geysa, came into collision with the strong body of Bavarian cavalry ordered to seek to establish a junction with the 8th corps. When this body of cavalry found itself suddenly and unexpectedly assailed by a heavy artillery fire, it was thrown into disorder and retreated precipitately, leaving the Prussians free to rush on between the two corps.

At the same time General Göben had received orders to advance beyond Dermbach and drive back any hostile forces he should come across there ; after which he was to break off the fight and return to Dermbach, that he might afterwards prepare for the further advance of the army by taking his station *en échelons* at Geysa. Göben executed the order most brilliantly : he took Wiesenthal, Zella, and Neidharts-hausen, and finally also the strong position which the Bavarians held on the Nebelberg.

Having accomplished his object, he fell back upon Dermbach in obedience to the orders of his commander-in-chief. This the poor Bavarians mistook for a "retreat," and indulged in somewhat overloud songs of triumph accordingly. They soon discovered their mistake, however, and hastened to move back southward, with a view to find some other way to join the 8th corps, which on its part drew nearer to Frankfort.

The advancing Prussians found Fulda abandoned.

The Bavarian army had taken up a strong position along the Franconian Sale river, behind the Rhön Mountains. This position also had been very well selected by General Tann, as it enabled the Bavarians to threaten the left flank of the Prussians. But on the 9th of July, Vogel von Falckenstein, moving suddenly to the left, crossed into Bavaria, and on the 10th of July, General Göben took Kissingen and the heights behind by storm, and kept his conquest against the repeated desperate efforts of the Bavarian reserves, whilst Beyer had a successful engagement at Hammelburg, and Manteuffel, who had followed, defeated the Bavarian troops opposed to him at Waldaschach and Hausen. In the fierce fight at Kissingen, General Tann was slightly wounded.

Prince Charles now retreated to Schweinfurt, when Vogel von Falckenstein quite unexpectedly marched upon Aschaffenburg. Prince Alexander of Hesse, at last thoroughly roused to the danger of this Prussian move, despatched the Hessian and Austrian divisions in hot haste from Frankfort to defend the most important position of Aschaffenburg, and keep the Prussians if possible from getting across the Main.

But the Hessians were defeated on the 13th of July at Frohnhofen and Laufach, and the Austrians on the 14th before Aschaffenburg, which place was ultimately stormed by the Prussians. Hereupon

Prince Alexander evacuated Frankfort in great haste, and the Prussian general entered the ancient free city on the 16th of July. Bieberich and Darmstadt also were occupied by the victorious Prussians.

How Manteuffel replaced Falckenstein on the 19th of July has already been narrated in the memoirs of the two Prussian commanders.

Meanwhile, the junction of the Bavarians with the 8th corps had been effected at last near Würzburg. The Prussian army of the Main, now reinforced to some 60,000 effectives, followed the South Germans, and on the 24th of July crossed the Tauber, carrying the Hessian position at Wertheim, the Würtemberg position at Tauberbischofsheim, and the position of the Baden division at Werbach. The fight at Tauberbischofsheim was particularly severe. Five times the Würtembergers, commanded by General Hardegg, the Minister of War for the kingdom, tried their hardest to regain the positions lost to the Prussians; but it was all in vain. In this hot fight the Würtemberg division suffered a loss of sixty men (nine officers among them) killed and 450 wounded.

The 8th corps now took up a strong position at Gerchsheim, the Bavarians at Helmstadt and Uettingen, with Würzburg in the rear.

On the 25th of July Göben attacked the 8th corps at Gerchsheim, Beyer the Bavarians at Helmstadt.

Pushed up in a corner as it were, Prince Charles

now resolved to assume the offensive. He carried this resolution into effect on the 26th of July, relying upon the aid and support of the 8th corps. But the same fatality which had pursued the South Germans throughout this campaign was experienced here once more : the Prince of Hesse failed to join in the fray, and, after a hotly-contested fight at Uettingen and Rossbrunn, the advance of General Beyer from Helmstadt, threatening the left flank and the line of retreat of the Bavarians, compelled the South German forces to retreat behind the Main, and take up their position east of Würzburg. This latter city, or rather the fortress of Marienberg which defends it, was cannonaded from field-pieces on the 27th of July. Soon after, the news of the armistice concluded between the belligerents put a stop to further hostilities.

When the war was over the disappointed Ultramontanists set all their organs in the press to work at assailing the reputation of General Tann—stupendous incapacity was the mildest charge insinuated against him ; most of these vile assailants accused him point-blank of premeditated corrupt treason to his king and his country. The general saw himself literally compelled to seek the protection of the law against these unscrupulous calumniators ; and the law, appealed to, came to his aid, clearing his unsullied reputation, and punishing the loudest and vilest yelpers of the pack.

In January, 1869, Tann was made general of infantry, and received the command of the 1st corps of the Bavarian army. When the Franco-German war broke out in 1870, the whole of the Bavarian contingent, consisting of the 1st corps under General von der Tann, and the 2nd corps under General Hartmann, was placed as part of the third army under the orders of the Crown Prince of Prussia.

General von der Tann and the corps commanded by him took a leading share in the great battles of Wörth, Beaumont, and Sedan. In this last crowning victory over M'Mahon's army it fell to the share of the Bavarians to carry Bazeilles, a small place of some 2,000 inhabitants, situate upon the right bank of the Meuse, a little more than half an English mile from Sedan. The fight here ranked among the most hotly contested of the campaign. It began at 4.30 A.M., and raged uninterruptedly for six full hours. The inhabitants took part in it by firing at the Bavarians from the windows. They also cruelly ill-used some unhappy wounded Germans who were at their mercy. This led to some excesses afterwards on the part of the enraged Bavarian soldiery, to which Tann energetically put a stop.

It was asserted at the time in certain organs of the British press that Bazeilles had been razed to the ground by the vengeful Germans, who had also

made a general massacre of the inhabitants—men, women, and children. There were even some English gentlemen found seemingly so lost to all moral sense of veracity as to vouch for horrors pretended to have been perpetrated by the Germans, which had no foundation whatever in truth, but were the merest shadowy offspring of the excited imagination of the narrators. A great French nobleman of Stuart extraction—the Duke Fitzjames—was not ashamed to stamp these baseless inventions with the authority of his own high name as a pretended eye-witness of the cruelties perpetrated by the German barbarians.

General Tann's name and fame were thus covered with obloquy and ignominy. The general never protested against the gross injustice done him. He patiently bided his time, which came the year after, when the mayor and corporation of Bazeilles, of their own free accord, published a plain statement of facts, which triumphantly showed how wilfully the general and his troops had been maligned.

When it became evident, in the beginning of October, that the government of Tours were massing considerable forces behind the Loire, with the manifest intention of trying to raise the siege of Paris, an expeditionary army was formed, consisting of the 1st Bavarian corps, the 22nd infantry division, and the 2nd and 4th cavalry divisions, and placed under the command of General von der Tann, with orders

to break if possible the projected organization of a strong French army on the banks of the Loire, and to clear the country north of the river of all hostile forces. On the 6th of October Tann set out on his mission. On the 8th he advanced to the heights of Etampes; on the 9th, to Angerville, without meeting any more serious opposition than desultory attempts to delay his advance made by bands of franc-tireurs. It was reported, however, that the French were concentrating a force of 40,000 men at Orleans.

On the 10th of October General von der Tann came upon the enemy at Artenay, where some 20,000 French troops of all arms tried to make a stand. They were, however, speedily driven back in disorder upon Orleans, where they joined the newly-formed 15th corps of the French army. They left three guns and over 1,000 unwounded prisoners in the hands of the victors.

On the 11th of October General von der Tann advanced upon Orleans, with the 22nd infantry division and the 2nd Bavarian division in the first line, the 1st Bavarian division in reserve, and the two cavalry divisions on both wings in observation. At 10.30 A.M. the German vanguard came first into collision with the French, who fought most valiantly and obstinately, so that it was not before late in the evening, after a nine hours' arduous struggle, that they could be driven back across the Loire. Fortunately

for the Germans, the bridges over the river had been left intact, so that they could cross over and carry the city by storm. In this battle again the French had heavy losses in killed and wounded, besides some 2,500 unwounded prisoners taken by the victorious Germans. The total loss suffered by the latter in the two fights at Artenay and Orleans amounted to 60 officers and more than 1,200 men killed and wounded.

The French retreated to Bourges. Gambetta, undismayed by losses and crosses, continued his efforts to organize a new French army. He appointed to the chief command General Aurelle de Paladines, one of the best and most meritorious officers of the French service. Neither of these two truly great men have as yet been treated with common fairness by contemporary report. Impartial history will in the end do justice to both of them, and vindicate their well-earned fame to posterity.

General von der Tann was instructed from headquarters to content himself with the position gained, and not to carry operations beyond the Orleans line. In the latter days of October and the beginning of November it became clear that the new French army of the Loire had assumed formidable proportions. Aurelle de Paladines determined to take the offensive against the Germans in and about Orleans, and a general move in advance was made by the French on the 3rd and 4th of November.

It was now reported to General von der Tann by his scouts, that Aurelle de Paladines was advancing against him at the head of more than 60,000 men, to whom he could at the most oppose some 28,000 effectives, as the 22nd infantry and a cavalry division had meanwhile been withdrawn from his command. The general resolved at once to reconnoitre the true position of affairs, and ascertain the actual strength of the French opposed to him.

Leaving a regiment of infantry in garrison at Orleans, he in the night of the 8th–9th of November concentrated his forces at Coulmiers, awaiting the French attack.

Coulmiers is a small place in the department of the Loiret, circle of Orleans, from which city it is some fifteen English miles distant. Here Tann was attacked in the morning of the 9th of November by an overwhelming French force under Aurelle de Paladines. After a most obstinate fight—in which the French, according to their own account, suffered a heavy loss of some 2,000 men killed and wounded, whilst the Germans lost only 42 officers and some 700 men killed and wounded—General von der Tann broke off the fight, and retreated in perfect order to St. Pérvy, on the road from Orleans to Paris. At noon he had withdrawn the small garrison from Orleans. One thousand sick and wounded Germans had to be left behind. The next day a small detachment of artillery ammunition reserve lost its way,

and fell into the hands of the French, with two guns without carriages. These were the only trophies the French had to show of the hot fight of Coulmiers.

Tann effected his retreat with consummate skill. Indeed, this retreat to St. Péray and, the day after, when the 22nd infantry division under Wittich had again joined the Bavarians, to the safer position of Toury, has been acknowledged by friend and foe alike to deserve to rank with the highest strategic achievements, and is of itself sufficient to mark General von der Tann as one of the greatest military leaders of the age.

The cavalry division commanded by Prince Albrecht the elder (one of King William's brothers), coming up from Chartres, also joined the Bavarian corps on the 10th of November, and the day after the Mecklenburg division came up under the Grand Duke Frederick Francis of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, a nephew of the Prussian king, to whom the command over the combined force was given—over the head of Von der Tann, who, without a chance of contradiction, was immeasurably and incomparably the greater military leader of the two. Moltke had taken care, however, to limit his royal highness's power of command to the mere empty title, the real leadership being vested in General von Stosch, the chief of the grand duke's staff, one of the most highly accomplished officers of the Prussian service, who is now holding the important position of First Lord of the Prussian Admiralty.

Under these circumstances Tann might put up with the slight apparently put upon him by placing a mere grand duke in command over him ; and he nobly did his duty in the new campaign, which was victoriously opened at Dreux on the 17th of October, just eight days after the affair at Coulmiers. He and his Bavarians distinguished themselves more particularly at Bazoches-les-Hautes on the 2nd of December, at Orleans on the 3rd and 4th of December, and at Beaugency on the 7th and 10th of December.

At the end of December the 1st Bavarian corps under Von der Tann rejoined the besieging army around Paris, where it replaced the 2nd Prussian corps, sent forward to the east, to join Manteuffel's forces intended to act against Bourbaki.

After the termination of the war, General von der Tann shared in the glory of the solemn entry of the German army into Berlin on the 16th of June, 1871. A month after, on the 16th of July, he commanded the Bavarian army on its triumphant entry into Munich.

In the beginning of October, 1872, General von der Tann was sent on an extraordinary mission to Stockholm, to represent King Louis of Bavaria at the funeral of King Charles XV. of Sweden, who had died on the 17th of September, 1872.

General von der Tann, who has had a profusion of military orders and decorations bestowed upon him

by his own king and other rulers, continues still in command of the 1st corps of the Bavarian army. There is good reason to believe that it had been the intention of the Emperor William to include the names of Von der Tann and Hartmann in the list of general officers upon whom monetary grants were to be conferred, but that the emperor had to give up this intention reluctantly, in deference to certain objections urged against its execution by the King of Bavaria. At least, so the writer of this memoir has been informed.

XVI.

GENERAL HARTMANN.

JAKOB (JAMES) HARTMANN was born on the 4th of May, 1795, at Maikammer, in the Palatinate. He was a posthumous child. His adoptive father, the French General Geither, provided for his education at the French military schools of Bonn and St. Cyr.

In 1806, General Geither was charged by the Emperor Napoleon with the organization of the military forces of the newly-created Grand Duchy of Berg, which the ruler of France had just then bestowed upon his brother-in-law, Joachim Murat. The general at once entered the name of the boy, who was then only eleven years old, on the muster-roll of the 1st regiment of the Grand Duchy of Berg as volunteer, promoting him afterwards, whilst still remaining at the schools of Bonn and St. Cyr, successively to the grades of corporal, sergeant, and sub-lieutenant, until ultimately, in 1811, the lad, then barely sixteen, joined the regiment in active service as first lieutenant—a striking illustration of the power

of patronage and the pernicious influence of favouritism in the much-vaunted military system of imperial France and its dependencies. That the boy-lieutenant in the end turned out an excellent soldier and most eminent commander in the field, was certainly no merit of the system.

From 1811 to 1815, young Hartmann did faithful service to the French empire. Upon the disarmament of the military contingent of the Rhine Confederation, he entered the 27th French infantry regiment. In 1814, he distinguished himself by a most cleverly-devised, successful ambush, in which a detachment of Cossacks advancing from Montargis upon Orleans was caught. In 1815 he fought most bravely at Planchenoit, in the great battle of Waterloo, saving the eagle of his regiment from capture by the advancing Prussians.

After the final overthrow of the empire, young Hartmann, who, despite his French education, was a most ardent lover of his native land, and had continued to serve the emperor only from an overpowering sense of military loyalty, resigned his commission in the French army in 1816. A few months after, he obtained a lieutenancy in the 10th Bavarian infantry regiment. His sterling soldierly qualities and brilliant military acquirements soon attracted the attention of his chiefs, so that he was appointed in 1818 to a place in the Topographic Bureau. After four years' arduous work in this most

important department, he was transferred to the corps of engineers ; and two years after, in 1824, he was appointed on the general staff of the army.

In 1827 he was promoted to the rank of captain, and attached to the Ministry of War as reporter to the board of administration.

Having in the course of these first ten years of his service repeatedly been charged with military missions necessitating journeys to various parts of Europe, and having also turned his occasional leaves of absence to excellent account, by travelling about in search of information upon subjects connected with or bearing upon the art and science of war, Captain Hartmann, though then only thirty-two years old, enjoyed already the deserved reputation of being one of the most solidly informed and most highly accomplished German officers.

He had by no means confined himself to the pursuit of military knowledge, but had assiduously studied also many branches of science, and kindly taken, besides, to the faithful cultivation of the fine arts, more especially painting, in which he may truly be said to have been as skilful and successful an adept as the great Vogel von Falckenstein himself. The writer of this memoir has seen some battle pieces painted by General Hartmann, which convincingly showed that the artist was just as expert in illustrating episodes of war as the warrior was in taking an active part in them.

In 1842 Captain Hartmann was promoted to the rank of major, and appointed one of the Crown Prince's adjutants by King Louis, by whom he was held in the highest esteem both as an eminent artist and a brilliant officer. His promotion had not been very rapid, it will be seen. He had been sixteen years a first-lieutenant and fifteen years a captain. But from this time forward he ascended the rungs of the military advancement ladder more rapidly, six years sufficing to transform the simple major into a full major-general and one of the chief aides-de-camp of the king.

In 1846 he submitted to the Ministry of War an excellent plan for the re-organization of the Bavarian army, which was much lauded by the minister and the military cabinet, but was only very partially acted upon.

In 1853 he elaborated a new code of service regulations for the infantry—with somewhat similar results, it would appear. The time for thoroughgoing reforms in the Bavarian service had not yet come.

The year after, in 1854, General Hartmann, who had now for five years commanded a brigade, was sent on a military mission to the *Camp de Boulogne*. Here he turned his opportunities to the best account. He carefully studied the organization and condition of the French army, and took note of its glaring defects and shortcomings. He also closely observed

the system of fortifications around Paris and all along the eastern frontier of France.

The results of these studies and observations he submitted, some six years after, in 1860, to the rulers of the German states in a memoir treating exhaustively of the military power, and the offensive and defensive strength, of the French empire. There can be no doubt that both Bismarck and Moltke, each in his own special way, fully availed themselves subsequently of the facts, hints, and inferences given in this excellent treatise.

In 1861 Hartmann attained the high rank of lieutenant-general. In the war of 1866 he commanded the 4th infantry division, and fought brilliantly though not victoriously at Rossdorf. At Kissingen he could do but little, owing to the gross blundering and the glaringly faulty dispositions of the incapable commander-in-chief of the Bavarian army. In the final encounter at Wurzburg, on the 27th of July, he did his best at least to guard the honour of the Bavarian arms.

With Hartmann's known patriotic German feelings, he must have been heartily glad of the termination of this fratricidal war, into which Louis of Bavaria had allowed himself to be dragged by the wretched set of Ultramontanist and Particularist advisers who were then exercising supreme sway over the land and the king. The overthrow of this anti-national cabal by the victories of Prussia must have proved a healing

balm for his heart, so grievously struck and wounded by the sad display of incapacity and folly in the highest quarter of the army command.

In 1867 King Louis bestowed upon Lieutenant-General Hartmann the proprietorship of the 14th infantry regiment, in acknowledgment of the great services rendered by the general, more especially of the brilliant bravery with which he had fought at Rossdorf and Würzburg.

Two years after, in 1869, the lieutenant-general was finally raised to the full rank of general of infantry, and appointed commander of the 2nd corps of the Bavarian army.

When the war broke out in 1870 between France and Germany, both the corps of Hartmann and that of Von der Tann were incorporated in the army under the command of the Crown Prince of Prussia—the so-called third army.

General Hartmann had now for the first time in his military career in the German army the fullest opportunity afforded him of giving practical proof of his high tactical skill in the field, in entire harmony with his ardent patriotic German feelings; and nobly and grandly did he avail himself of this opportunity. It was he who contributed most largely and prominently to the winning of the first great victory at Weissenburg; and again he who, by his skilful and energetic attack upon the left French flank, initiated the still greater victory of Wörth, which he completed by

the taking of Fröschweiler, the railway station at Reichshofen, and ultimately of Niederbronn.

On the 14th of August, 1870, he forced Marsal to surrender. In the battle of the 1st of September, one of the divisions under his command took the village of Ballan, whilst the other was pushed forward to the very foot of the glacis of the fortress, the artillery of the corps assailing the citadel with a shower of projectiles.

To General Hartmann's share it fell to gain the first successes before Paris, on the 16th, 17th, and 18th of September, at Corbeil and Petit-Bicêtre. On the 19th of September, the 2nd Bavarian corps joined the 5th Prussian corps in a most successful attack upon General Vinoy's forces, posted on the heights of Sceaux. General Hartmann carried the plateau Moulin de la Tour (Châtillon), which highly important position, commanding the south forts, and, in a certain measure, the city of Paris, the general set at once to work to provide with the most effective defences against all possible attacks on the part of the French. These defences were completed in the briefest time, and the 2nd Bavarian corps was thus placed in a position to victoriously repulse all attacks made upon the plateau from the forts, although throughout the siege ship guns of the very heaviest calibre kept on deluging the parts held by the Germans under Hartmann in their entire length and breadth with a perfect shower of the most destructive projectiles, and several

desperate attempts were made by the French to force the Germans from their post by the crushing weight of overwhelming numbers. The formidable attack made upon Clamart, in the night of 14th–15th January, 1871, was one of the last of these attempts. It failed like the rest.

After the termination of the war, General Hartmann returned to his headquarters at Wurzburg. King Louis bestowed upon him, as a signal mark of his high appreciation of the most important services rendered by the general in the campaign, the rare distinction of the Grand Cross of the military Maximilian Joseph order, which had not been conferred on anyone since the days of the War of Liberation. He also raised him to a free hereditary barony. The cities of Speyer and Wurzburg were proud to enrol him among their citizens. The Emperor of the Germans and King of Prussia gave him the orders of the Iron Cross of the first class and the second class, and of the Crown with Swords. So when the old general departed this life, on the 22nd of February, 1873, it might well be said of him that he died full of years and honours.

XVII.

GENERAL ALVENSLEBEN II.

As this general, by his prompt decision, energetic action, and high tactical skill, contributed so largely to the successful issue of the fierce battle of Mars-la-Tour, a brief memoir of his career may not be deemed out of place here.

Constantine von Alvensleben is descended from an ancient noble family. He was born on the 26th of August, 1809. Like many other scions of the Prussian nobility, he received his education at the great Institute of the Cadet Corps at Berlin. At the age of eighteen he obtained his commission as second lieutenant. His promotion was rather slow, for he was past forty-four before he attained the rank of major.

At the time of the Danish war in 1864, he had reached the grade of colonel. In this war he distinguished himself by his personal bravery and the consummate skill with which he handled his regiment in the various encounters with the Danes. After the war he was made a major-general, and had the com-

mand of a brigade of the guards given to him, at the head of which he gained great distinction in the Bohemian campaign of 1866, more particularly at the battle of Königgrätz, where, after the fall of General Hiller von Gärtringen, he took the command of the 1st division of the guards, left, unhappily, vacant by the death of that heroic leader on the battle-field.

King William showed his due appreciation of the eminent services rendered by Alvensleben, by raising him to the rank of lieutenant-general, and bestowing upon him the actual command of the 1st division of the guards, which he had temporarily led at Königgrätz. In 1870, when the war with France broke out, and Prince Frederick Charles had intrusted to him the lead of the so-called second army, Lieutenant-General von Alvensleben was promoted to replace the prince in the command of the 3rd corps of the Prussian army.

It was in one of the fiercest and bloodiest battles of the Franco-German war, at Mars-la-Tour, on the 16th of August, 1870, that General Alvensleben had a glorious opportunity afforded him of showing his high military qualities on a field which could not possibly be more favourable for the display, and most gloriously did he avail himself of this opportunity.

With his single corps (the 3rd) unsupported till the battle was far advanced, he fought for hours

against overwhelming French forces (the corps of Decaen, Ladmirault, Frossard, Canrobert, and the French imperial guard), holding his tenacious grasp upon them until at length Prince Frederick Charles could bring up part of the 8th, 9th, and 10th corps, and, though still greatly inferior in numbers to the French host, after twelve hours' incessant fighting force the enemy back into Metz.

There was a most critical moment in this battle of Mars-la-Tour, when Canrobert was on the point of breaking through the feeble Prussian force which was so desperately striving to hold him fixed to the ground. He was just preparing to throw forward the two corps which formed the centre of his army at Vionville. Had he succeeded in accomplishing this move, the French army of the Rhine might have made good its escape from the meshes of the net so skilfully thrown round it by Moltke's genius.

But General Alvensleben was equal to the occasion. With marvellously prompt decision he resolved to risk the total loss of two regiments of cavalry, by hurling them against the French centre at Vionville before Canrobert should be able to execute his projected movement in advance.

Six squadrons of Prussian cavalry, three of the 16th Lancers, and three of the 7th Cuirassiers, were selected by the general for the purpose. The lead of the attacking force was intrusted to Count Schmettau, colonel of the 7th Cuirassiers, who threw his

small force with a desperate dash upon the French centre at Vionville, completely confusing Canrobert, and effectually staying the intended advance until the favourable moment for it had passed away. The gallant Prussian cavalry got safely back afterwards out of the seemingly inevitable jaws of death, albeit with heavy loss of killed and wounded.

This magnificent tactical stroke fully deserves to rank with those brilliant inspirations of genius by which Claudius Nero snatched the assured victory from great Hasdrubal in the decisive battle of the Metaurus, and Kellerman turned the Austrian victory at Marengo into a disastrous defeat.

At Gravelotte the 3rd corps, under Alvensleben, formed the reserve along with the 10th corps; the artillery of the 3rd corps, and part of its infantry, took an active share in the actual fight.

The 3rd corps joined subsequently in the siege of Metz, where it participated in the repulse of Bazaine's last attempt, of the 7th of October, 1870, to break out of the iron circle thrown round his army by the Germans. Later on the corps took an effective part in the fights at Beaune-la-Rolande, Chevilly and Chilliers-aux-Bois, Orleans, Vendôme, &c., and finally in the crowning victory of Le Mans.

If the past may be looked upon as a pledge for the future, there is certainly every reason to conjecture that General von Alvensleben, who is only

in his sixty-sixth year, may have a still more brilliant career before him.

Here our list of commanders in the field must end, although many other generals who have also largely contributed to make the new German empire might fairly claim a place,—Prince Augustus of Württemberg, for instance, the excellent commander of the Prussian guards, Generals Alvensleben I., Blumenthal, Barnekow, Beyer, Bose, Craushaar (who fell at St. Privat, on the 18th of August, 1870), Degenfeld, François (who fell at Spicheren, on the 6th of August, 1870), Fransecky, Glümer, Goltz, Keller, Kirchbach, Kummer, Manstein, Mutius (who died of cholera in 1866), Obernitz, Rheinhaben, Schlotheim, Schmeling, Sperling, Stiehle, Stosch, Treskow, Tümpling, Voigts-Rhetz, Waldersee, Wartensleben, Wedell, William of Baden, Wittich, Zastrow, and a host of other leaders, the briefest sketches of whose achievements would fill many volumes, but whom we are compelled to pass over, as we have barely left space sufficient for brief memoirs of General Hindersin, the late chief of the Prussian Board of Ordnance; Heydt and Camphausen, the two great financiers who found the *nervus rerum* in 1866 and 1870; President Delbrück and Councillor Lothar Bucher, and, lastly, Dreyse and Krupp, of needle-gun and steel cannon fame; and Grünberg, the intelligent cook who concocted the pea sausage.

XVIII.

GENERAL HINDERSIN.

IN the memoir of Field-Marshal Roon it has been explained at greater length how the new military organization initiated and perfected by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, which had so successfully stood the test of the great Liberation War, had in the course of time grown antiquated and rusty, and must of necessity have proved a disastrous failure if tried when no longer kept up by the burning patriotism and the deep hatred of the foreign oppressor that had pervaded the great citizen host throughout the campaigns of 1813-15 ; and how the brilliant genius of Roon had succeeded in converting this somewhat clumsy and inefficient weapon into the exquisitely tempered arm with which Bismarck and King William had wrested supremacy in Germany from the strong and tenacious grasp of Austria in 1866, and, some few years later, supremacy in Europe from the proud hold of France.

But even with his brilliant genius and his immense power of organization, Roon might have found

success impracticable in the gigantic task undertaken by him, had he not been most ably seconded by many other men of his own high stamp of intellect. Among his most efficient helpers we may cursorily mention here the late Prince Adalbert of Prussia, the chief creator of the infant navy of Germany, which whenever the time for a first trial of its strength shall come, is sure to prove itself an infant Hercules; the late Prince Albrecht of Prussia, brother of the emperor, who has contributed most largely to ensure the marvellous efficiency of the Prussian cavalry in the field; Generals Etzel, Holleben, Kameke, Ollech, Peucker, Podbielski, Wartenberg, and, more particularly, the subject of this memoir, Hindersin, to whose high capacity and patient perseverance the Prussian artillery owes its actual vast superiority over any other gunnery force on the continent of Europe.

Gustavus Edward Hindersin was the son of a Lutheran clergyman, who held a small curacy at Wernigerode, in the Harz district. Born on the 18th of July, 1804, he was carefully educated by his father, and embraced the military career at the early age of sixteen, from natural predilection for the profession of arms.

In October, 1820, he entered the 3rd artillery brigade, then in garrison at Erfurt. The young aspirant had to wait five years before he obtained his first commission as second lieutenant. However, his evident high capacity, sober and studious character,

and solid acquirements soon attracted the attention of his chiefs, and he was sent to the general War School at Berlin, to complete his scientific military education.

After this he was ordered to join the topographic section of the general staff of the army.

In 1841 he obtained his promotion to a first lieutenancy, and was appointed on the general staff. The year after, in 1842, he was made a captain, and four years later, in 1846, he was promoted to the rank of major, and made chief of the topographic section. In this position he remained till the summer of 1849, when he was ordered to join General Peucker's combined German corps in the campaign against the Baden insurgents, first as assistant-chief, soon after as principal chief of the staff. He was present at the encounters at Lautershausen and Ladenburg. During the latter fight he had occasion to ascend the city tower, to be better able to reconnoitre the forces of the enemy. At this juncture the insurgents obtained a temporary success, and Major Hindersin was cut off before he could effect his retreat from his high observatory. He was carried a prisoner to Rastatt, but released soon after by his captors when the insurrection had collapsed.

After the termination of the campaign, Major Hindersin was appointed on the staff of the 6th corps at Breslau. In 1850 he was entered as major on the muster-roll of the 6th artillery regiment, and

four years after, in 1854, he was made lieutenant-colonel and commander of the 2nd artillery regiment. The same year he was promoted to the rank of full colonel, and four years later, in 1858, he was made major-general and inspector of the 3rd artillery inspection.

On the 18th of October, 1861, Hindersin was named lieutenant-general by King William, and appointed inspector of the 2nd artillery inspection at Berlin; also president of the board of examiners for first-lieutenancy commissions in the artillery.

In the Danish war of 1864, General Hindersin organized the engineer and artillery attacks upon the works of Düppel, and the successful issue of the operations, and of the final assault, delivered on the 18th of April, was due in a great measure to his skill and energy.

King William, wishing to bestow upon the general a signal mark of his high appreciation of his long and eminent services, raised him to the Prussian peerage, and appointed him in December, 1864, first and sole inspector-general of artillery, and curator of the high school for artillerists and engineers.

General Hindersin entered now upon the most successful and productive period of his career. It is not too much to say that he revolutionized the entire Prussian gunnery system—nay, that he created anew the Prussian artillery such as it is at the present day. He organized the systematic artillery practice at

Berlin. He directed and superintended with the most anxious care the substitution of the most efficient rifled cannons for the much less perfect ordnance of the past. He introduced the Kriegsspiel, or war game, among the obligatory branches of the education of artillery officers, himself inventing a new variation of the game as applied more especially to sieges. He organized extensive exercises in siege operations, and in the defence of fortresses. He insisted most strongly upon the tactical improvement of the officers under his inspection, and never ceased calling their most serious attention to the high importance of a proper comprehension and appreciation of gunnery practice. He laid it down as an axiom in artillery firing, that no shot should be thrown away or fired at random.

When the war of 1866 broke out, the great reforms carried out since then by General Hindersin were still in the period of initiation ; besides, except perhaps at Königgrätz, the Prussian artillery had not a fair opportunity afforded it in the Bohemian campaign to show what it might be able to do in case of need. General Hindersin, however, attended the king at the royal head-quarters from the beginning of July to the end of the campaign. He was then promoted to the rank of general of infantry.

In 1868 he was appointed a member of the land defence commission. In September, 1869, King William bestowed another signal mark of his high

appreciation of Hindersin's eminent services upon the general, by conferring upon him the chiefship of the Pomeranian regiment of field artillery No. 2.

In the war of 1870-71, General Hindersin attended the king at royal head-quarters from first to last as general-in-chief of the German artillery. He was present at the battles of Gravelotte and Sedan, and during the siege and bombardment of Paris, and shared personally in the fights of la belle St. Cloud, and beneath Mont Valérien.

On the 18th of July, 1871, General Hindersin celebrated the jubilee of the fiftieth anniversary of his entering the Prussian military service, having been unable to do so on the proper day, the 18th of October, 1870, on account of the war then waging. It was a most glorious festival for the old man—his majesty the emperor and king, the Crown Prince, and the other princes of the imperial and royal house, the German kings and princes, and the general's brothers-in-arms eagerly vying with each other to pour their sincerest congratulations and best gifts and wishes upon him. Six months and eight days after, on the 25th of January, 1872, he departed this life, universally regretted, more especially by his "children," as he used to affectionately call the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the artillery force, which owes its actual high efficiency chiefly to his solicitous care.

THE MONEY MARSHALS.

THE great Raymond Montecuculi, one of the most distinguished Austrian commanders of the seventeenth century, the worthy rival and competitor of Turenne and Condé, in his famous work on the art and science of war (published first in the original Italian by Ugo Foscolo, in 1807, at Milan, and subsequently once more by Grassi, in 1821, at Turin), lays it down as a leading axiom, that he who would indulge in the enticing but perilous pursuit of armed strife should, first and foremost, make ample provision of three things—*money*, to wit, in the first place; MONEY, again, in the second place; and MONEY, finally, in the third place. Long ere the brilliant Modenese had penned this sage maxim, its truth had been practically illustrated many and many times by the experience of all preceding ages.

Now, as the chief part of Bismarck's perilous venture for the Imperial German Unity Stakes had

to be played on the battle-field, the two eminent men to whom the guidance of the financial department of the state was intrusted in these critical times may well and deservedly claim a niche in this Walhalla of German worthies.

XIX.

HEYDT.

“Der’s vacuum maxime deflendum, die horrible Leere,
Den thalerlosen Abgrund, von Bodelschwingh ihm hinterlassen,
So wunderbarlich ausgefüllt; zu seines Namens ew’ger Ehre
Heydtmässig viel des Gelds geschafft in die geleerten Kassen.”

(Which may be briefly paraphrased, in vernacular prose unadorned:—He who so wondrously filled up the deplorable vacuum, the horrible hollow, the dollarless abyss, left him by Bodelschwingh; and, to his name’s undying honour, made a rich Pactolean stream flow into the empty treasury.)

AUGUSTUS VON DER HEYDT was born on the 15th of February, 1801, at Elberfeld, where his father was chief of one of the leading banking establishments of Rhineland-Westphalia. Brought up almost from infancy to mercantile pursuits, he from an early age displayed signs of the marvellous aptitude for business that distinguished him through life. After finishing his commercial education in Germany, he worked a few years as clerk and correspondent

in several leading houses of commerce and finance in France and in England.

Having passed through this excellent practical school, he, in conjunction with his brothers Charles and William, entered upon the management of the parental banking house in Elberfeld.

He was still a very young man at the time, but his manifest sound practical sense, and his eminent capacity for active work, soon drew upon him the attention of his fellow-citizens, who elected him a member of the municipal council of Elberfeld, at an age when most young men of wealth and station would barely think of extending the display of their gifts beyond the social circle and the ball-room. He at once became one of the most active and painstaking members of the corporation, and strove from the very commencement of his municipal career to fulfil his civic duties to the best of his transcendent ability. Heydt was truly a great citizen in the fullest sense of the term.

He took a leading share in every measure of public improvement. The admirable system of administering to the wants of the indigent, which makes the Elberfeld poor-law regulations the marvel and model of all communities with philanthropic aspirations, owes its origin and elaboration chiefly to him.

He had only just attained the legal age for the office when he was elected one of the judges of the Tribunal of Commerce of Elberfeld, and soon after,

he was raised to the presidential chair of the Court, which he occupied uninterruptedly for many a long year, it may fairly be said, with the universal approbation of all who had occasion to have recourse to that high tribunal.

In 1841 he was elected to represent his native city at the Rhenan Provincial Diet; and in 1842 he attended the sittings of the United Committees of the collective Prussian Estates at Berlin. He was sent also to the United Provincial Diet of 1847. Here he was one of the most active members. He warmly advocated the conversion of the old cumbersome Provincial Estates into a real constitutional representation of the whole land.

When 1848 came, with its violent commotions and perturbations, Heydt, with his excellent sense, foresaw at once the lame and impotent conclusion to which the ill-considered, extravagant, revolutionary projects and aspirations of that tempestuous period were inevitably tending. So he resolved to have naught to do with the political movement of the time, and accordingly declined to accept the mandate of deputy tendered to him, to represent Elberfeld at the National Assemblies of Frankfort-on-the-Main and Berlin. He also declined the seat proffered him in the Prussian Cabinet by the Pfuel-Eichmann administration. He knew that the time had not yet come for useful collaboration in the regeneration of Prussia.

It was only after the translocation of the van-

quished assembly from Berlin to Brandenburg that he could be prevailed upon to accept the proffered mandate. On the 4th day of December, 1848, the day of the dissolution of the Prussian National Assembly, he accepted the office of President of the Board of Trade and Public Works in the Brandenburg-Manteuffel cabinet.

In this capacity he brought his rare energy and great talents to bear upon the arduous task before him, and rendered the most eminent services to the government and the country. In 1851 he accepted also the chairmanship of the Bank of Prussia, to the manifest advantage of that great institution.

Upon the retirement of the Manteuffel cabinet, on the 6th of November, 1858, Heydt retained his old office in the new Hohenzollern ministry, and subsequently in the Auerswald-Schwerin administration, until the 18th of March, 1862, when the Liberal cabinet resigned, in consequence of Hagen's motion to have a specified budget submitted to the House being carried.

Hohenlohe-Itzenplitz, who succeeded, offered Heydt the Chancellorship of the Exchequer, which he accepted. This was, unhappily, the time when the conflict between parliament and crown anent Roon's military reorganization plan was raging most fiercely.

Heydt, who, though with preponderating Conservative leanings, had still a considerable admixture of constitutional Liberalism in the composition

of his political character, strove hard to steer a middle course between the two opposing currents. He wrote a letter to Roon, then Minister of War, in which he endeavoured to persuade his colleague to drop the proposed additions to the taxes, and consent to economise in the budget of the Ministry of War instead. This letter somehow found its way into publicity, most likely through Heydt's own instrumentality. But it failed in its evident purpose to conciliate the Liberal majority of the chamber.

Heydt's offer to submit a specified budget to the House, in conformity with Hagen's motion, proved equally unsuccessful, and the attempted conversion of the $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. loans of 1850 and 1851 into 4 per cent. consols gave also a negative result. To fill up the measure of Heydt's failures and disappointments at this critical juncture, the king turned a deaf ear to the counsels of concession and conciliation tendered him by his Chancellor of the Exchequer.

Thus foiled at all points, the unlucky Minister of Finance took the pretext of Bismarck's appointment to the Premiership, on the 23rd of September, 1862, to tender his resignation to the king, which his majesty was pleased to accept, graciously bestowing upon the retiring minister an hereditary peerage as a mark of his royal favour.

Baron von der Heydt took his seat on the Con-

servative benches, and voted with the government on most questions.

At the end of May, 1866, when war with Austria and her German abettors had clearly become inevitable, and Bodelschwingh, Heydt's successor, who had held the Chancellorship of the Exchequer since the 1st of October, 1862, had the cool assurance to drily inform his majesty the king that there was not a thaler in the treasury to defray the expenses of the intended war, Bismarck, who has always shown a singular aptitude in choosing the fittest instruments for his work, advised the king to send for Baron von der Heydt, who was thus once more made Chancellor of the Exchequer, on the 2nd of June, 1866.

He had a most difficult task before him. Money *must* be had for the impending war, yet a loan was clearly out of the question, considering the hostile feelings of the majority of the Prussian Commons. Von der Heydt was equal to the task. By the judicious sale and transfer of certain railways belonging to the state, he obtained funds sufficient to defray the heavy expenses of the war; and, by a wise administration of the resources of the country, he succeeded in rescuing the Prussian exchequer from the slough of despond into which the incapable feudalists and Austrophiles Bodelschwingh had plunged it *de gaieté de cœur*.

Indeed, so thoroughly did the new Chancellor of the

Exchequer succeed, that he could appear on the 5th of August, 1866, before the Chambers with a highly satisfactory budget for 1867, which showed the finances of the country to be in a most brilliant and truly healthy condition, unexampled in the history of the Prussian exchequer, not only providing amply for all current wants, but even enabling the minister to gratify many legitimate wishes which, up to this, had had to be ignored of necessity for lack of means.

It was at this time also that Von der Heydt rendered a most signal service to the cause of constitutional liberty in Prussia, by standing manfully by Bismarck in the hard fight waged by the great man with the reactionary majority in the cabinet and the stiff-necked old king to force their reluctant consent to acknowledge that the king's government had, since 1862, violated the constitution, albeit in the true interests of the country, and that the only proper and constitutional way to purge this infraction of the great fundamental law of the land was to ask the representatives of the people to grant a bill of indemnity for the past.

The bill of indemnity, drawn up by Von der Heydt, was granted by the Commons, and thus a happy end was put at last to the lamentable conflict which had for years divided the government and the country into two hostile camps.

The House, thus judiciously put into the very best and most yielding humour, granted the Chancellor of

the Exchequer all he wanted to carry on his majesty's government—to wit, a vote of 9,000,000*l.* for the extraordinary army and navy budget, and the creation of the state treasure upon a new legal basis.

From 1866 to 1869, Von der Heydt remained at the head of the Prussian exchequer, the king repeatedly declining to accept the resignation tendered by the baron on account of his failing health.

But it was not alone that the Prussian Finance Minister's health was giving way—the condition of the country also had been changing for the worse. Trade and commerce were beginning to show alarming signs of stagnation ; several bad harvests in succession had interfered sadly with the prosperity of the land. The incorporation of the new provinces was necessarily attended with financial embarrassments and difficulties, which seemed to require a more vigorous hand to effectively deal with them than that of an old man close upon seventy, and in indifferent health.

So it came to pass that the budget for 1870 showed a deficit of some £800,000 upon the financial year, which the Chancellor of the Exchequer proposed to cover by additions to the direct taxes ; and this the Prussian Commons were not disposed to grant.

Von der Heydt, feeling his absolute inability to grapple with the difficulties of his position, tendered his resignation once more to the king, who was at last graciously pleased to accept it, bestowing upon

the retiring statesman the rare distinction of the Order of the Black Eagle as a most signal mark of the royal appreciation of his eminent services.

Baron Von der Heydt died last June in Berlin, leaving an immense fortune to his family, and several large bequests for charitable and philanthropic purposes.

It may not be altogether out of place here to mention that Von der Heydt was for many years a leading member of the board of directors of the principal Rhenan railways, which may be truly said to owe their actual prosperity, in a very great measure at least, to his wise, skilful, and energetic management of their affairs.

XX.

CAMPHAUSEN.

“Wie er, verstand's wohl je ein Finanzier so gut,
Den Manco umzuwandeln in den Ueberfluss;
Der Kasse seichte Ebbe in die hohe Fluth,
Das schlimme Deficit in schönen Ueberschuss?”

(Did ever financier know so well as he how to convert lack into abundance, the exchequer's dry ebb into a rich high tide of cash, the sad deficit into a handsome surplus?)

IN 1866 Von der Heydt had boldly taken the helm of the tempest-tossed financial state bark, and steered it brilliantly through the storms and rocks and shoals and quicksands of these most critical

times to the secure harbour of success. But advancing age and infirmities had since then somewhat dimmed the clear sight of the experienced old helmsman, and his hand retained no longer the same firm grasp upon the tiller as of old.

But as has always been Prussia's good fortune, *uno avulso, non deficit alter*. At the perilous juncture, in the fall of the year 1869, another still greater financier was ready to take the helm of the exchequer from Heydt's relaxing grasp.

Otto von Camphausen was born on the 21st of October, 1812, at Hünshoven, in the district of Aix-la-Chapelle. As his family ranked among the wealthiest people in Rhineland, he could follow the bent of his own inclination in the choice of his future career in life. Two elder brothers of his having taken to mercantile and financial pursuits, and founded in 1825 a great banking business at Cologne, under the style of A. and L. Camphausen, young Otto elected to devote himself to the study of law and of political economy in all its branches, extending his course of reading also to history, philosophy, and art.

Although the great wealth of his family might have exempted him from all thought of ever having to turn his university pursuit to practical account for getting a living, he worked at his studies even harder than many of the poorest students. The result was that he passed a most brilliant examination.

He made it speedily manifest also that he purposed to devote the exercise of his talents to the service of his country. Soon after passing his examination, in the autumn of 1834, he took his station on the lowest rung of the bureaucratic ladder in the general government department of the state at Cologne, where he remained about three years.

His brother Ludolf, his senior by nearly ten years, one of the chief partners in the great banking house of A. and L. Camphausen at Cologne, induced Otto to turn his special attention to the serious consideration of questions connected with trade, commerce, and industry.

In 1837 young Otto Camphausen was transferred to Magdeburg, where he remained nearly three years in the capacity of assessor. He then entered the Ministry of Finance for a short time, as assistant in the treasury department. In December, 1840, he was sent to the government board at Coblenz, whence he was in February, 1842, transferred to Treves. In 1844, he was raised to the rank of councillor, and attached to the Ministry of Finance at Berlin. The year after, in 1845, at the early age of thirty-three, he was made Privy Councillor of Finance.

As he showed himself gifted with remarkably quick comprehension of the most difficult and knotty questions in the domain of political economy, and with equally remarkable power of lucid exposition, the draft of the important law respecting the in-

introduction of an income tax into the Prussian monarchy was confided to his care. Both the project of law submitted by him to the first united Prussian Diet of 1847, and the explanatory and elucidatory memoir accompanying the draft, were perfect models of clearness.

In 1848 his elder brother, Ludolf Camphausen, stepped suddenly, *per saltum*, from his banker's desk at Cologne to the presidential chair of the Ministry of State at Berlin, being called by King Frederick William IV. to succeed Count Arnim-Boitzenburg as prime minister, on the 29th of March. Ludolf availed himself largely of his younger brother's splendid business talents, and the two might, indeed, have succeeded at the time in tiding over this most critical epoch in the constitutional history of the land, had they not had to encounter the deep insincerity of the monarch on the one side, and the (very excusable) profound distrust of the Radical and Progressist majority of the Assembly on the other side.

Both Ludolf and Otto Camphausen were moderate Liberals—too honestly Liberal to suit the views of the king and of the reactionary feudal clique around him, and too honestly Conservative for the impatience of the men of progress. Less than three short months sufficed to convince Ludolf Camphausen of this fact, and already on the 20th of June he tendered his resignation to the king.

One month after, at the end of July, 1848, Ludolf Camphausen was sent as Prussian representative to the new German central power at Frankfort-on-the-Main. Here he remained till April, 1849, when he finally resigned, and went back to his banking business at Cologne, a wiser and a sadder man, thoroughly disenchanted of the alluring illusions of power and office.

Otto Camphausen was a member of the Second Prussian Chamber from 1849 to 1852. He was also elected to the Erfurt Parliament in 1850. He distinguished himself greatly as reporter on financial and politico-economical questions. A moderate Liberal in politics, he kept also in his views and opinions on trade and commerce the right middle between the two extremes of prohibitive protection and absolute and unrestricted free trade.

In 1854 Otto Camphausen exchanged the active state service for the quasi-independent, highly important, and influential position of president of the Seehandlung, or institute of maritime commerce, in which he succeeded Baron Rother, late minister of state.

A bachelor, and possessor of a very large private fortune, not to mention the rich emoluments of his high office, President Camphausen could now freely indulge in the gratification of his social and artistic tastes, and also in the exercise of a wise and truly benevolent philanthropy, devoting large sums

annually to the encouragement of literature and art, and to the support of charitable institutions.

But in the fall of 1869 he had to quit this happy, easy life at the call of duty. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Baron von der Heydt, had failed to grapple successfully with the financial embarrassments of the state treasury, and had thereupon tendered his resignation. Bismarck asked Camphausen to take the vacant seat in the Prussian cabinet.

A few days after his installation in office, the new Chancellor of the Exchequer appeared before the Second Chamber with the welcome announcement that he withdrew his predecessor's proposal of an increase of the direct taxes, deeming it the more expedient course to cover the deficit of £800,000 out of the fund annually devoted to the reduction of the national debt.

He made a provisional declaration on this occasion, that, in his opinion, a wise financial policy should strive to give the government of the state a wider latitude of action in its measures and operations for the reduction of the national debt. He could not see the wisdom of paying off annually some £1,200,000 to £1,500,000, at the very time when the necessities of the state might actually require the raising of new loans, most likely upon more onerous terms than those of the existing old debt. The state should, on the contrary, have the free choice of devoting in good years larger, in bad years smaller

sums, even down to nothing, to the reduction of the debt. The rights and privileges of the state creditors need not be infringed upon in this proceeding.

A few days after, at the sitting of the 4th of November, 1869, the minister further illustrated his views upon this highly important question. He explained how the creditors of the state might, by the offer of a premium, be easily prevailed upon to consent to the conversion of the whole of the old $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. and 4 per cent. state debt of the old provinces of Prussia into a consolidated funded debt paying the holders $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. interest per annum. This would leave the state at full liberty to devote any available funds to the purchase of consols, thereby reducing the national debt in the simplest manner, whilst it would free the government from the onerous obligation of paying back a stipulated fixed sum every year. In this sense Camphausen drew up a series of resolutions, which the Parliament subsequently adopted. So soon as he had thus freedom of action given him, he set vigorously and skilfully to work, and speedily effected the proposed conversion and funding of the debt with brilliant success.

Camphausen's administration of the finances of the country was equally successful in all other respects. In the most important question of the revenue, the Prussian Chancellor of the Exchequer advocates the healthy development of the system

of indirect taxation, and he is the most uncompromising opponent of all attacks levelled against the fundamental principles of that system.

He is also an advocate of a moderate increase of the tax upon coffee and similar articles of consumption which cannot properly be regarded in the light of indispensable necessities of life. On the other hand he would free all raw materials, &c., required for the purposes of industry as much as possible from the trammels of taxation.

Camphausen's management of the Prussian exchequer has been most brilliantly successful ever since he came into office. In 1870, more especially, he repeated, more grandly still, Heydt's great achievement of 1866, by his financial skill and wise statesmanship enabling the treasury to bear without embarrassment the immense burden of the war. Since then he has made his appearance before the Prussian Parliament year after year with a glorious budget showing a large surplus, in lieu of the sad deficits of old.

Camphausen is also one of the leading Prussian members of the German Federal Council, and Vice-President of the Prussian ministry, and he may be said to be practically one of the Vice-Chancellors of the German empire, Delbrück being the other. As a signal mark of his high consideration, the emperor has bestowed upon him the Order of the Red Eagle of the first class.

BISMARCK'S STAFF.

IN his titanic task of reconstructing the political system of Prussia and Germany—and of Europe—Bismarck has been most efficiently seconded throughout by a body of able men, such as it has perhaps never before in the world's history been the good fortune of empire or kingdom to possess for state servants, conjointly at one and the same period of time.

Among the most eminent of this body, which may truly be called the staff of the great leader Bismarck, rank Bülow, Thile, Abeken, Ægidi, the two Philipsborns, Keudell, Hatzfeld, Michaelis, and, most especially, Delbrück and Lothar Bucher. All these and many more of the same exalted order of intellect have largely shared in the making of the new German empire. Brief memoirs of the two last named, by way of general illustration of the class, may therefore well be permitted to find a small corner here.

XXI.

PRESIDENT DELBRÜCK.

“Des inneren Gefüges Roon,
Ein treuer, starker Arbeitsheld,
Ob auch von seinem stillen Thun
Man wenig hört nur in der Welt.”

(Which may be briefly paraphrased :—The “Roon” of the empire’s inner structure ; a valiant, indefatigable worker, albeit the trumpet of fame may not loudly sound the praises of his silent achievements.)

MARTIN FREDERICK RUDOLF DELBRÜCK, now Prussian minister of state, and President of the German Imperial Chancellery Office, was born in Berlin in 1817. His father, John Frederick Gottlob (*i.e.* Praise God) Delbrück, who died in 1830, at Zeitz, as pastor and superintendent, had been for nine years, from 1800 to 1809, tutor to the two eldest princes of the royal house of Prussia, the Crown Prince, afterwards King Frederick William IV., and Prince William, the present German emperor. The two princes always bore their first teacher in grateful remembrance, bestowing many signal favours upon the son.

Young Delbrück lost his mother when he was barely six, and his father when he had only just attained the age of thirteen. Fortunately, Pastor

Delbrück, ere he died, had himself thoroughly grounded his son in all the branches of a sound practical preparatory education, so that the boy of thirteen was a marvel of solid learning and extensive knowledge.

After attending the excellent gymnasium of Halle for about three years longer, young Delbrück, at the exceptionally early age of scarce sixteen, entered upon the study of law and political economy, first at Bonn, then at Göttingen, and lastly at Berlin, where he also served his year as a volunteer in the army, along with his most intimate friend, young Philipsborn, who was afterwards for many years Postmaster General of Prussia, until he was at length succeeded, some four years ago, by Stephan, the actual Postmaster-General of the German empire.

At the age of twenty, Delbrück passed his first law examination, when he was attached as auscultator (the initiatory step on the law-ladder in the Prussian state service) to the county and city court of Halle. Two years after, in 1839, he was transferred to the administrative branch, and sent to Merseburg, where he remained two years, working his hardest to acquire a thorough practical mastery of the business and routine in every department of the administration accessible to the ardent young official, and adding largely to his store of political, economic, and financial knowledge.

One of the most gratifying results of his ardent

and intelligent labour at this important period of his life was that, when he presented himself, in 1842, to pass the second, higher state examination, he both surprised and enchanted his examiners, as much by his manifest sagacity and penetration, as by the extent and soundness of his lore, more especially in the vast domain of political economy.

The first consequence of his brilliant success was his immediate transfer from his subordinate position at Merseburg to a much more important office in the general revenue department of the Ministry of Finance at Berlin. Here he had the good fortune to find himself placed under the immediate guidance and tuition of one of the soundest administrative officials in the Prussian service, Privy-Councillor Kühne, whom he took for his model in his own official career.

A year after, in 1843, Delbrück was promoted to a higher position in another branch of the exchequer—the section for trade and commerce, to wit—which was then presided over by Privy-Councillor Beuth, another great administrator of the time, and the actual founder of the commercial policy of Prussia. Beuth was a man of singularly wide, liberal, and advanced views in political economy, who, although himself too much trammelled and confined then by the old pig-tail element rampant under the feeble-minded King Frederick William IV. to give full practical expression and effect to his own enlightened conceptions,

yet did implant in the mind of his favourite pupil and follower, Delbrück, the seed which has borne such excellent fruit since, in giving freedom of expansion and motion to trade and industry in Germany.

In 1844 Delbrück was transferred to the new Board of Trade, then first constituted in Prussia under the direction of Privy-Counciller Rönne, another man of liberal views and high administrative capacity.

Four years after, in March, 1848, Delbrück, though only thirty-one years old then, was appointed a ministerial director in the Camphausen ministry, and, after the retirement of the latter, chief of the newly-created Ministry of Commerce, with the rank and title of an actual privy superior councillor of government—a splendid position to be achieved by one comparatively so young, and after only eleven years of office, and certainly one of the rarest instances on record of most exceptionally rapid promotion in the Prussian state service.

Although still sadly fettered and restrained in his freedom of action by the unpropitious conditions of the heavy times through which Prussia was then passing, Delbrück, in his new, comparatively independent, and highly influential position, strove, notwithstanding, to the best of his ability and power, and with marked success, to give to the commercial policy of Prussia, confided to his guidance, the impulse of his own enlightened views and liberal aspirations.

In 1851 the clouds of a great peril were gathering

over Prussia. Austria, not satisfied with having imposed upon her hated rival the moral degradation of Olmütz, sought also to inflict upon the Prussian exchequer a heavy material loss.

The Austrian minister, Bruck, suddenly proposed the accession of the entire Austrian monarchy to the German Customs Union (*Zollverein*), of which Prussia was the ostensible head and leader. Now, the Austrian crown lands might safely be calculated to consume a very small proportion only of goods liable to duty, whilst the total proceeds of the duties raised in all the lands of the Union were, according to this pretty Austrian scheme, to be distributed among the members of the Union in proportion to the number of inhabitants in the several countries—which of course would give Austria just the one clear half of the total revenue!

Even leaving out of consideration the enormous accession of political power Austria must necessarily derive from being placed at the head of a customs association numbering some 70,000,000 souls, it was not likely that Prussia, even under the baneful influences then swaying her destiny, should consent to submit quietly to the heavy sacrifice of money involved in the proposal.

So Delbrück found it comparatively easy to decline the proffered honour of Austria's accession to the *Zollverein*. And, most likely, Bruck had never even dreamt of a possible success of his arrogant scheme

but had simply put it forward by way of introduction to a much more insidious and dangerous proposal which followed soon after—the offer, to wit, of a treaty of commerce with Prussia and the Zollverein. The offer was clogged simply with the trifling proviso that the Zollverein should renounce the right of making alterations in the tariff without the express consent and sanction of Austria!

As the South German states of the Zollverein had been gained over to Austria's views, Delbrück found himself placed in a most ticklish position. However, he skilfully temporized to gain a little time, which he turned to the best account by opening secret negotiations with the *Steuerverein*, a Customs Union then existing between Hanover, Oldenburg, and Lippe, which lay just like a wedge between the eastern and western provinces of Prussia.

His untiring energy and consummate skill carried the day, and in September, 1851, Hanover, Oldenburg, and Lippe acceded to the Prussian Zollverein. The territorial extension of the Union thus gained in the north left it no longer a matter of primary and paramount importance to retain the South German states *à tout prix*, and Prussia saw herself accordingly placed in a position to leave to the recalcitrants the alternative of consenting to the renewal of the treaty with her, or submitting to be cut off entirely from the sea-shore.

They preferred, of course, to do the former, and

Delbrück had the satisfaction of concluding at Berlin, on the 4th of April, 1853, a new treaty for twelve years embracing all the states of the Union.

Soon after this great achievement, Delbrück, moving resolutely onward in the path of commercial reform and progress, concluded a treaty of commerce with France, which placed the Zollverein on the same trade footing in that country as England and Belgium.

In 1862 the renewed machinations and intrigues of Austria again gravely imperilled the continued existence of the Prussian Zollverein.

On the 29th of March of that year Delbrück had signed the draft of a new commercial treaty with France, and Austria was now using her most malignant efforts to procure the rejection of this treaty by the South German states, and the ultimate secession of the latter from the Prussian Customs Union. Misled by Austria's evil counsels, and misguided in a great measure by their blind political enmity to the great North German kingdom, the South German states showed themselves more than half disposed to break up the Union, to the sacrifice even of their own interests.

But Delbrück, finding himself now most efficiently supported and upheld in his commercial policy by the new Prussian premier, Bismarck, who had definitively taken the helm of the state on the 9th of October, 1862, battled vigorously and victoriously against the crafty machinations of Austria, and the patent ill-will

of the South German states. In his efforts to overcome the malevolent opposition of these latter, he received most valuable aid at the hands of the late King John of Saxony, who, disregarding alike the solicitations and promptings of the pro-Austrian court and *camarilla* petticoat clique around him, and the wily counsels of Beust, declared for the renewal of the Prussian Customs Union and the ratification of the new Franco-Prussian treaty of commerce.

So Delbrück in the end victoriously overcame all obstacles thrown in the way of the ratification of the treaty by all the states of the Union, which was accomplished on the 12th of October, 1864.

In the course of the same year he negotiated a treaty of commerce with Austria, and three years later, after successful negotiations with England and Belgium, he concluded a treaty of commerce with Italy, on the 31st of August, 1865.

But, whilst thus brilliantly successful in his efforts to consolidate the Zollverein, and to improve its external relations, Delbrück found that he could make but scant progress in another at least equally important direction—to wit, the improvement of the inner rules and regulations, and the tariff arrangements of the Union, as he had constantly and invariably to meet on this field the most stubborn opposition on the part of the ministers of the several governments constituting the Union, who were full of individual whims and prejudices in commercial

and financial matters and politico-economic questions, and most uncompromising and unyielding in the assertion of their own opinions.

However, when the great events of 1866 had incalculably increased the power and influence of Prussia, Delbrück at once seized the favourable opportunity to strengthen his own hands in the councils of the Union, by proposing to summon a Customs Parliament, to give the people in the several states an equal share with their governments in the deliberations and resolutions of the general council.

Delbrück's demand was acceded to by the other members of the Union, and a new treaty was concluded at Berlin on the 8th of July, 1867, which vested the direction of the affairs of the Zollverein jointly in the Customs Federal Council and the Customs Parliament.

The beneficial results of this great step in advance soon became manifest in more than one direction. Delbrück, powerfully supported now by the Customs Parliament, naturally so much better able than a conclave of narrow-viewed, prejudiced officials could possibly be expected to be to justly appreciate the practical chief's wise measures, found it no longer impracticable to give the fullest effect to his own enlightened views and aspirations.

On the 11th of August, 1867, Delbrück was named President of the Chancellery Office of the North German Confederation. This office was created to conduct

the affairs of the new North German Confederation under the supreme guidance of the Federal chancellor, who took upon himself the sole and undivided responsibility of the office.

Bismarck, who has barely ever yet blundered in the choice of the fittest instruments for his purpose (not even excepting Arnim, who, moreover, was not his own uncontrolled choice), hit upon Delbrück as the best man for the new office, and the event has since amply proved the sagacity of the selection. Delbrück's advanced Liberal views on political and economic questions, his enlightened mind and clear, practical intellect, his vast knowledge and extensive acquirements, his immense business capacity and marvellous power of working, found the freest scope now for the most beneficial exercise.

Delbrück, in his capacity as Chief of the Federal Chancellery, had to act also as the representative of the chancellor at the Diet and in the ministerial cabinet, and in the discussion and determination of all questions relating to the chancellor's German policy and the promotion of the chancellor's own views. Indeed, President Delbrück, who was named also Prussian minister of state, to enable him to maintain undisturbed the indispensable harmonious action between the Federal and the Prussian government, might well be called Bismarck's own special minister.

In this highly important position, Delbrück

speedily found the welcome opportunity also of displaying another of his great statesmanlike qualities ; he revealed himself as an accomplished parliamentary speaker and excellent debater. There is no dazzling ornamentation, no flagree work, about his speeches in Parliament ; they always go straight to the point, as they are succinct, clear expositions of what the speaker has to say and intends to convey to the hearer's mind and understanding.

Among Delbrück's most brilliant oratorical successes may be mentioned, more particularly, the great speech delivered by him on the 5th of December, 1870, in which he reported on the treaties concerning the accession of the South German states to the Federation, lucidly explaining the origin and nature of these treaties, and expressing his fervent hope to see accomplished at length the political union of the great German Fatherland.

Upon the establishment of the new German empire, Delbrück at once assumed the function of President of the new Imperial Chancellery office, which he retains to the present day.

When, in the spring of 1871, the great dotation question was submitted to the new German Parliament, the House voted an amendment, proposed by the committee with the assent of the government, sanctioning the grant of dotations also to German statesmen who had prominently contributed to the creation of the new empire. It was universally felt at the time that

Delbrück's name ought to stand first and foremost on the list.

Field-Marshal Blücher reposed the most unbounded confidence in his chief of the staff, General Gneisenau, and had the most implicit faith in his universal knowledge and the infinite versatility of his talents. It is said that when the university of Oxford, on the occasion of Blücher's visit to England, presented to him the doctorate of laws, the old marshal, in whose mind all doctors were indissolubly connected with physic, would only consent to accept the proffered honour on condition that Gneisenau should be appointed his dispensing apothecary. The good old man, who was conscientious in his way, and naturally misdoubted his own skill in the leech line, trusted that Gneisenau would safely see him through all difficulties that might attend the exercise of the new profession so unexpectedly thrust upon him.

Bismarck is in the habit of calling Delbrück his "Gneisenau." It would certainly be impossible to show a higher appreciation of the great president and his eminent services.

XXII.

LOTHAR BUCHER.

LOTHAR BUCHER, Actual Privy Councillor of Legation, and Councillor Reporter in the Prussian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is universally and rightly believed to be Bismarck's most intimate and most trusted adviser. He is a man of vast capacity and extensive acquirements, and, next to Delbrück, the hardest worker in Germany.

Lothar Bucher was born on the 25th of October, 1817, at Neustettin, where his father was professor at the Hedwig gymnasium. In 1821, Professor Bucher was transferred to the gymnasium at Köslin, in Pomerania, where his son received accordingly his preparatory education. Gifted with quick apprehension and a retentive memory, the boy distinguished himself greatly at school, and advanced rapidly through the several classes and forms of the gymnasium, until, at the age of eighteen, in 1835, he passed a brilliant examination of fitness for higher university studies.

He was sent to Berlin, where he devoted himself to the very hardest and most persevering study of the law, cultivating also, with ardent zeal, the philosophy of Hegel.

In the autumn of 1838 he passed his first law examination, and was soon after appointed auscultator at the upper provincial court at Köslin. Some five years after, he was appointed to an assessorship, and, about midsummer 1843 he was sent to Stolp, where he was attached to the provincial and city court, and had also intrusted to him the administration of justice in several so-called patrimonial courts, or manor courts.

In the latter capacity, more especially, he obtained a clear insight into the actual condition of the farmers, the peasantry, and the cultivators of the soil, and the many glaring abuses which the old feudal system still flourishing there made the unhappy land under its sway endure. Bucher, a man of vast, kindly sympathies, soon took a generous dislike to the objectionable state of things he found existing in his justiciary district; so he naturally became a reformer.

A small provincial town in Pomerania is not exactly the place where one may expect to find great literary and scientific treasures and resources. Now, there are some exceptionally rich intellectual natures that find it next to impossible to give their faculties even an instant's absolute repose. There is a noble lord living now, an ex-chancellor, one of England's most eminent legislators, and one of the kindest and best of men, who could not abstain from active mental work even during the few brief minutes of

his daily shaving, but must turn them to profitable account by committing to memory, among other things, the whole of Milton's immortal epic.

Bucher belongs to the same high category of men. With his immense capacity for work and his insatiable craving for intellectual occupation, he, happening to come across "Rotteck and Welcker's State Lexicon," took the curious notion into his head to go through the bulky work from the first line to the last.

The radical constitutionalism and the constitutional radicalism of this famous production of the two Liberal professors exercised a decisive influence upon his mind, made specially receptive for this kind of teaching by the very large dose of Hegelian philosophy which had been administered to it whilst Bucher was pursuing his studies at the university of Berlin. His political ideas were thus naturally directed into an ultra-radical channel.

No wonder then that when, in the spring of 1848, the town and district of Stolp elected him their representative at the new National Assembly at Berlin, he should take at once a leading position among the most advanced radical reformers. In November, 1848, he joined in the revolutionary refusal of the Assembly to grant the crown the right of levying taxes.

After the dissolution of the National Assembly, Bucher was, in the spring of 1849, elected by his

former constituents a member of the Second Prussian Chamber. Here he added to his old sins and offences against the now all-powerful royal and feudal reactionary party, his stinging report on the motion declaring illegal the royal decree which placed Berlin in a state of siege.

In 1850 the reaction thought fit to arraign Bucher and some forty other leaders in the old tax-refusal movement of November, 1848, before the public tribunals. Bucher was aware that he was the principal accused in the matter, the other forty being drawn in simply for decency's sake, that the proceeding might not look too monstrous. He also knew that at that particular juncture, and under the peculiar circumstances of the case, there was really no chance of an acquittal, and that his state career in Prussia might fairly be considered at an end, even should he abide the almost certain condemnation, and submit to his sentence without murmuring.

He resolved, therefore, to withdraw himself from the power of his enemies. Whilst the jury empanelled to try him had retired to deliberate upon their verdict, he cunningly gave the police officer set to guard him the slip, and made his escape to England.

It would seem to have been his intention at first to try for a position at the English bar. A brief sojourn in London sufficed to open his eyes to the fact, that the realization of this intention would take him long years. So, as he had to work for his living,

he preferred becoming a member of the fourth estate. For some ten years he supplied certain leading newspapers in Germany with a series of brilliant articles. His contributions to the Berlin *National Zeitung*, more especially, attracted general attention through the soundness of the information given in them as much as through the lucid style in which they were written.

But Bucher was always a man of very clear mind. In London he had most excellent opportunities afforded him of becoming intimately acquainted with the history of the British constitution, and of studying the apparently so complicated, yet in reality so beautifully simple, wheelwork of that marvellous growth and maturation of ages. His eyes soon opened to the real value of the doctrines imbibed by him out of the pages of Rotteck and Welcker, and conned over in his former intercourse with the ultra radicals of the whilom famous National Assembly at Berlin.

Bucher was also always a most sincere man. It would have been impossible for him to conceal the gradual change in his political views from the German papers to whom he was sending contributions from London. This gave rise to dissensions between him and these journals, and led, among other things, to a long-protracted polemical discussion between him and the Berlin *National Zeitung*, then the uncompromising organ of the most advanced Liberal section in politics and political economy in Prussia.

The quarrel was slightly envenomed by certain heretical deviations of Bucher's from his former professions of pure faith in the doctrines of absolute free trade.

Still, these polemics notwithstanding, Bucher continued to contribute articles to most of the papers with which he was connected at this time. In 1856 Bucher went to Paris, where he remained till the close of the first Paris International Exhibition, as reporter and correspondent for several leading papers in Germany.

During his residence in London, Bucher had come into contact with a multitude of Englishmen; also with a great many political refugees from other countries than Germany. He had intimately known Joseph Mazzini, Ledru Rollin, Kossuth, Louis Blanc, Garrido, and many other non-German exiles from the land of their birth, and he found the whole batch of them intensely national, and every one of them most warmly enthusiastic for the special people to whom he happened to belong. The German refugees alone seemed to constitute an exception from this general rule of particularism, and to wish to embrace the whole world within the wide range and reach of their universal sympathies.

From his experience of men and things in this line, clear-headed Lothar Bucher had already in London drawn the great lesson for himself, that it behoves a sensible practical man to restrict his patriotic mani-

festations and aspirations in the first place rather to his own particular country and nation, and more especially not to indulge overmuch in the bubble of so-called "nationalities." His Paris experience confirmed him thoroughly in his new opinion on this matter. No wonder, then, that he now dropped absolutely the hollow, sentimental, and thoroughly anti-historic theories anent the rights of every small nation, race, and tribe, to keep up an arbitrary independent existence within the great conglomeration to which it might happen to belong.

This extraordinary doctrine was much advocated at the time in Germany. Bucher boldly maintained, on the contrary, that the great German people, who had actually bestowed upon certain alien races and tribes settled in Germany all the blessings of civilization enjoyed by them, had also an indefeasible right to exert a preponderating political influence over them.

Now this doctrine of Bucher's went right against the grain of the German Liberals, and Bucher, who had meanwhile returned to Berlin in consequence of the general amnesty proclaimed by King William, found himself very soon at loggerheads with his former political associates and friends.

Still he continued his contributions to the *National Zeitung* for about a twelvemonth longer, after which he tried to obtain employment in the *Berlin Telegraph* administration.

Conscious of the extent and soundness of his legal attainments, he made up his mind at last to apply for his reinstatement into the law service of the state, his intention being at the time to qualify himself for the position of a barrister or pleader before the courts of law.

A friend of Lothar Bucher's undertook to sound Bismarck about this. Now the great minister had been peculiarly struck with the sound sense and marvellous logic of Bucher's articles, more especially in the *National Zeitung*. He, with his sharp sight and clear insight, reckoned up the man who had penned these articles, and divined the great spirit in him, kindred to his own.

So he sent word to Lothar Bucher that, if he would consent to pass a period of probation in the service of the Foreign Office, it was his (Bismarck's) opinion that he would do much better there than in the law career.

Bucher eagerly accepted the opening thus offered to him, and entered the Foreign Office in December, 1864. Of course, he very soon made his mark. A man of such transcendent abilities, and such enormous working capacity, could not possibly have failed in securing a firm footing within the briefest possible period of time. The year after, already, in 1865, he was raised to the rank of Councillor of Legation, and definitively appointed to a high position in the Foreign Office.

In December, 1866, he acted as recorder of the minutes at the conference of the plenipotentiaries charged to draw up the constitution of the North German Federation; and in 1867 he was appointed Actual Privy Councillor of Legation and Councillor Reporter in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—which may fairly be instanced as an almost unheard-of rapidity of promotion in one of the most difficult departments of the state service in Prussia.

Bismarck, who by this time fully knew the immense value of such a man as Lothar Bucher, made it a point to have the brilliant councillor always as much as possible in his own immediate vicinity. Thus, in 1869, Lothar Bucher was full five months with Bismarck at Varzin, and in 1870 he was again at Varzin, with the chancellor, from May up to the outbreak of the war with France, on both occasions taking a vast amount of hard work off the chancellor's shoulders.

When Bismarck left for France, Bucher remained behind, intrusted with the management of the most intimate affairs of the Foreign Office. But even in September already, when Councillor Abeken was seized with his fatal illness, Bismarck sent for Bucher to replace this trusty counsellor and aid near his person.

Bucher joined the Chancellor of the North German Confederation at Ferrières, and remained thence-

forward with him up to the conclusion of peace, giving the chancellor the most valuable aid of his brilliant talents, and his marvellously sound political knowledge and clear insight into the innermost nature of affairs.

In March, 1871, again, Lothar Bucher attended Bismarck at the final conference of Frankfort-on-the-Main, which terminated so smoothly in the conclusion of the definitive peace between Germany and France on the 10th of May, 1871.

Three years and a half have passed since then, and Lothar Bucher still retains his position and influence with the great chancellor. Strange to say, perhaps, these two men, starting from diametrically opposite extremes in political life, seem to have met exactly half-way on their course, Bismarck having dropped by the way all his spurious, declamatory ultra-royalism and Junkerdom, and Lothar Bucher having rid himself of the fearful encumbrance of Hegel, Rotteck, and Welcker, and of all the other ultra-radical impediments of his hot youth.

There are but too many political pretenders in Germany coveting the inheritance of the great Bismarck. Most of these ambitious aspirants are the veriest pigmies—very clever men, no doubt—aye, almost as clever as Harry Arnim; for all that, lacking the least approach to the great chancellor's genius. Lothar Bucher has more of Bismarck in

his composition than all the Savignys and Arnims, and the other still smaller cattle that would follow in their wake, and whom the eminent Berlin correspondents of certain London papers are so foolishly bent upon parading daily in their Berlin letters.

SPECIAL ARMS AND VICTUALLING DEPARTMENTS.

“ Die Kruppische Kanone,
Des Dreyse sein Gewehr,
Die waren gar nicht ohne,
Die Erbswurst auch half sehr.”

—KUTSCHKE'S *Soldatenlied*.

(Krupp's cannon and Dreyse's needle-gun were by no means unimportant adjuncts, and the pea-sausage also contributed largely to the great success.)

IN all wars, from the earliest antiquity, the quality of the weapons of the combatants has formed a most important item of consideration in the calculation of the chances of success. In modern warfare, when arms of precision play so preponderating a part, the condition of the general and special armaments of the troops must necessarily fall with double weight into the scale.

The living machines of war that had come forth from the skilful hands of the Roons, the Albrechts, the

Hindersins, the Hollebens, and many others of the same high capacity of organization, were unquestionably of the most admirable make and the fullest efficiency. Yet, suppose they had had to take the field with the old percussion gun and the venerable smooth-bore, muzzle-loading, bronze cannon of the past, surely their chances of success would have been much less promising than the perfection of their armament actually made them.

The ingenious inventors and makers of this armament may therefore well be permitted to bring up the rear here, at least, of the German notabilities of the present day.

XXIII.

DREYSE.

JOHN NICHOLAS DREYSE was born on the 20th of November, 1787, at Sömmerda, a small township in the Erfurt district. His father, John Christian Dreyse, was a master locksmith, pretty well to do for a man in his position. From his seventh to his fourteenth year Nicholas went to the city school of Sömmerda, where he received a sound primary education. Being naturally fond of mechanics, he took to his father's trade from choice. At the age of fourteen he became an apprentice in his father's workshop.

He had soon completely mastered the elements of the craft, and agreeably surprised his father by his manual dexterity, as well as by the happy ingenuity of his improvements in locks and other articles in his line of business.

When his apprenticeship was over, young Nicholas, after the universal manner of German workmen of the period, went forth to wander into the world in search of work, and to acquire a more extensive and perfect knowledge of his craft. This was in 1806.

On his wanderings he happened to come upon the great slaughter field of Jena, on the 15th of October, the very day after the battle which had laid Prussia in the dust. He was then a youth of nineteen. The awful sight of heaps of dead bodies all around made a very powerful and most sad impression upon his young mind, the sadder, as he was a youth of ardent patriotism. He took up from the ground a Prussian gun, of the venerable old Brown Bess type, and examined it with the eye of a skilful mechanist. He found it sadly wanting in everything required to constitute an effective arm. Whenever he related the story afterwards, he used always to add that this Prussian gun seemed to him at the time to have been expressly made with a view of shooting round the corner. It was the worst article of the kind then in existence.

Here, on this field of death, the first thought came

into his mind, to improve the mechanism of the Prussian fire-arms. Soon after, he had occasion to see a French infantry gun of the so-called pattern of 1779, which was then the most perfect of its kind in the world.

He now worked at his trade for three years at Altenburg, Dresden, and some other places in Germany, striving more particularly, and whenever the opportunity offered, to improve his knowledge and skill in the construction of fire-arms. He was always trying one improvement or other, but with only indifferent success, as the French 1779 pattern seemed to him then the most perfect model.

In 1809 he was at last enabled to gratify the most ardent wish of his heart—to go to France, which at the time enjoyed the deserved reputation that the most ingenious and skilled locksmiths, and the best makers of fire-arms in the world, were to be found there.

Soon after his arrival in Paris he had the good fortune to obtain employment in the famous gun-factory of the Swiss officer Pauli, then under the special patronage of the Emperor Napoleon I. Pauli took a great liking to young Dreyse, whom he found a most excellent craftsman and an indefatigable worker. He confided to him that the Emperor had asked him to try to construct a *breech-loading* gun. This notion, which Napoleon might possibly have taken from the toy-guns of children, or from having

accidentally come across some of the breech-loading cannons that would seem to have been in partial use about the year 1770, flashed upon Dreyse's mind as a complete revelation. He knew now at once where he had to direct his attention first in his intended construction of an improved infantry gun.

Pauli succeeded, after infinite labour, in producing a breech-loading gun, but of such complicated construction that it required most skilful handling to use it with proper effect, and was entirely unsuited to the common run of soldiers. Napoleon was so pleased, nevertheless, that he bestowed upon the inventor a gift of 800*l.* and the Cross of the Legion of Honour. However, Pauli felt so discouraged by his comparative failure, that he gave up the breech-loading notion altogether.

Not so Dreyse, who was of a most persevering turn of mind. All the time he remained in France, up to 1814, he turned every spare hour to the best account in thinking of what had now become the all-absorbing object of his life—the construction of a simple breech-loading gun that might be handled and used effectively by any private soldier.

In 1814 he returned to Sömmerda, to his father's workshop.

In 1821 he married, and established soon after, in partnership with a merchant of the name of Kronbiegel, a factory for the making of iron nails, buttons, and other articles in the so-called cold way, by

machinery. After Kronbiegel's death, a Mr. Collenbusch joined Dreyse in the business, which continues in existence to the present day. Dreyse was the first in Germany to produce these machine-made articles.

Meanwhile the percussion-gun had been invented, in 1815, in England, and the percussion-caps also, though two Frenchmen, Pidat and Debonbert, have since then successfully claimed the latter invention for theirs. In 1822 the new invention found its way into Germany, where extensive experiments were at once instituted, more particularly in Prussia, with a view to substitute the new percussion lock for the old flint lock.

Dreyse naturally became at once one of the most eager and persevering experimenters on this field. He more especially brought all his technical knowledge to bear upon the preparation of igniting or exploding material for the discharge of percussion-guns. Aided by the chemical knowledge of a friend of his, Baudius, an apothecary in Sömmerda, he succeeded in turning fulminate of mercury to account for this purpose. In 1824 he established a factory of percussion-caps at Sömmerda, in partnership with Collenbusch. The Prussian government granted the firm a patent for the new caps. In the same year Dreyse also obtained a patent for his newly-invented "steam generator." For this patent he was indebted chiefly to the patronage of Privy Councillor Beuth.

After this, Dreyse turned his particular attention to devising the means of carrying into practical effect an old favourite notion of his, which had for its chief object to change the place of the igniting or exploding process from the outer to the inner part of the gun, and also the construction of a cartridge that should contain within itself the whole of the materials required for the charge of the gun.

After some three years' hard work, and many bitter disappointments, he succeeded at last, in 1827, in producing a percussion needle-gun—only a muzzle-loader, however.

He sent models of his new invention to the Prussian minister of war, who speedily informed him that the weapon had been found unfit for practical use in the army, and that he was at liberty to dispose of it elsewhere. He thereupon sent models to several other governments, also to the Austrian minister of war—who sent it back with contemptuous scorn, telling the presumptuous Prussian gunsmith that there was no lack of clever men in Austria! Had this conceited minister only been a wise man in his generation, and had he accordingly tried his hardest to secure the ingenious inventor for Austria! . . . many things might be different, perhaps, now from what they are, and even the great fact of the new German empire might still remain a bright dream in the pondering brains of German patriots!

The present Emperor of Germany, then Prince William, happening to be at Weimar in 1829, sent for Dreyse. The prince felt much interested in the new invention, and induced the Prussian minister of war to take the matter up anew.

From 1830 up to 1833, a series of experiments were made with Dreyse's gun by a commission of officers under the presidency of General Thiele and Colonel Neumann, the results of which led to the admission of Dreyse into the official service of the state, with a sufficient subvention to enable the man to devote himself entirely to the improvement of his invention.

The year 1835 saw the birth of the first *breech-loading* needle-gun. But, unhappily, Messrs. Redtape and Routine, if they have it not quite their own way in Prussia as much as in certain other lands, are yet not without most powerful influence whenever they choose to indulge in their favourite practice of throwing a wet blanket upon a new discovery or invention beyond the very limited comprehension of their own narrow brains. So it took the patient inventor some five years longer, and all the benevolent exertions in his favour of General Witzleben, Colonel Priem, and some other distinguished officers, to obtain at last the king's sanction for a final trial of the efficiency of the new arm. The trial commission was presided over by Prince Augustus of Prussia, who, as well as most of the other general officers,

was firmly convinced in his own mind that Dreyse's gun would fail practically, as the cartridges must of course explode of their own accord after the eighth or tenth discharge of the gun. These learned gentlemen were grievously disappointed. The new weapon stood the test most brilliantly.

It was only after this great success, in 1840, that King Frederick William IV. ordered 60,000 of Dreyse's guns, granting the inventor at the same time sufficient funds to establish a large needle-gun and ammunition factory.

On the 15th of October, 1841, just thirty-five years after the first idea had entered Dreyse's head to produce an efficient gun for the Prussian infantry, the new factory entered upon active work.

Up to 1863 it had supplied 300,000 needle-guns to the Prussian army.

In 1843 Nicholas Dreyse had conferred upon him the Order of the Red Eagle of the fourth class; in 1846 he was named a Councillor of Commission, and decorated with the Red Eagle of the third class.

He perseveringly continued his experiments in fire-arms, turning his attention successfully also to improvements in rifled cannon. Even the most cursory enumeration of his numerous inventions and improvements in fire-arms must be omitted here for want of space. .

In 1864 the war in Schleswig-Holstein afforded a grand opportunity for testing the excellence of

Dreyse's needle-gun. The new weapon stood the test admirably. King William was delighted with the result, and gratefully bestowed upon the ingenious inventor the Prussian Crown Order of the third class, and a patent of nobility for himself and his descendants.

The productive power of Dreyse's works at Sömmerda was considerably increased in the years 1864-65. In the latter year, more especially, the number of hands employed reached the high figure of 1,500.

Dreyse lived to witness the splendid success of his creation in the war of 1866. He died on the 9th of December, 1867, in the eighty-first year of his age. His gun-factory, and other works and establishments at Sömmerda, are now conducted by his only son and heir, Francis, who had already for long years had the technical direction of the works.

This gentleman, who was born on the 2nd of March, 1822, continues to conduct the paternal business with considerable skill and talent.

Since the Franco-German War of 1870-71, the needle-gun has been very considerably improved, as the old pattern had been found inferior in efficiency, range, and rapidity of firing to the French chassepot-gun. After many and most varied experiments, the supreme military authorities of the German empire have now finally decided to supply

the whole of the German army—with the exception of the Bavarians, who have a most excellent weapon already in the Werder gun—with a gun of a new pattern, made by a Württemberg gunsmith of the name of Mauser, who lives at Oberndorf. This new pattern is called the Mauser gun or rifle. This Mauser gun is said to be in every way vastly superior to the chassepot.

However, as the supply of so large a number as the arming of the immense German host requires must necessarily be a work of years, the old pattern needle-gun has meanwhile been altered and improved, to fit it for immediate service. This improved needle-gun is also said by competent judges to be superior to the chassepot of the French infantry.

Large numbers of the French chassepots which had fallen into the hands of the victors in the late war, have also been converted for provisional use in the German army. The carbine, for instance, with which the light cavalry and a portion of the lancers are armed now, is simply a shortened chassepot.

XXIV.

KRUPP.

ALFRED KRUPP was born at Essen, in the district of Düsseldorf, on the 12th of April, 1812. His father, Frederick Krupp, was the same as Dreyse's,

a locksmith and worker in steel, in a small way. This poor man had an inventive genius, overcast by the sad fate of incessant failure in all his efforts to improve the quality of the steel used by him for the manufacture of cutting instruments. He died in 1827, not yet forty, leaving his business, such as it was, to his son Alfred, then a boy of under fifteen.

At the time of Alfred's birth, Essen was a very small place; indeed, the entire estate of the old *Stift* (Chapter) of Essen, covering an area of some sixty-five to seventy English square miles in extent, had then only about 18,000 inhabitants at the most. Now the population has multiplied sevenfold, and the city of Essen is going on fast towards 60,000 souls!

This splendid development of the city and circle of Essen may fairly be said to be, in a very great measure at least, the result and natural concomitant of the extraordinary success of Alfred Krupp's great industrial undertaking there.

After the father's death the boy continued the business, aided by two workmen only. But whilst naught but failure had attended all Frederick Krupp's most earnest efforts, fortune smiled upon everything the son touched. And so it has come to pass, in the course of less than fifty years, that the humble workshop, which may be seen on the premises to the present day, has expanded into one of the most gigantic establishments in the world, covering an

area of more than an English square mile, and occupying 12,000 workmen !

Alfred Krupp's is the largest steel-casting establishment to be found anywhere. It numbers some 600 furnaces, and close upon 1,000 machines for the making of tools and implements alone. There are nigh upon a quarter of a million melting crucibles. Some 300 steam engines, from 1,000 horse-power down to 2 horse-power, and about 80 steam hammers, from 50 tons weight down to 2 cwt., are incessantly at work. The daily consumption of coal exceeds 1,700 tons.

Articles of cast steel are manufactured here of every kind, size, and weight, to the total amount of something like 80,000–100,000 tons a year.

The merest cursory description of such an establishment as Krupp's is of course altogether out of the question here ; nor can space be afforded for the slightest sketch of the man's career.

We must rest content, then, with merely stating that Alfred Krupp is a man of high intelligence, vast inventive genius, the most patient perseverance and endurance, and extraordinary working powers. He was the first to devise an efficient system of casting steel successfully in immense blocks and enormous masses, and remains even to the present day without a serious competitor in his line.

Alfred Krupp exhibited the first great cast-steel block of his manufacture in 1851, at London. This

block weighed $2\frac{1}{4}$ tons—a weight unheard of before. The largest block competing with Krupp's, which was sent to the Exhibition by a Sheffield firm, weighed only a ton. Eleven years after, in 1862, Krupp sent a block of 25 tons weight to the London Exhibition; and in 1867, he sent another to Paris, weighing 40 tons. It is said that solid masses of steel up to 200 tons weight and above can now be cast at Essen!

In 1847 Alfred Krupp first conceived the idea of casting cannon of steel. In 1851 he sent the first six-pounder cast in his factory to the great Exhibition at London. The article was not perfect, however, as it was cast in two pieces. In 1854 the first trial was made to test the power of resistance of “Krupp's infants.” They stood even some of the most unfair tests. In 1856 Krupp overcame the last difficulties in the way of producing steel breech-loaders cast in a single piece.

His first customer for steel cannon was the Viceroy of Egypt; Prussia and Russia soon after followed the example set them by the African ruler. Up to 1858, however, the business was rather slack, no more than 100 pieces of ordnance altogether being cast at the Essen works. During the seven years following, Krupp furnished close upon 3,000 cast-steel cannon of all sizes, some of them capable of throwing projectiles of a quarter of a ton weight.

In 1867 Krupp astonished the world by his giant

cannon exhibited at Paris, which was intended to throw projectiles of half a ton weight, with a charge of 1 cwt. of gunpowder.

Of late years the manufacture of cast-steel rifled breech-loading ordnance at the Essen establishment has taken still greater expansion.

That Krupp's cannon have vastly aided in achieving the great Prussian and German victories in the field is universally admitted. Their efficiency was brilliantly proved as early as 1864 in the Schleswig-Holstein campaign.

However, Alfred Krupp is thoroughly cosmopolitan and mercantile in the supply of these splendid engines of war—perhaps even beyond what might properly be deemed compatible with loyal allegiance to his own country, for he freely furnishes the prospective enemies of Germany with his rifled ordnance.

The King of Prussia has bestowed upon Krupp the title of Privy Councillor of Commerce. He also offered him a patent of nobility, which, however, the stiff-necked manufacturer declined accepting.

The Essen establishment pays in rates and taxes something like £24,000 a year. In the early part of the present year, Krupp wished to raise a loan of £1,500,000. In a few days the subscriptions to this loan exceeded £5,000,000 !

In conclusion, it remains now simply to briefly note that singularly important article of food so

largely used by the German commissariat in the war of 1870-71—the pea-sausage, to wit, and its ingenious compounder.

XXV.

GRÜNBERG.

THAT the purveying and victualling department must always claim a paramount share of attention and care on the part of the leaders of an army in the field, is so self-evident a proposition, that no proof or argument need be adduced here in support of it.

No apology can be needed, then, for just tagging to the memoirs of the inventor of the needle-gun and the cast-steel rifled cannon, a passing mention of the name of the man whose ingenuity and knowledge as a cook devised the preparation of a savoury, nutritious preserve for the German army in the field—Grünberg, a culinary artist of Berlin.

The pea-sausage, which he compounded, consists of pea-flour, best beef-suet, bacon (two parts of lean to one of fat), onions, salt, and spices. It is one of the most nutritious articles of food. Properly made, and fitted into paper cases specially prepared for the purpose, it will keep unchanged for years in airy places. For eating, it may either be cut into small cakes, and boiled with water into soup, or it may be boiled whole and eaten as a sausage.

The Prussian government made the inventor, Grünberg, a present of 10,000*l.*, and had a manufactory of the article built at Berlin, at the expense of the state. At first only about 14,000 lbs. of pea-sausage were daily produced at this establishment ; this was soon increased, however, up to ten times the quantity, 2,400 males and females being employed in the production of this large supply.

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